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ABSTRACT 
Aleksandra Rebeka: Role of Mental Representations and Experience in Decision Making 
and Acquisition of Knowledge 
(Under the direction of Richard A. Bettis) 
 
The dissertation addresses the question of how to deal with problems where perfect 
rationality principles do not hold and optimization is not possible. I study the role of mental 
representations and experience in identifying and evaluating alternative solutions. I argue that 
actors can use different sources of information to set up reference points, or constraints, to guide 
search for strategies and acquire knowledge about strategies’ usefulness to solve a problem. In a 
computational model, I find that an exogenous goal has a curvilinear effect on the acquisition of 
knowledge and long-term performance. When the goal is set too low, actors often believe that 
inferior strategies are useful and do not explore enough. When the goal is set too high, actors 
explore too much but do not develop more accurate beliefs. The effect of using a competitor’s 
performance as an additional source of information is highly contingent on the goal level. In a 
laboratory experiment, I further study effects of competitor’s performance and find that 
differences between treatment conditions are not consistent across levels of analysis. Although 
an addition of competitor’s performance seems to hurt the acquisition of knowledge about the 
problem structure and the odds of achieving a challenging goal, it does not hurt decision making 
and performance nor does it influence exploration in predicted ways. Supplementary analysis of 
experimental data suggests that individual differences in the understanding of the problem 
structure are the primary driver of performance heterogeneity; however, the importance of 
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experience in developing this understanding is not evident. I find that participants in the study 
engage in a high level of exploration regardless of information on competitor’s performance but 
very few of them actually improve their understanding during the course of the game. The 
participants’ response to feedback does not appear to be consistent with the theoretical 
framework that is based on a simple model of reinforcement learning. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A theory of the firm is fundamentally a theory of how decisions are made (Simon, 1947 
[1997]; Cyert and March, 1963). An organization can be viewed as a complex adaptive system 
that consists of agents making a myriad of interrelated decisions (Bettis and Prahalad, 1995). 
While some decisions are trivial, others are so profound that could potentially change the history 
of mankind. Firms’ choices affect firms’ chances of success and survival, and they could also 
affect the society at large. If there is such a thing as basic science in management research, a 
general theory of decision making is a key part of it. The validity of any model of organizational 
behavior and performance depends on the validity of a decision theory that it adopts as given. 
Rational approach to decision making has been a long-standing paradigm in economics. 
A rational decision maker is assumed to have infinite computational abilities and complete 
information about the environment, which is then used to calculate the consequences of all 
available alternatives with surgical precision (Simon, 1955; 1956). This knowledge is used to 
form consistent and stable preferences that allow the decision maker to make an optimal choice. 
Simon (1955, 1979) referred to rationality used in the sense above as “perfect”, “global”, or 
“omniscient” rationality. Although good in theory, the application of perfect rationality to real 
problems has proven to be difficult, if not impossible. Savage (1954), who is considered to be the 
founder of modern Bayesian decision theory, stresses in his work that principles of perfect 
rationality hold only in type of decision situations whose problem spaces are well defined and 
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small enough for optimization to be feasible. However, strategic organizational decisions do not 
meet these requirements.  
Strategic decisions are often characterized by a lack of readily available solutions, 
ambiguity about their values, uncertainty about future outcomes, and computational intractability 
(Simon, 1955; Arthur, 1992; Bettis, 2016). If potential solutions have to be sought, there is no 
guarantee that all of them are found prior to deciding which one is best. Even if all solutions are 
available at the time of making a decision, it may be difficult to compare their values because not 
all solution outcomes can be measured on the same scale. It could be difficult or even impossible 
to predict outcomes that are yet to occur, especially if they depend on other elements of the 
ecosystem surrounding a decision, for example, actions by actors in other parts of organization, 
actions by competitors, customers, investors, government, and other stakeholders. Finally, even 
if all solutions are known and can be evaluated unambiguously, their sheer number may prevent 
a decision maker from making an optimal decision due to the unreasonable amount of time it 
would take to conduct a rigorous and comprehensive analysis of all alternatives. Due to these 
characteristics of strategic decisions, it is simply inappropriate to apply deductive reasoning and 
optimization principles of rational decision theory in strategic decision situations.  
Developing a theory of decision making that is appropriate for strategic problems in 
organizations should be a high priority on the agenda for research in strategic management. My 
ultimate aspiration is to contribute to this development. In this dissertation, my objectives are to 
build an understanding of what makes it impossible to optimize in strategic decision situations 
and then begin an exploration of how decision makers can deal with strategic problems in such a 
way that better decisions are made. 
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Previous research has sought to address some aspects of decision making in the contexts 
where optimization is not feasible. Three streams of research are particularly relevant here. The 
two streams, the Carnegie School and research on heuristics, build on the concept of bounded 
rationality introduced by Herbert Simon (1955; 1956). The Carnegie School tradition focuses on 
search for alternatives and rule-based behavior (Gavetti, Levinthal, and Ocasio, 2007). The 
seminal texts of “Administrative Behavior” (Simon, 1947[1997]), “Organizations” (March and 
Simon, 1958), and “A Behavioral Theory of the Firm” (Cyert and March, 1963) lay out 
fundamental ideas of how organizations actually make decisions – ideas that are radically 
different from prescriptions of rational decision theory. The Carnegie School tradition builds on 
Simon’s original ideas that organizations do not know all the alternatives but have to search for 
them. Although building on bounded rationality and satisficing, this research tradition has 
focused more on firms’ behavior around aspiration levels, than on studying how organizations 
select and evaluate alternatives when optimization is not possible. Due to heavy focus on 
established firms that deal with issues of organizational change, standard operating procedures 
and routines have come to dominate research within the Carnegie school tradition. However, the 
emergence and dynamics of standard operating procedures and routines are rarely, if at all, 
discussed. 
While the Carnegie School tradition focuses on search for alternatives, research on 
heuristics focuses on search for cues that allow a decision maker to evaluate and differentiate 
between alternatives in an efficient manner (Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001). Identifying cues is the 
basic approach to forming a heuristic – a decision rule that ignores part of available information, 
facilitates fast decisions, and is often as accurate as more complex methods (Gigerenzer and 
Gaissmaier, 2011). Heuristics are meant to exploit the regularities in the environment’s structure 
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making heuristics ecologically rational. However, the extant research has heavily focused on 
studying stylized and context-dependent heuristics. The issues of generalizability of stylized 
heuristics across different contexts, heterogeneity of heuristics across decision makers, and how 
heuristics emerge and evolve are not fully understood. 
The third stream of research comes from a broad discipline of cognitive science and 
focuses on mental representations (Thagard, 2005). Taking the assumption that humans and 
organizations are information processing systems as given (Newell and Simon, 1972), research 
on cognition emphasizes the importance of knowledge structures that encode, organize and store 
information and knowledge in long-term memory (Anderson, 2000). The information in 
knowledge structures is not a perfect replication of reality. Knowledge structures help a decision 
maker organize the messy and complex real world and form a mental representation of it 
(Holland et al, 1986; Thagard, 2005). Although a real-world situation comes with enormous 
amount of information, the mental representation helps an actor isolate and attend only to 
information that she considers relevant to a given problem (Simon, 1997). How external 
information is encoded and converted into knowledge structures plays a big role in how this 
knowledge is then used for making decisions. While there is a good amount of research on 
cognition in the management literature (see Walsh (1995) and Kaplan (2011) for reviews), I have 
chosen to build on research in cognitive science because it recognizes issues of emergence and 
dynamics of mental representations more aptly than management literature does. While 
management scholars generally agree that cognition matters in decision making, what role it 
plays in selecting and evaluating alternatives is poorly understood. The issue of how decision 
makers develop beliefs about the structure of the environment and consequences of decisions is 
central in this dissertation.   
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By focusing on heterogeneous, dynamic, and incomplete nature of mental 
representations, I highlight the importance of knowledge in solving strategic decision problems. 
To be able to solve the problem, the actor needs to know at least something about the underlying 
structure of the problem and what solutions are effective for solving it. By using Nelson and 
Nelson’s (2002) definition of knowledge as “the content of mental representations”, I 
conceptualize knowledge as a hybrid of facts, beliefs, and values. I argue that knowledge of 
decision makers does not always reflect reality, changes with experience, and is better be thought 
of as a set of beliefs. Decision makers that acquire accurate beliefs about the structure of the 
problem and what solutions are appropriate are said to have veridical knowledge about the 
problem. Beliefs about the problem emerge from a decision maker’s experience with the 
problem. Therefore, it is plausible to assume that there could be different ways to experience the 
problem that could influence a decision maker’s ability to develop accurate understanding of the 
problem structure and make correct inferences about strategies that work best for solving the 
problem.  
To explore the role of experience in the acquisition of veridical knowledge, I 
conceptualize problem solving as a search through a problem space ─ a decision maker needs to 
find operators that will allow her to move from initial state to a goal state (Newell and Simon, 
1972; Simon, 1983; Anderson, 2000). Given that strategic decision problems have very large 
problem spaces, decision makers need to use heuristics to search through the problem space 
more efficiently (Newell and Simon, 1976). Heuristics exploit the knowledge about the structure 
of problem, but such knowledge is likely to be partially unavailable. If a decision maker has to 
solve the problem repeatedly, it makes sense to invest in developing the understanding of the 
problem structure. Decision makers can use various constraints to reduce the size of the problem 
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space and guide their learning. Constraints, aspirations, reference points, and goals are used 
interchangeably and are in the spirit of Simon’s way of using the term “constraint” (Simon, 
1997). They are defined as threshold values on variables of interest that determine what is 
relevant and what is not, or what is useful and what is not useful for solving the problem. The 
most common constraint that decision makers set up is the level of satisfactory performance. I 
suggest that even in the absence of any knowledge about the problem structure, decision makers 
can use external sources of information to set up constraints. These include exogenous goals and 
competitors’ performance. Although these metrics are well-known in the literature, their 
implications for the emergence and dynamics of mental representations have not been previously 
explored.  
I examine how exogenous goals and competitor’s performance influence search when 
used for setting up constraints. Specifying a constraint is an important way to direct search and 
gather information but it also has its shortcomings in a way of limiting both the problem space 
and knowledge development. I develop a set of propositions to explore whether using an 
exogenous goal and competitor’s performance has a positive or negative effect on acquisition of 
accurate beliefs about the problem structure and long-term performance. I argue that an 
exogenous goal is useful as a constraint when it is challenging enough to prevent a decision 
maker from settling down on an inferior solution but not so challenging that it leads to a 
perfection syndrome when decision makers continue searching for better solutions because they 
discard everything they try as useless for solving the problem. I further argue that using the 
performance of a superior competitor as a constraint usually forces a decision maker to search 
more, because even superior strategies may be undervalued. Using the performance of an inferior 
competitor is believed to have an opposite effect, because the effectiveness of poorly-performing 
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strategies may be overestimated. If paying attention to performance of either superior or inferior 
competitor results in partially incorrect inferences, then I believe a combination of exogenous 
goal and competitor’s performance is a less effective constraint, than an exogenous goal alone.  
To test propositions related to exogenous goals and competitor’s performance, I develop 
a computational model based on the multi-armed bandit. The multi-armed bandit is an important 
model to study dynamic learning from feedback in the presence of Knightian uncertainty 
(Arthur, 1991; Sutton and Barto, 1998). It is a simple model that is well-suited to study a specific 
type of strategic problems, in which consequences of alternatives cannot be computed with 
reasonable accuracy. The key feature of the model is that actors have to make decisions based on 
incomplete knowledge about the problem structure. Actors’ choices are driven by beliefs about 
relative value of available solutions, and beliefs are in turn influenced by outcomes of choices 
that actors make. In the model, I introduce changes to the belief updating function by assuming 
that actors use constraints to make inferences about usefulness of different strategies.  
In line with propositions, results of simulation experiments show the following. First, the 
goal level has a curvilinear effect on the accuracy of beliefs and performance. Second, as the 
goal level increases, actors explore more because they are more likely to make inaccurate 
inferences that strategies they have tried are not useful. Third, actors that pay attention to a 
superior competitor explore more than actors that pay attention to an inferior competitor. 
However, several findings in simulation experiments were not aligned with propositions. First, I 
found that the most effective goal is not the one that isolates the optimal strategy but the one that 
isolates at least a couple of top-performing strategies. Such goal leads to better inferences about 
relative usefulness of strategies and more efficient search. Second, a combination of an 
exogenous goal and a competitor’s performance hurts the accuracy of beliefs and performance 
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only at some goal levels. When an exogenous goal is effective, paying attention to a competitor’s 
performance hurts. However, when the goal is extremely challenging, paying attention to inferior 
competitor helps neutralize some of the incorrect inferences that all strategies that have been 
tried are useless.   
To further test propositions related to effects of competitor’s performance, I conduct a 
laboratory experiment. To capture the emergence and development of mental representations of a 
problem, I present study participants with a problem that they are unlikely to have experienced 
before. Participants are asked to play six rounds of a computer-based analytical game, which has 
an original design to ensure that participants do not have prior knowledge about the problem 
structure. The only way participants can win the game is if they learn about the underlying 
structure of the problem from their own experience and use that knowledge to identify the most 
efficient search strategy. Without the knowledge of the structure, the problem appears intractable 
and thus cannot be optimized, even though the optimal performance value is known. Participants 
in the study are randomly assigned to one of the four treatment conditions, where one group does 
not observe a competitor’s performance, and the other three groups observe different kinds of a 
“virtual competitor” (superior, similar, and inferior). 
Some results of the laboratory experiment are in line with the propositions. Findings 
show that the odds of winning by participants that do not observe competitor’s performance are 
twice the odds of winning by participants that observe superior and inferior competitor. 
Participants that do not observe competitor’s performance also develop better understanding of 
the problem structure. However, some results are not in line with propositions. There are no 
significant differences in the level of exploration across treatment groups. Participants that 
observe inferior competitor make more effective decisions and achieve better absolute 
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performance scores than other groups, even though they are less likely to win the game. In the 
discussion, I develop several possible explanations that could reconcile inconsistent findings. 
These explanations could be tested in future research.  
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows. I provide a brief review of 
background theory on rational decision theory, characteristics of strategic problems that prevent 
the application of rational decision theory, as well as concepts of search, heuristics, and 
cognition that have been useful for approaching decision making when optimization is not 
feasible. I then develop a conceptual framework for thinking about the nature of knowledge and 
role of experience in acquiring veridical knowledge. Next, I discuss how constraints can be used 
to approach a problem when knowledge about its structure is incomplete or even completely 
unavailable. I present propositions about effects of using exogenous goals and competitor’s 
performance as a constraint on search, development of beliefs, and performance. I then discuss 
the results of the computational model and the laboratory experiment. I conclude with a 
discussion on limitations, implications for theory and practice, and directions for future research. 
 
10 
 
BACKGROUND THEORY 
The purpose of this dissertation is to study how decision makers can deal with problems 
in which principles of perfect rationality and deductive reasoning do not hold and optimization is 
not feasible. In this chapter on background theory, I first discuss principles of perfect rationality 
principles, under what conditions they hold, and briefly review how various economic theories 
propose to handle violations of rationality principles. Then I discuss specific characteristics of 
strategic problems that organizations face and conclude that rational decision theory, even after 
proposed fixes, is simply not appropriate for dealing with strategic problems. Finally, I review 
the three streams of literature that attempted to address the issue of strategic decision making in 
situations where optimization is not feasible. The core ideas of search, heuristics, and mental 
representations provide a foundation, on which I later build a theoretical framework of inductive 
decision making and acquisition of knowledge.   
 
Rational decision theory  
Decision making has been perhaps one of the most contentious areas of research on 
organizations specifically and human behavior more generally. An intellectual war has enthused 
between proponents of a rational approach and those who reject it as valid. Economic theorizing 
is predominantly based on the assumptions of perfect1 rationality and logic of deduction ─ that 
“human agents derive their conclusions by logical processes from complete, consistent and well-
                                                          
1 Simon (1956, 1979) used a number of different adjectives including global, omniscient, and perfect to describe 
rationality as it was used in economics. He used terms “bounded rationality” and “adaptive rationality” to describe 
how human actors actually make decisions (Newell and Simon, 1972; Simon, 1979). 
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defined premises in a given problem” (Arthur, 1992). A rational agent has complete knowledge 
or access to complete information about a given problem, has sufficient computational 
capabilities to evaluate consequences of all alternatives and select one that will lead to the 
optimal outcome (Simon, 1955; 1956). Rational decision theory implies intra-and inter-agent 
consistency of decisions, i.e. it predicts consistent choices from the same agent at different points 
in time and consistent choices from different agents at the same point in time. If taken to an 
extreme, rationality implies homogenous agents that never get surprising future outcomes. There 
is no room for error in rational decision theory; there is no room for variability. 
Scholars across disciplinary borders have raised questions about the boundary conditions 
of deductive reasoning and perfect rationality. Savage (1954), who is often considered the 
pioneer of the modern Bayesian decision theory, has been very cautious about the applicability 
of the decision theory he was putting forward. As he states (Savage, 1954: p. 16): 
“The point of view under discussion may be symbolized by the proverb “Look before you 
leap” and the one to which it is opposed by the proverb “You can cross that bridge when you 
come to it”. One must indeed look before he leaps, in so far as the looking is not unreasonably 
time-consuming and otherwise expensive; but there are innumerable bridges one cannot afford to 
cross, unless he happens to come to them. 
Carried to its logical extreme, the “Look before you leap” principle demands that one 
envisage every conceivable policy for the government of his whole life (at least from now on) in 
its most minute details, in the light of the vast number of unknown states of the world, and decide 
here and now on one policy. It is utterly ridiculous, […] because the task implied in making such 
a decision is not even remotely resembled by human possibility. It is utterly beyond our power to 
plan a picnic or to play a game of chess in accordance with this principle, even when the world of 
states and the set of available acts to be envisaged are artificially reduced to the narrowest 
reasonable limits.  
Though the “Look before you leap” principle is preposterous, if carried to extremes, I 
would none the less argue that it is the proper subject of our further discussion, because to cross 
one’s bridges when one comes to them means to attack relatively simple problems of decision by 
artificially confining attention to so small a world that the “Look before you leap” principle can 
be applied there.” (Emphasis added) 
The term ‘small worlds’ was a succinct way for Savage to describe problems where 
rationality principles hold. The question is whether strategic problems that organizations face are 
a type of problems in which conditions for perfect rationality are met. Based on a substantial 
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amount of empirical evidence in psychology and organizations research we can infer that major 
decisions in organizations do not meet requirements of perfect rationality. Binmore (2009) used 
the term ‘large worlds’ to describe such problems.  
Nevertheless, principles of perfect rationality have proven to be resistant to both 
empirical evidence and theoretical critics, and to date dominate the fields of economics, finance, 
accounting, and management science, especially in formal theory and modeling. Assumptions of 
perfect rationality permeate studies of critical organizational phenomena such as incentives of 
managers, R&D productivity, valuation, and markets for technology (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Pakes, 1986; Serrano, 2010; Bloom, Schankerman, and Van Reenen, 2013). Proponents of 
rationality have attempted to demonstrate some empirical evidence that individual and 
organizational decision making is indeed based on deductive reasoning and rationality principles 
(Jorgenson and Siebert, 1968; Rips, 1986; Rust, 1992; Braine and O’Brien, 1998), but it is 
important to note that these findings are not the result of a direct comparison with behavioral 
models. The lack of comparison is interesting, given that economists are particularly keen on 
having high predictive validity of models they develop. In response to the critics of omniscience, 
economists have offered various “fixes” for uncertainty and incomplete information, while 
continuing to adhere to the rule of maximization. “Fixes” include introducing information and 
search costs, rational expectations, and game theory models to incorporate risk and competitive 
interactions (Stigler, 1961; Marschak and Radner, 1972; Muth, 1961; Baron and Diermeier, 
2007; Bloom et al, 2013). Statisticians have also weighed in on the question of incomplete 
information by developing approaches broadly based on Bayesian probability theory (Carnap 
and Jeffrey, 1971; Daston, 1988). In response to the critics of infinite computational abilities, a 
research program in psychology has emerged to demonstrate that humans are not good at either 
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logical inferences or statistics. This program shows that human decision making deviates from 
predictions of optimal reasoning, with an underlying notion that human thinking is generally 
inferior to optimal reasoning in that it is less robust and less accurate (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1973; Tversky and Kahneman, 1973; 1974). None of the approaches just described – in 
economics, statistics, and psychology – have abandoned deductive reasoning and optimization as 
ideal approaches to decision making.  
Proponents of perfect rationality have demonstrated an unprecedented commitment to 
rational decision theory, which, as some scholars argue, can be explained in part by the fact that 
rationality allows for “nice mathematical models” and “beautiful solutions” (Arthur, 1992; 
Ghoshal, 2005). However, potential implications of using rationality in solving real-world 
problems go beyond just having a theory that does not adequately describe human behavior. The 
actual use of rational decision theory may have resulted in a few unfortunate practical outcomes 
that could be a concern for the society. For example, some scholars have argued that economists 
could not predict the 2008 financial crisis because economic models assume rational behavior for 
agents in the economic system (Colander et al, 2009). Other scholars have argued that 
maximization of shareholder value, one of the most impactful developments that came out of 
rational decision theory, is the reason why we observe so much unethical behavior (Freeman, 
Wicks, and Parmar, 2004; Ghoshal, 2005). Another example is concerned with the lack of 
experimentation in firms. “No room for error” condition of rationality stiffens exploration that is 
so much needed in research and development (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993). 
There is a need for continuous development of a decision theory as well as its rigorous 
testing, particularly in strategic situations that do not meet the requirements of perfect rationality. 
In the next section, I will discuss characteristics of strategic decision problems that make it 
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difficult to apply deductive logic and find optimal solutions for such problems. In the following 
section, I will review several existing approaches that deal with some of the issues of strategic 
decision problems. 
 
Characteristics of strategic decision problems  
The optimal solution to a problem can be found if all alternatives are known and feasible, 
their consequences can be computed unambiguously, and a decision-maker does not get any 
surprises in the future (Savage, 1954; Simon, 1979; Binmore, 2009). If these conditions are 
satisfied, a perfectly rational decision can be made. Major real-world problems, especially the 
ones that organizations face, generally do not satisfy these conditions. Therefore, we should 
consider what makes it difficult to find the optimal solution to a problem.  
Is it possible to know all alternative solutions to solving a particular problem? For some 
trivial problems, it may be. For example, I want to buy a chocolate that costs $2.3 with tax. If I 
have only $2.0, then my alternatives are to walk away without a chocolate or buy something else 
that costs less than $2.0. If I have more than $2.3, then I have an alternative of buying a 
chocolate, buying something else, or buying nothing. Of course, if the chocolate is all I can think 
about (in other words, having a chocolate is my goal), then I have only one satisfactory solution 
in the latter scenario (to buy the chocolate), and I have no satisfactory solutions in the former 
scenario, because I do not have enough money. It seems that buying a chocolate is a well-defined 
problem that I should be able to solve through optimization.  
However, I would pause here and ask myself the following question. In the first scenario, 
where I have only $2.0, have I really considered all possible alternatives? Is there really no other 
way for me to get the chocolate? It turns out that there are other possibilities. Maybe, I would 
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meet a friend who could lend me 30 cents so that I could buy the chocolate. Or maybe I could 
ask strangers in the store if they could give me 30 cents. Or maybe I could sing in front of the 
store and people would pay a few cents for my performance. Or maybe I could steal the 
chocolate when nobody is looking. If I now consider all these alternatives as feasible, how do I 
make a perfectly rational decision? What choice is the optimal one?  
To make a rational choice, I will need to compute some kind of value for each alternative, 
so that I can compare values and choose an alternative with the highest value. How do I 
determine the value of each alternative? I have to take into account their consequences. For 
example, if I ask people in the store for 30 cents, will they publicly shame me or report me to the 
store security? If I sing in front of the store, will I have an overpowering feeling of anxiety and 
embarrassment? If I try to steal the chocolate, will I get caught? If I get caught, will the store call 
the police? If police is called, will an officer arrest me? If I truly want to put a value on each 
alternative and make a rational decision, I will have to consider all the consequences of all the 
alternatives. Even if I believed that there is such a thing as subjective expected utility, I would 
have a hard time calculating it. 
If I ran into so many issues while trying to make an optimal decision in a simple 
chocolate problem, then what would happen to an organization if instead of 30 cents it was 
dealing with $300,000 (of a $2.3 million budget)? Bettis (2016) provides an excellent example of 
complexities that a division of an organization will face if it attempts to solve a strategic 
planning decision problem rationally. Following Bettis’ example, if the division considers only 
20 variables (such as cost of beef, cost of potatoes, change in consumer preferences, moves of 
competitors, regulatory changes) and 5 possible levels for each variable, then there are over 
95×1012 alternatives that the division will have to analyze. It is clear that even if we spend just 
16 
 
few minutes analyzing each alternative, it is going to take an impossible amount of time to 
analyze all of them. This is what Bettis (2016) has called the ‘organizational intractability’. 
Decisions can be intractable even in the absence of interdependencies among decisions 
(Levinthal, 1997; Siggelkow, 2001). For example, an R&D department and a marketing 
department may develop their strategies independently and each could face an intractable 
problem (analogous to Bettis’ example above). However, if an organization needs to coordinate 
decisions made by the R&D and marketing departments, interdependencies among strategic 
choices exponentially increase intractability of the firm’s overall strategy (Rivkin, 2000)2. 
It is important to recognize that organizational (or computational) intractability has 
nothing to do with limitations of the mind, especially in the modern world of computers. Some 
problems, known as NP-complete problems, cannot be solved in real time even by the fastest 
computers (Yanofsky, 2013), due to the sheer number of alternatives that need to be analyzed. It 
appears that most organizational problems are NP-complete. 
The discussion above has not touched on the uncertainty of the future yet. Most of 
organization’s strategic decisions are made in the presence of uncertainty, the kind that is 
different from risk in a Knightian sense (Knight, 1921; Arthur, 2013). Unfortunately, 
organizations do not have a perfect foresight. If they did, we would not see failed acquisitions, 
failed clinical trials, or failed product launches, as we would not see organizations that fail and 
exit the market. The fact that we do see failures suggests that organizations take actions without 
complete knowledge of future outcomes. There is a clear implication of not knowing the future 
                                                          
2 Rivkin (2000) demonstrated how interdependency makes firm’s strategy computationally intractable. He 
specifically stated, that decisions become intractable when k>2 (where k specifies the extent to which decisions are 
interdependent in the NK model). To my knowledge, Bettis (2016) is the first to show that even a single decision, 
such as strategic planning for one division, can be computationally (and organizationally) intractable.   
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for rational decision making − the decision of a problem involving uncertainty cannot be 
optimized. As Arthur (2013: p. 4) states: 
“[Fundamental uncertainty] has an important consequence to theorizing. To the degree that 
outcomes are unknowable, the decision problems they pose are not well-defined. It follows that 
rationality—pure deductive rationality—is not well-defined either, for the simple reason that 
there cannot be a logical solution to a problem that is not logically defined. It follows that in such 
situations deductive rationality is not just a bad assumption; it cannot exist. There might be 
intelligent behavior, there might be sensible behavior, there might be farsighted behavior, but 
rigorously speaking there cannot be deductively rational behavior. Therefore we cannot assume 
it.” 
Therefore, I conclude that it is not feasible to find an optimal solution to a strategic 
decision problem, because the strategic problem exhibits at least one of the following:  
 Not all alternative solutions are known. 
 Consequences of alternatives cannot be computed with reasonable accuracy. 
 All alternatives cannot be analyzed in a reasonable amount of time. 
Uncertainty, computational intractability, difficulty to value and compare alternatives, 
and constantly changing environment that alters decision maker’s problem space are the realities 
of organizations. Despite all these issues, organizations make decisions every day. And some 
organizations are remarkably good at it. 
In the next section, I will discuss several approaches that have been developed in the 
management literature to capture how organizations deal with problems which do not meet the 
requirements of perfect rationality. 
 
How do organizations deal with strategic decision problems? 
There are three theoretical approaches in the management literature that are pertinent to 
the issue of dealing with strategic decision problems in organizations – that of search, heuristics, 
and cognition. Despite the fact that they all attempt to address the issue of applying perfect 
rationality principles in strategic situations, they have gone in rather different directions and have 
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little overlap with each other. While all three approaches agree that most organizational decisions 
are not optimal in the purest sense of perfect rationality, non-optimality has a very different 
meaning in the three schools of thought. 
Search. The concept of search has come into being with realization that a decision maker 
who deals with a strategic problem is not endowed with complete knowledge of all alternative 
solutions. She has to search for alternatives. If the exhaustive search is not possible within a 
reasonable amount of time and within the constraints of available resources, she will only 
continue searching until a satisfactory solution is found. A solution is deemed satisfactory if it 
meets criteria defined, implicitly or explicitly, by the decision maker3 (Simon, 1997). It means 
that the decision maker does not optimize – she satisfices4 (Simon, 1956; 1979).  
The concept of search has taken roots most prominently within the behavioral tradition, 
also known as the Carnegie School (Simon, 1947 [1997]; March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and 
March, 1963), and has been further advanced in evolutionary economics (Nelson and Winter, 
1982). The research stemming from the behavioral tradition has taken a major stance against the 
perfect rationality renaissance (Simon, 1979; Gavetti et al, 2007). However, Simon’s original 
ideas on how decisions are made have been significantly trimmed down to focus on a rather 
narrow set of issues that has taken the behavioral theory and evolutionary economics away from 
developing a more sound decision theory. Primarily driven by studies of established firms and 
their established practices, the behavioral theory has given a status quo a central stage, with 
focusing on standard operating procedures (or routines) and change that depends on 
                                                          
3 In an organization, it is likely that criteria for satisfactory solutions are set at one level of hierarchy, while solutions 
are identified at a lower level of hierarchy. This division has important implications, which would be addressed later 
in the dissertation.  
4 Simon (1997) notes that satisficing is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as “deciding on and pursuing a 
course of action that will satisfy the minimum requirements necessary to achieve a particular goal” and that is the 
meaning he has always implied in his writing. 
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organizational performance relative to aspirations. Standard operating procedures and routines 
help organizations save scarce and costly resources of time, efforts, and money. A standard 
operating procedure is a set of actions that is invoked in response to a stimulus – this is what 
March and Simon (1958) call a performance program. If such program is called for, the 
organization does not have to search for a solution – the performance program already contains 
one. These standard operating procedures are difficult to change, and the change, when it 
happens, is usually incremental (Gavetti et al, 2007; Gavetti and Rivkin, 2007). A trigger for 
change is a firm’s performance below an aspiration level, which “in the short run defines a 
utility function with essentially only two values – good enough and not good enough” (Cyert and 
March, 1963: p.10). Cyert and March (1963: p.123) proposed that organizational aspiration 
levels are weighted functions of past aspiration levels, past performance and competitive 
performance. These assumptions about aspiration levels persist to date, and the question of 
aspiration’s origins and antecedents has not received proper attention (Shinkle, 2012). 
An over-simplified short version of the behavioral theory of search goes then as follows. 
Organizations rely on standard operating procedures, programs, and routines as long as 
environmental stimuli remain largely unchanged. In stable environments, organizations don’t 
have to search. In stable environments, the performance is also fairly stable, and thus historic 
performance (of both the focal firm and its competitors) serves as a good proxy for what to 
expect in the future. When the environment throws the firm a surprise, i.e. when the firm 
performance is below the aspiration level, the firm may consider changes to its routines.  
Does the behavioral theory, in its over-simplified short version above, help explaining 
how strategic problems are solved? Unfortunately, only to some extent. Let’s go back to the 
example of strategic planning problem for a division that we discussed earlier. And let’s imagine 
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a firm solving this problem for the nth time period. If we think about a full set of alternatives to 
solve this problem, the theory slices it into two subsets – one containing the currently used 
solution and the other containing the rest of over 95×1012 alternatives. The theory does not 
explain how the first subset, containing the currently used solution, has come into being, i.e. how 
a strategic planning problem for a division has become rule-based. As Simon (1997: p. 89) 
states: 
“… the routines themselves are embodiments of “once and for all” decisions”, and applying them 
in particular circumstances is a decision, albeit often itself a routine one. When routines take over, 
our analysis must turn to the process that created them, and those that lead, from time to time, to 
questioning, reviewing and periodically revising them. Since Barnard, we have been aware that 
determining the occasions for decision (or for not taking a decision) is itself a key element in the 
decision process.” 
If the problem had over 95×1012 alternatives when the firm was solving it for the first 
time, how was the decision made in the first time period? The firm surely was not endowed with 
the routine – it had to create one, and that definitely took a long time. The theory has no 
explanation for the process of creation and evolution of a standard operating procedure, a 
routine, or a program. Furthermore, the theory tells us that we are more likely to consider an 
alternative from the second subset if the division’s performance was below the aspiration level 
but it does not tell us which alternative from the second subset we are going to choose5. The 
problem continues to be organizationally intractable, and the original meaning of satisficing, as 
discussed by Simon (1979; 1997), has been lost.  
 Heuristics. The research program on heuristics has also emerged from Simon’s original 
writings on bounded rationality (Simon, 1955; 1956). Heuristics are defined as “strategies that 
ignore information to make decisions faster, more frugally, and/or more accurately than more 
                                                          
5 Computational models built on the idea of aspirations avoided this problem by reducing number of alternatives to 
just two (see, for example, Denrell and March, 2001). 
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complex methods” (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011: p. 453). Heuristics can be a powerful way 
to make decisions (Gigerenzer, 2008), particularly suitable for strategic decision problems where 
perfect rationality and optimization are not appropriate. Like the behavioral tradition, the 
research on heuristics also draws on the concept of search. However, unlike the behavioral 
tradition that focuses on search for alternatives, research on heuristics focuses on search for cues 
– “reasons and predictors when decided between given alternatives” (Gigerenzer and Selten, 
2001). Heuristics are designed to exploit the structure of the environment when it actually 
exhibits regularities and cue-goal relationships can be learned6. In that sense, heuristics are 
ecologically rational because they adapt to the structure of the environment, but that also makes 
them highly domain-specific (Gigerenzer, 2001).  
In management literature, research on organizational heuristics does not boast the same 
kind of legacy as does the Carnegie School. The situation is very different in the field of artificial 
intelligence where heuristics research is very prominent and its legacy is substantial (Newell and 
Simon, 1976; Pearl, 1984; Lucci and Kopec, 2013). However, the management literature on 
heuristics has been growing (see Loock and Hinnen (2015) for review). The focus of 
management scholars has been more on what heuristics managers use and less on whether 
heuristics that are used actually facilitate accurate decision making in organizations and are 
superior to more complex tools. For example, Bingham and Eisenhardt (2011) studied what 
heuristics IT firms learned during internationalization. They found that firms developed a 
portfolio of heuristics that was refined and simplified over time. And although Bingham and 
Eisenhardt (2011) have suggested that a set of learned heuristics constituted a competitive 
                                                          
6 It is interesting that the NK modeling literature that has provided most promising insights on the structure of the 
environment and its effects on search has chosen a structure of the environment that is essentially random, i.e. it 
does not exhibit any regularities that firms can identify and exploit. 
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advantage to the firms in the sample, we cannot say whether the firms would have been better off 
otherwise, without explicit comparisons to more complex methods of decision making. There is, 
however, a study published in the Journal of Marketing that compares the performance of a 
heuristic used by retailers to the performance of a more sophisticated model (Pareto/NBD model) 
that predicts customer purchase (Wubben and Wangenheim, 2008). A Pareto/NBD model 
estimates a number of parameters, including purchase over lifetime and dropout rate, and makes 
distributional assumptions across customers. A heuristic that managers used was simply a 
recency of the last purchase: if a customer did not purchase anything in a certain number of 
months, she was considered inactive. It turned out that managers actually did not need to know 
the lifetime of customers’ purchases or purchase frequency. The accuracy of the heuristic was at 
least as good as the accuracy of the Pareto/NBD model. 
However, is the “less-is-more” effect true for any organizational decision problem? The 
issue here is that strategic decision problems could be very different from each other; therefore, 
we have only barely scratched the surface in developing our understanding of which heuristics 
work for what kind of problems (in a normative sense) and the scope of their generalizability. 
When do we need to gather more information and when do we need to ignore some of the 
information we have in order to make a better decision? What influences these choices? Similar 
to routines and standard operating procedures in a behavioral theory, the origins and dynamics of 
heuristics are poorly understood. 
Cognition. Despite significant interest in the role of cognition in decision making 
demonstrated by multiple disciplines, including cognitive psychology, artificial intelligence, 
philosophy, and neuroscience, cognition does not have a proper home in any of the prominent 
theories of decision making in organizations research. It does not have a place in rational 
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decision theory because complete information and infinite cognitive abilities are assumed. 
However, research streams on search and heuristics discussed earlier have also been surprisingly 
wary of incorporating cognition into their agenda and models7. Both research streams have called 
for more attention to cognition (Gavetti et al, 2007; Loock and Hinnen, 2015).  
Given that cognition is often vaguely defined in the literature and can mean different 
things to different people, it is important to state clearly assumptions and definitions that will be 
used and advanced in this study8. Humans, and by extension organizations, are assumed to 
operate as information processing systems (Newell and Simon, 1972; Tushman and Nadler, 
1978). The information and knowledge that exist in the world are perceived, encoded, and stored 
into knowledge structures in the long-term memory (Anderson, 2000). Information and 
knowledge come from events that we either experience ourselves or observe others experiencing 
them. We process and encode events differently; therefore, there is no such thing as an objective 
account of an event by a human observer. What we deal with is an internal, or mental, 
representation (Newell and Simon, 1972). Each of us has a mental representation of the world, 
but when we deal with a particular problem, we isolate knowledge structures that we believe to 
be relevant to the problem and create a mental representation of the problem. 
The process of isolating relevant knowledge structures and creating a mental 
representation of the problem is essential for organizational decision making. As Simon (1997) 
states: 
“Economic man purports to deal with the “real world” in all its complexity. The administrator 
recognizes that the perceived world is a drastically simplified model of the buzzing, blooming 
                                                          
7 Gavetti and Levinthal (2000), Nelson and Nelson (2002), Nelson (2008), Denrell, Fang, and Levinthal (2004), 
Gavetti (2005) provide good insights on how to incorporate cognition into the behavioral tradition and evolutionary 
economics.   
8 There is a debate on whether human cognition and inference are fragile and inferior to logic and rationality 
(Nisbett and Ross, 1980; Kahneman and Tversky, 1996) or robust and functional in the context of uncertainty and 
complexity that decision makers face (Holland et al, 1986; Gigerenzer, 1996). This study adopts the latter view. 
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confusion that constitutes the real world. The administrator treats situations as only loosely 
connected with each other – most of the facts of the real world have no great relevance to any 
single situation and the most significant chains of causes and consequences are short and simple. 
One can leave out of account those aspects of reality – and that means most aspects – that appear 
irrelevant at a given time.” 
Mental representations are critical for dealing with strategic decision problems because 
they make problem spaces of strategic decisions smaller. When a problem is computationally 
intractable, mental representations influence what alternatives are considered first. The more the 
underlying structure of the problem is unknown to a decision maker, the more her beliefs about 
regularities in the structure become critical in directing her search for alternatives. When a 
problem involves uncertainty, beliefs about uncertain outcomes of various alternatives affect 
what alternatives are considered and which one is eventually selected.  
The research on the role of mental representations in decision making is still in its 
infancy in the management literature, particularly with respect to understanding the emergence 
and dynamics of beliefs about the structure of the problem and about consequences of 
alternatives. Understanding how decision makers develop beliefs about strategic decision 
problems and their solutions is especially critical in organizational settings where many decisions 
are made repeatedly, over and over9. Why some organizations develop rigid beliefs and struggle 
to adapt while others remain flexible and nimble for change is important to reconcile 
theoretically. A dynamic view of mental representations and the associated inductive decision 
making offers a fruitful ground to do so. 
 
                                                          
9 It is interesting that the research on repetitive decision making resulted in the advancement of highly non-cognitive 
view in a way of routines and standard operating procedures. As discussed earlier, it is not clear how routines and 
standard operating procedures emerge in the first place. If they are the evidence of highly automated, non-cognitive 
behavior, there had to be a point in the past when making a decision for a particular problem has shifted from being 
a deliberate choice to being an automatic habitual behavior. 
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THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
Knowledge ─ the missing pivot in Simon’s scissors 
Let us consider faculty hiring decisions in universities. Each university department makes 
such decisions almost every year. These decisions are not trivial. Departments need to identify 
their needs, form a recruiting committee, advertise positions, screen applicants, interview 
candidates and select the ones to give offers to. It is unlikely that the process of candidate 
selection is entirely scripted. Some aspects of it could be standardized − for example, the 
application submission process is most likely to be standard from year to year. But there is likely 
to be a good amount of deliberation on which candidates to invite for interviews and, among the 
ones interviewed, which ones to give an offer to. How do departments make these choices? What 
do departments take into consideration when they decide? Do they consider the quality of a 
candidate’s training, number of publications, importance of a research topic, status of the 
candidate’s advisor, or other factors? How do these factors weigh into decisions?  
Or let us consider patent renewal decisions in R&D intensive firms. Every firm that has 
been granted a patent in the United States is subject to paying a renewal fee at the end of 4, 8, 
and 12 years since the grant date. A number of patents for which renewal decisions are made can 
run into hundreds and thousands in some large firms, and these decisions are typically handled 
by the firm’s intellectual property office (Khanna, Guler, and Nerkar, 2016). A number of 
scholars suggest that a renewal decision is inherently related to the patent value (Pakes, 1986; 
Moore, 2005) but other factors such as an overall firms’ portfolio, competition, new 
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technologies, and interdependencies may play a role as well (Liu et al, 2008; Khanna et al, 
2016). How do then firms weigh these different factors and make patent renewal decisions?  
Both decisions, faculty hiring and patent renewal, are organizational problems, for which 
finding the optimal solution is not feasible. In both cases, organizations would like to select the 
best possible alternative – to hire the best candidate and to retain patents with the highest value 
while letting go useless ones. However, in both cases, evaluations of consequences of 
alternatives are complicated by uncertainty that stems from genuinely not knowing future 
outcomes. A university department has to judge the quality and future productivity of a candidate 
based on what she has accomplished to date, while the IP office of a firm has to judge future cash 
flows from a patent that may not even be a marketable technology yet. There is no way for 
university departments and IP offices to optimize their respective decisions, but can 
organizations make problem spaces of these decisions smaller? And if they can, then how?  
Simon (1990) emphasized that in studying human problem solving and decision making 
it is important to consider both “the structure of the task environment and computational 
capabilities of the actor” – like the two blades of a scissors. The research that has grown out of 
Simon’s original writings on bounded rationality (Simon, 1955; Simon, 1956) has often focused 
only on one of the blades (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Levinthal, 1997; Fang and Levinthal, 
2009), with just a fraction of research that has looked at both (e.g., Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; 
Gigerenzer, 2008). While the use of the metaphor has been powerful in driving significant 
theoretical developments, taking it literally may have led researchers to discount the importance 
of another phenomenon in decision making and problem solving – that actors often vary 
dramatically in what and how much they know about the structure of the task environment and 
strategies useful in that specific environment.  
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Knowledge is the missing pivot in Simon’s scissors that actually holds blades together 
and allows the actor to “cut” through a problem space of a strategic decision problem and make 
it smaller. Actor’s cognitive abilities may not be sufficient to find the optimal solution10, but they 
may be sufficient to extract useful information from the structure of the problem to find a better 
solution rather than worse. Newell and Simon (1976) called this ability intelligence. However, 
for an actor to act intelligently, she needs to know what useful information the structure of the 
problem can provide and what solutions are better than others given the structure of the problem. 
The key word here is “to know”. As Simon (1997 [1947]: p. 94) states:  
“Rationality implies a complete, and unattainable, knowledge of the exact consequences of each 
choice. In actuality, the human being never has more than a fragmentary knowledge of the 
conditions surrounding his action, nor more than a slight insight into the regularities and laws that 
would permit him to induce future consequences from a knowledge of present circumstances.” 
But where do “fragmentary knowledge… and slight insight” come from? Can we have 
more knowledge and better insights, and will they actually be helpful in solving a strategic 
problem? Also, what does it mean to know more in the context of solving strategic problems?  
Before addressing the above questions, it is useful first to consider what knowledge is in 
general as well as in an organizational context. Although a common word, knowledge does not 
have a unique definition that unequivocally says – this is what knowledge is11. Knowledge is 
difficult to define and even more difficult to measure, and it is true at both individual and 
organizational levels of analysis (Polanyi, 1958; Grandori and Kogut, 2002; Argote and Miron-
Spektor, 2011). The term ‘knowledge’ is often used interchangeably with other terms, such as 
skill, competence, know-how, expertise, and capability (Winter, 1987; Simon, 1990; Kogut and 
                                                          
10 By an actor, I mean an individual, a computer, or an organization. As argued before, strategic problems that 
organizations face are such that even a supercomputer cannot solve it optimally. Thus, it is not just a limitation of a 
human mind, and thus cannot be addressed by a calculating machine or multiple minds put together. 
11 Checking various dictionaries yielded several definitions that were quite different in a conceptual sense.  
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Zander, 1992), which may or may not be appropriate for a specific context or research question. I 
will argue that in the context of solving strategic problems for which optimization is not feasible, 
it is appropriate to use these terms interchangeably, as long as we accept a proposition that 
knowledge is dynamic and may not be veridical at a given point in time. I elaborate on this 
below.  
A definition useful to the conceptualization of knowledge advanced in this study can be 
found in Nelson and Nelson (2002: p. 721): “… knowledge is a general term referring to the 
content of all the long-term memory/representations humans possess”. Knowledge here is 
defined purely in cognitive terms – intentionally so. While I acknowledge the existence of 
knowledge externalized in procedures, programs, routines, manuals, reports, et cetera, I argue 
that such externalized knowledge is only a by-product of knowledge that resides in mental 
representations. When an actor decides to follow a known procedure, she makes a mental choice 
to forgo other alternatives, i.e. she makes a conscious or unconscious decision that following a 
procedure is the best action given what she knows. When the actor uses a report prepared by 
others to educate herself about the problem, the information in the report will be perceived, 
encoded, and stored in her mental representation, just as any other information, fact, or event that 
the actor experiences. The knowledge in the mental representation at a point in time will drive 
decisions that the actor makes.  
If knowledge is the content of a mental representation, then what does a mental 
representation contain? The key aspect of the conceptualization developed here is that 
knowledge is a hybrid of facts, beliefs, and values. Information and facts from experience are 
interpreted by the actor and cannot be separated from her beliefs and values. In fact, the entire 
content of mental representations is better thought of as just a set of beliefs ─ some beliefs 
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coincide with facts, while others may not reflect the objective reality. However, this distinction 
holds true only if the objective reality can be identified as such. In the context of strategic 
decision problems that organizations face, the objective reality may not be readily available to 
actors for knowing. Let’s consider investment decisions to develop new technologies. Naturally, 
we will prefer to invest in technologies whose commercialization potential is higher. However, 
because technologies are not developed yet, their real commercial value is not known. As 
technology development progresses, we will know a little more about the relative potential of 
various technologies, but the true values will still be unavailable to us, because technological 
trajectory in part depends on the decisions made earlier in the development. We cannot know 
where we would have ended up had we taken the path we never travelled. For example, can we 
know what the world would have been like if Facebook had never started? In situations where 
values and their differences among social groups play a key role, the objective reality is also not 
obvious. Public policy is a prominent example of a decision space, where values cannot be 
separated from facts (Nelson and Winter, 1982: p.382), but for-profit organizations have also 
been gaining attention as battlegrounds of values. Commercialization of stem cell research is an 
interesting example in this regard, because apart from uncertainty associated with the technology 
itself, there is also much ambiguity about the greater good or greater evil of stem cells that is 
driven by religious arguments. 
Knowledge is endogenous to a decision maker and thus can never be fully objective. 
Thinking of knowledge in this way has important implications for our treatment of human 
rationality. Can rationality be ever truly objective? Simon (1997 [1947]: p. 85) defined a decision 
objectively rational if “in fact it is the correct behavior for maximizing given values in a given 
situation”, and subjectively rational if “it maximizes attainment relative to the actual knowledge 
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of the subject”. However, the definition of an objectively rational decision is troubling, because 
it is not clear who has the authority to decide what the correct behavior for a given situation is. Is 
180 degrees the correct answer to the question “What do angles of a triangle add up to?” Is 100 
degrees the correct answer to the question “At what temperature does the water boil?” If the 
answers to such seemingly objective questions are not uniquely defined, then what can we say 
about less obvious situations such as the market shift from the analog photography to the digital 
photography? Was Polaroid wrong to believe that razor-blade model would work for the digital 
technology12? Would we say that Polaroid was at least subjectively rational? Or was it not 
maximizing its value relative to what it knew at that point in time? This is a very difficult 
question to answer given the subsequent developments of the industry and the knowledge we 
have acquired since then – it is difficult to shake off the hindsight and ignore our personal beliefs 
about the industry and events that took place in the past. 
What an actor knows then matters to how she solves problems. Typically, the actor has a 
vast amount of general knowledge in her long-term memory. However, when she faces a specific 
problem, only knowledge deemed relevant to the problem is assimilated into a mental 
representation of the problem. If the actor has never faced the problem, she is likely to know 
very little about its structure or what solutions exist to address it. If she has dealt with the 
problem multiple times, she may have developed some theories on what the underlying structure 
of the problem is and what solutions work for solving it. The mental representations of the 
problem are very different in these two cases. Research in cognitive psychology has 
demonstrated empirically that problem representations of novices and experts have very different 
knowledge content and structure for problems in chess, physics, programming, evaluation of 
                                                          
12 Tripsas and Gavetti (2000) is an in-depth case study of Polaroid at the time of transition to digital photography. 
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candidates for residency in hospitals, security price prediction, and others (de Groot, 1978; Chi, 
Feltovich, and Glaser, 1981; Adelson, 1981; Johnson, 1988).  
Having different knowledge makes experts perform better than novices in some contexts 
but not in others. Experts seem to have performance advantage in solving physics problems, 
programming, and chess. However, experts have failed to perform significantly better than 
novices in many other domains, including clinical psychology diagnosis, economic and financial 
forecasting, and evaluation of applicants’ merit for studies and jobs (Goldberg, 1959; Dawes, 
1971; Armstrong, 1978; Johnson, 1988). These research findings raise an important question of 
what it means to be an expert in a particular domain. Is somebody an expert because of having 
experience or superior problem solving ability? Research in cognitive science historically had an 
implicit assumption that more experience translates into superior problem solving, but this bias 
can be partially explained by the fact that the domains that have been traditionally the focus of 
problem solving research (physics problems, programming) are the problems for which it is 
feasible to find the optimal solution. It is possible that in the context of problems for which it is 
not feasible to find the optimal solution – such as medical diagnosis, economic forecasting, or 
strategic decision making, experience does not always get translated into superior problem 
solving ability. Therefore, while actors may acquire more knowledge as they gain more 
experience, the knowledge may not be veridical. 
Chess does not seem to fit the explanation above because chess is clearly a type of a 
problem which it is impossible to optimize. However, the puzzle of expertise in chess can be 
resolved by seeing that an expert in chess studied in the literature is somebody who has an 
enormous amount of experience (more than 10 years) and enormous amount of knowledge stored 
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in a mental representation (more than 50,000 patterns of chess positions)13. It is not quite clear 
what happens in between having no experience at all and having an enormous amount of 
experience. However, this is the space where most organizations find themselves in – most of the 
times they have to learn about the problem structure and solutions that work to solve the problem 
from a very small sample of decisions they have made or observed others make.  
This discussion leads to the two important questions that we can ask in the context of 
repeated decision making. Faculty hiring and patent renewal decisions, discussed in the 
beginning of this chapter, are made repeatedly and present organizations with opportunities to 
gain superior knowledge about these strategic problems. The first question that we can ask is 
how to acquire the right kind of knowledge from a limited experience – the knowledge about the 
structure of the problem and solutions that are effective for solving it. Second, how much 
experience does one need to have with the problem to be able to solve it effectively? 
Experience leads to more veridical knowledge about the problem and its solutions only 
when five conditions are met. First, the structure of the problem is not completely random, i.e. 
there are patterns and regularities in the structure that can be exploited to find better solutions. 
Second, the patterns and regularities can be discovered through experience. Third, the actor is 
not punished for failing to solve the problem and can continue to look for a better solution after 
failure. Fourth, the actor believes that there are regularities in the structure and makes an effort to 
look for them. And fifth, the heuristics that the actor chooses to search for solutions and choices 
that she makes do not limit the problem space to such an extent that regularities cannot be 
observed and better solutions cannot be discovered.  
                                                          
13 That experts in chess store in their long-term memory nearly 50,000 patterns of chess positions that allow them to 
play at the superior level seems to be one of Simon’s favorite examples of expertise. It is mentioned in Simon (1990; 
1996) and Newell and Simon (1976).  
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Emergence and dynamic development of knowledge 
There are different ways to view problem solving as a cognitive activity (Thagard, 2005). 
Most popular metaphors include viewing problem solving as search, reasoning, or constraint 
satisfaction (Simon, 1983). I rely on the search metaphor and look at problem solving as search 
through a problem space, where one state corresponds to the initial state (where an actor is 
before solving a problem), one or more states correspond to a goal state (where the actor wants to 
be when she solves the problem), and there are many states in between (Newell and Simon, 
1972; Anderson, 2000). The actor needs to find operators that allow her to move from one state 
to another, until she reaches the goal state (Simon, 1983).  
A problem space could be thought of as either a set of alternatives or as a set of cues (or 
characteristics of the environment), or both. For example, in the chocolate problem discussed 
earlier, alternatives such as asking a stranger, singing, or stealing are states in the space of 
alternative decisions that an actor can take. The problem space for the chocolate problem could 
also be thought of as a set of alternative worlds depending on how things play out after the actor 
takes action. It could include a world (a) where the actor gets the chocolate but is embarrassed, 
(b) gets the chocolate but then is caught by the police, (c) gets the chocolate and is very happy 
after eating it, (d) does not get the chocolate and is angry, etc. In the strategic planning decision 
problem, also discussed earlier, variables such as cost of beef or changes in consumer 
preferences constitute cues that an actor may pay attention to while devising a strategy. Some of 
the variables may also serve as potential action points (e.g. we can negotiate a lower cost of beef 
as part of the strategy). Thinking of the problem space from different perspectives may 
potentially lead to finding better solutions to the problem ─ although this is an important 
research question and deserves a separate consideration, it is beyond the scope of this study. For 
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the purpose of this study, a problem space consists of a set of alternative solutions that have 
different payoffs. A goal state then is a solution whose payoff is above the threshold value 
specified by the goal. Even if an objective problem space exists for a given problem, each 
decision maker will search through a mental representation of the problem space ─ this is a 
crucial aspect of my view of problem solving, common with the view of problem solving in 
theories of complex adaptive systems, mental models, and induction (Holland et al, 1986; 
Cowan, Pines, and Meltzer, 1994; Johnson-Laird, 2006). 
Problems that are computationally intractable or characterized by high levels of 
uncertainty often have extremely large problem spaces. Wandering blindly through different 
states in such problem spaces may not prove fruitful in a limited time span that organizations 
usually have to solve these problems. Decision makers are better off searching intelligently 
through the problem space – by using heuristics that allow them to get to a goal state in a shorter 
time, if at all (Newell and Simon, 1976). Heuristics exploit the knowledge about the structure of 
the problem space, but actors are unlikely to have such knowledge when they face the problem 
for the first time. Repeated exposure to the same kind of problem allows actors to accumulate 
information and revise their knowledge about the problem; however, even repeated problem 
solving does not guarantee that the knowledge emerging from experience is veridical or 
generalizable beyond specific problem instances. Faculty hiring and patent renewal decisions are 
interesting in this regard. On the one hand, the nature of decisions is the same every time period 
– faculty members need to be hired and patents need to be valued and renewed (or not). On the 
other hand, potential candidates are unique and different from the ones before, and so are the 
patents. What knowledge is generalizable and useful from one time period to another and what 
knowledge is too context-specific to be retained and be useful the next time? The issue of 
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generalizability and usefulness of knowledge is magnified when we try to apply knowledge 
accumulated from experience with one class of problems to a new class of problems. The 
phenomenon is known as analogical reasoning and is quite common in the business world 
(Gavetti and Rivkin, 2005; Gavetti, Levinthal, and Rivkin, 2005). An extensive research in 
cognitive psychology and a more recent research in management show that analogical reasoning 
is not always effective and may even backfire (Gick and Holyoak, 1983; Bassok and Holyoak, 
1989; Markman and Gentner, 1993; Gavetti et al, 2005; Gary, Wood, and Pillinger, 2012). Major 
issues with using an analogy, if one was found and applied to the new problem, stem primarily 
from the fact that knowledge that is applied to the problem is simply not appropriate for it.  
Therefore, if an organization has to solve a particular problem repeatedly, investing in 
understanding the problem and acquiring veridical knowledge about its structure and appropriate 
solutions is of paramount strategic importance to the organization. It could be thus argued that 
organizations that are more deliberate about learning the problem structure and its solutions will 
be better off long-term, than companies that are less deliberate and do not invest in such 
learning14.  
 Solving a new problem starts with creating a mental representation of a problem by 
pulling together current information from a given problem statement (whether explicit or 
implicit) and any previous knowledge that is deemed relevant to the problem. An actor attempts 
to understand the problem first – comprehend given information, analyze various problem 
elements and identify conceptual relationships between them (Hayes and Simon, 1974; Greeno, 
                                                          
14One could say that companies that are less deliberate are the ones that develop rigid routines or standard operating 
procedures for dealing with particular type of problems. However, as Nelson and Winter (1982) note on several 
occasions, companies may also have routines for deliberate learning, which does not contradict my argument. 
Therefore, I do not think that my view is in contrast with routine-based view of organizational behavior advanced in 
the Carnegie School tradition.  
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1977; Kintsch and Greeno, 1985). From given information, the actor tries to extract specification 
of the goal, the distance from the initial state to a goal state, and constraints that need to be 
satisfied15. The reality of course is usually much more complicated than what is described above. 
Problems differ in the extent to which these elements of the initial problem representation are 
specified or present, which is driven both by the nature of the problem as well as by resources 
and capabilities of a problem solver (Simon, 1956; Simon, 1973; Jonassen, 2000; Anderson, 
2000; Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000). There is heterogeneity among decision makers in what 
information they are able to extract from the problem statement, because processing new 
information is conditional on what is already known (Simon, 1983; Johnson-Laird, 2006). Some 
problems do not have well-specified goals (Cohen, March, and Olsen, 1972). If the actor does 
not know what the target is, it could be difficult to figure out how far she is from it. And even if 
the actor knows what the goal is, she may have a misunderstanding of where she is in the 
problem space. For example, managers and entrepreneurs often overestimate what they know 
and underestimate what they do not know (Cooper, Woo, and Dunkelberg, 1988; Kahneman and 
Lovallo, 1993; Schrage, 2015). Constraints are also often misidentified, especially among first-
time entrepreneurs who often don’t recognize the bottlenecks that operations or finances can 
create. Another issue with objectives and constraints is that it is often difficult to disentangle 
them. In fact, Simon (1997: p. 154) suggests that we should think about problem solving as 
finding a solution that satisfies a set of goals or a set of constraints instead of a single goal, 
                                                          
15 Given that a problem space here is defined as a set of alternative solutions available to the actor, I assume that an 
actor is aware of possible operators if she is able to construct a problem space. While it is a strong assumption, it 
does not take away heterogeneity of operators available to different decision makers nor does it imply that decision 
makers use appropriate operators to solve the problem.   
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accompanied by a set of constraints. This view of multiple criteria for decision making is 
adopted here.  
If an actor knows nothing about the problem structure, she does not have any knowledge 
about which directions of search will be more beneficial than others, i.e. she does not know 
which operators to use. Specifying a set of constraints could be a reasonable first step. The terms 
‘constraint’, ‘goal’, ‘aspiration’, and ‘target’ are treated as synonyms here and refer to minimum 
(when more is better) or maximum (when less is better) threshold values that a decision maker 
establishes as satisfactory for variables of interest. In general, the variables of interest to the 
decision maker include both inputs and outputs. It could also be said that they include both cues 
and outcomes. For example, in the strategic planning problem, the organization can set up 
constraints on cue variables (e.g. cost of beef) and outcome variables (e.g. desired profitability 
next year). Similar to the issue of separating goals and constraints discussed above, separation of 
cue variables and outcome variables may also not be straightforward. Moreover, in the context of 
the current study, it is not critical to separate them. Therefore, going forward, constraints will be 
considered in a single vector, without explicit division in cues and outcomes.  
A set of constraints serves multiple functions as it aids solving a problem with a large 
problem space. The first function is to direct search. Constraints help slice the problem space 
into smaller, more manageable segments, potentially converting a computationally intractable 
problem into a tractable one. In some cases, constraints can reduce the problem space so much 
that optimization becomes possible. My recent purchase of a car serves as a good example. By 
specifying a very strict (and quite idiosyncratic) set of constraints on what I want from a car, I 
rather quickly reduced a set of feasible alternatives to less than 10 and had no issue identifying 
the best alternative within that set. Was it an optimal choice among all possible alternatives? I 
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can almost guarantee that it was not, even with respect to my preferences. However, it was a 
choice that satisfied all criteria I wanted it to satisfy at the time of purchase – I did not have to 
compromise, which could by itself be considered a great accomplishment. Organizations rarely 
get away without compromising at least along some dimensions (Cyert and March, 1963). 
The second important function of constraints is to help an actor evaluate usefulness of 
alternative solutions in order to gain knowledge about the structure of the problem. When a 
decision maker does not have the knowledge about true values of alternatives, constraints allow 
the actor to gather some useful information. Let us look at a simple problem, for which there is a 
set S of N strategies Sj available to the actor for consideration. Each strategy has a true value 
Q*(Sj), but the true values are unknown to the actor. If the actor sets a threshold value P* for a 
desired outcome, such that a realized payoff Q (Sj) should be at least as large as P* (Q (Sj) ≥ P*), 
then P* could be used to judge the usefulness of strategies that have been tried. If payoffs are 
deterministic and the actor has enough resources to try all N strategies, then after N trials, the 
actor can identify the best alternative, and there is no need to specify a constraint. However, if 
payoffs are non-deterministic and judgments have to be made over a limited number of trials, 
constraints allow for more efficient gathering of information about tried strategies. Specifically, 
strategies can be judged as useful or not useful for achieving a desired payoff. If the actor 
encodes strategies’ usefulness in some structured manner and stores in her memory, this 
knowledge can be used later as an input to deciding which strategy to pick. As long as the actor 
does not have a complete knowledge, the actor will be making a decision inductively.  
Despite the virtues of constraints in directing search and aiding acquisition of knowledge, 
there are serious shortcomings of constraints that an actor should be aware of. First, constraints 
may severely limit the actor’s ability to find better solutions in later trials, if she has to solve the 
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problem repeatedly. By slicing the problem space and restricting the actor to only a part of it, 
constraints may prevent her from exploring other regions of the problem space (Simon, 1997: 
p.75). Second, constraints may also limit subsequent acquisition of knowledge, precisely because 
they played a role in initial acquisition of knowledge in the first place. As Johnson-Laird (2006: 
p. 176) states, “we reason in service of our goals”. While judging the usefulness of strategies 
relative to goals is an efficient way to gather information in a given context, using this 
information in a different context or under different set of constraints becomes increasingly 
difficult. Thus, there is always a tradeoff for the actor to solve the problem in short-term versus 
gathering information and developing knowledge about the problem structure in the long term. 
Third, in organizations, there could also be an issue of hierarchical division of specifying 
constraints and searching for appropriate solutions. People at different levels of organizational 
hierarchy often have different knowledge bases. If constraints specified at one level are driven by 
the knowledge not available to the level below ─ a level that is responsible for finding a solution, 
the organization will not only have a problem that has not been solved, but also disappointed 
managers and frustrated employees.  
There are few other important observations about constraints. First, constraints do not 
have to be inter-temporarily fixed. That means that a decision maker can alter existing 
constraints, remove some constraints, and add others, as she gains more knowledge. Second, 
constraints do not have to be precise or clear. In fact, as long as the actor’s knowledge about the 
structure of the problem remains largely imperfect, it will be impossible, if not foolish, to impose 
any sort of precise constraints. Third, a vector of constraints does not have to include an outcome 
variable, at least not in its traditional sense. That could seem as heresy to scholars of rational 
choice theory; however, there is value to be found even in undirected, or blind, search. Consider 
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for example, explorations by companies such as Alphabet or Facebook, or some of the scientific 
discoveries. Conceptually, these ideas have been displayed quite prominently in writings on 
decision making with ambiguous goals (e.g. March, 1978; Simon, 1996); however, there seems 
to be less appreciation of these ideas in vast empirical literature on aspirations.  
Specification of constraints is itself a subject to the actor’s knowledge. Sometimes, the 
situation calls for some arbitrarily set values just to get things going. This is one of the reasons 
why constraints should never be viewed as fixed and precise. However, even in the absence of 
complete knowledge about the structure of the problem space, the actor can use information from 
the environment to specify values for constraints. My conjecture is that constraint specification 
could be one way for decision makers to change the way they experience problems and 
potentially improve acquisition of veridical knowledge. The question then is whether different 
ways of specifying constraints to direct search and gather information lead to differences in 
actor’s knowledge and subsequent performance. In the next section, I will discuss different 
sources of information that could be used to set constraints in order to search for solutions and 
learn about the problem structure in the absence of a complete mental representation of the 
problem. 
 
Implications of constraint specification for knowledge development and performance  
Exogenous goal. Let us start by considering the following situation. An actor is 
presented with an unfamiliar problem. There exist several alternative solutions that could be 
useful for solving the problem but the actor does not know how good payoffs of alternative 
strategies are. Because the problem is unfamiliar, the actor also does not know what level of 
payoff is possible to achieve in a given problem space. We often observe that actors use external 
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performance benchmarks for problems that they have never experienced before. One such 
external benchmark is an exogenous goal given to the actor by a third party. An example of an 
exogenous goal is a target issued by a higher level in an organization (e.g. a sales target) or a 
milestone set by an alliance agreement (e.g. very common in R&D alliances in the 
pharmaceutical industry).  
Setting a goal is not an ordinary task. The goal serves as an efficient constraint if it allows 
an actor to differentiate between superior and inferior strategies. To differentiate correctly 
between superior and inferior strategies, the actor needs a goal that will lead to an inference that 
inferior strategies are useless to solve a problem, and superior strategies are useful. To visualize, 
let us continue with an abstract example introduced earlier. We assume that there are N available 
strategies with payoffs 𝑄(𝑆𝑗) distributed around true values 𝑄
∗(𝑆𝑗). We further assume that true 
problem space is one-dimensional and such that it is limited by the true value of the worst 
strategy on the left, i.e. min
𝑆𝑗
𝑄∗(𝑆𝑗), and by the true value of the best strategy on the right, i.e. 
max
𝑆𝑗
𝑄∗(𝑆𝑗). In this problem set, setting the goal too low may lead to the development of false 
beliefs that many inferior strategies are useful (Figure 1, Scenario A). If the actor is given a low 
goal, and in her experience she comes across an inferior strategy that happens to produce a 
payoff that is above the goal level, the actor will infer that the strategy is useful and will be more 
likely to select this inferior strategy again in the future. Correcting this false belief and 
identifying a better strategy will be difficult, because finding a better strategy will require that 
the actor explore other alternatives. However, early inferences about inferior strategies’ 
usefulness will reduce the actor’s likelihood to explore other strategies. Therefore, when the goal 
is too low for a given problem space, actors are likely to settle on inferior alternatives.  
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Setting a goal too high will lead to the rejection of many alternatives, including superior 
ones (Figure 1, Scenario B). If an actor is given a very challenging goal and tries inferior 
strategies early in her experience, she will make inferences that inferior strategies are in fact 
inferior. Inferring that tried strategies are useless increases exploration and thus the likelihood of 
finding a better alternative. However, if superior strategies happen to produce a low payoff that 
falls below a challenging goal, they too will be considered useless, forcing the actor to continue 
exploring. Therefore, a very challenging goal leads the actor to explore too much and make her 
less likely to settle on any specific alternative. This argument suggests that there exists a level of 
a goal, which is neither too low nor too high, that results in superior knowledge development and 
superior performance outcomes. This level of goal also corresponds to the optimal balance 
between exploration, i.e. trying different strategies, and exploitation, settling down on a strategy 
that is believed to be the best. This leads to the following propositions: 
Proposition 1: The effect of the goal level on accuracy of beliefs that the actor develops 
from experience is curvilinear. Accuracy of beliefs increases as the goal level increases 
but after a point it starts decreasing as the goal becomes more challenging. 
Proposition 2. The effect of the goal level on performance is curvilinear. Performance 
increases as the goal level increases but after a point it starts decreasing as the goal 
becomes more challenging. 
Proposition 3: Level of exploration increases linearly with the goal level. 
Proposition 4: The exogenous goal will be the most effective in guiding search and 
knowledge development when it is in the neighborhood of the solution with best true 
value. 
The discussion above and Propositions 1–4 suggest a mechanism that is different from 
the ones advanced in the goal-setting theory (Locke and Latham, 1990). The goal setting theory 
generally suggests that there is a linear relationship between goal level and performance16. The 
                                                          
16 Research in goal-setting finds that task complexity serves as a moderator variable with effect sizes usually much 
smaller in complex tasks, than in simple tasks (Locke and Latham, 2002). However, the nature of the relationship 
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argument is that a hard and specific goal resolves the uncertainty of what is achievable in a given 
task (Locke et al, 1989). According to the goal-setting theory, there are four mechanisms that 
explain the effect of a difficult goal on performance (Locke and Latham, 2002). Goals (1) direct 
attention and effort, (2) energize, (3) improve persistence, and (4) prompt the actor to recall and 
use the knowledge and skills appropriate to the task. The arguments of these mechanisms hinge 
on the three important assumptions. First, it is assumed that a party that sets the goal has the 
knowledge of problem structure. In other words, the goal accurately indicates what is achievable 
in a given problem space. Second, it is assumed that the actor (a) has access to appropriate 
information about the problem and alternative strategies, (b) is able to convert this information 
into knowledge, and (c) uses it to solve the problem. Third, it is assumed that the actor’s 
experience provides unambiguous feedback. Even if the first assumption is true, there could be 
differences between knowledge held by the party who sets an exogenous goal and knowledge of 
the actor who is trying to solve the problem. In addition, if the actor has to learn from experience 
about the merit of different strategies, her learning becomes endogenous to the goal.  
The goal-setting theory further argues that a very challenging goal in complex tasks 
hampers learning (Ordonez et al, 2009). The explanation is purely motivational ─ a challenging 
goal and failure to reach the goal decrease an individual’s desire to explore alternative solutions 
(Kanfer and Ackerman, 1989; Locke and Latham, 2002). However, my argument is that even if 
the actor’s motivation to solve the problem remains high, her ability to learn from experience is 
curtailed because her inferences are very likely to be wrong. Therefore, I suggest that it is not the 
failure to adequately explore the problem space but rather the failure to make correct inferences 
                                                          
remains unchanged and has been explained by other factors (such as setting a learning goal or proximal goals) to 
keep the main idea intact. 
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about the merits of strategy that is the primary mechanism behind the negative effect of a very 
challenging goal on performance.  
Competitor’s performance. In the real world, actors rarely operate in a vacuum where 
they are the only ones trying to solve a problem. In the business context, there are usually 
competitors who are likely to be dealing with the same kind of problems. Irrespective of whether 
the focal actor has information on what strategies are tried by a competitor, competitor’s 
performance alone may provide useful information about the problem. Competitor’s 
performance may indicate what is attainable within a given problem space. The information on 
competitor’s performance becomes particularly valuable when the actor is not familiar with the 
problem and does not know what level of performance is feasible.    
The issue of competitor’s performance has long been studied in social psychology and 
management. In social psychology, it is considered in research on social comparisons, i.e. 
comparisons between self and others, which also include comparisons of who the others are and 
what they do. Social comparisons significantly influence individual judgments and behaviors 
(Corcoran, Crusius, and Mussweiler, 2011). When actors have access to information about 
others’ performance or achievements, they tend to relate this information to their own 
performance and achievements (Dunning and Hayes, 1996). In management and organizations 
research, competitor’s performance has a prominent place in the literature on learning from 
performance feedback (Greve, 2003), and on imitation and vicarious learning (e.g. Haunschild 
and Miner, 1997; Haunschild and Sullivan, 2002). These streams of research have been long 
concerned with how organizations select a comparison group to form a social aspiration point 
(Haveman, 1993; Porac et al, 1995; Greve, 1998b) and how decision making is affected by the 
organizational performance relative to this aspiration point (Cyert and March, 1963; Greve, 
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1998a; Baum et al, 2005; Baum and Dahlin, 2007; Iyer and Miller, 2008; Gaba and 
Bhattacharya, 2012). The empirical findings suggest that competitor’s performance could be 
salient to a decision maker. However, we still know very little about exact mechanisms. The 
main limitation of the extant research is that proposed mechanisms cannot be directly observed 
or tested. In most situations, organizations are assumed to pay attention to a certain aspiration 
point which is based on competitive performance (e.g. industry average), but researchers do not 
know whether the companies actually are paying attention to that specific reference point. 
Moreover, research has shown that there is heterogeneity of attention to competitor’s 
performance across companies and across time (Blettner et al, 2014). This suggests that we still 
know very little about the effects of social aspirations on organizational learning, change, and 
performance. Therefore, here I consider whether using competitor’s performance as a constraint 
helps or hinders the acquisition of veridical knowledge and the achievement of high long-term 
performance.  
Let us look at a couple of scenarios. Let us first consider that the actor faces a superior 
competitor, i.e. the actor’s own performance is below that of the competitor. If competitor’s 
performance is higher than a payoff the actors receives from trying a particular strategy, that 
strategy will be considered useless. In other words, superior performance of a competitor will 
indicate to the actor that there probably exist strategies with better payoffs. This inference will 
trigger the actor to explore other alternatives. If the actor continues to benchmark payoffs of 
various strategies against competitor’s performance, and competitor’s performance happens to be 
extremely high (such that it is beyond what is possible in the given problem space), most 
strategies will be considered useless for solving the problem (Figure 2, Scenario A). Paying 
attention to an unusually high performance of a competitor may prove to be counterproductive. 
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Seth Goldman and Barry Nalebuff, the co-founders of Honest Tea, discuss in their book how 
Jones Soda, another beverage company, was valued at 20 times their sales in 2007. Even though 
Honest Tea founders realized that Jones Soda was overvalued, they nevertheless tried to use the 
competitor’s performance as a benchmark in their negotiations with Coca-Cola. Thankfully, 
Coca-Cola did not take the bait (Goldman and Nalebuff, 2013: p. 246). Jones Soda’s stock 
plummeted in a matter of months, and is now selling for less than a dollar.  
Facing an inferior competitor generally should have the opposite effect. Judging the 
usefulness of strategies by comparing their outcomes to the performance of the inferior 
competitor leads to the development of a false belief that many ineffective strategies are 
appropriate. This way of learning becomes pathological when performance of an inferior 
competitor falls below the true value of the worst strategy (Figure 2, Scenario B). If 
benchmarking against an unusually high performance of a competitor leads to excessive 
exploration, benchmarking against an unusually low performance of a competitor leads to 
insufficient exploration and high likelihood of settling on inferior strategies. This leads to the 
following proposition: 
Proposition 5: Using performance of a superior competitor as a constraint results in 
higher level of exploration than using performance of an inferior competitor. 
 What happens when the actor is given an exogenous goal but also pays attention to 
competitor’s performance? I argue that the use of competitor’s performance as an additional 
constraint reduces the effectiveness of search and learning triggered by attention to the goal. 
When the actor faces a superior competitor, most tried strategies, including superior ones, will be 
judged as useless. If the actor has tried a strategy and found that it was helpful to meet the goal, 
she may nevertheless discard the strategy because it was not good enough to beat the competitor. 
Therefore, facing a superior competitor will lead to increased search even if strategies that meet 
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the goal have been identified. When the actor faces an inferior competitor, most tried strategies, 
including inferior ones, will be judged as useful. If the actor found a strategy ineffective for 
achieving the goal, she may nevertheless hold on to it because it was good enough to beat the 
competitor. Therefore, facing an inferior competitor will lead to insufficient search even if the 
goal requires a higher level of achievement. This discussion leads to the following propositions: 
Proposition 6: Using an exogenous goal as a constraint results in higher accuracy of 
beliefs than using a combination of an exogenous goal and competitor’s performance, 
regardless of the level of competitor’s performance. 
Proposition 7: Using an exogenous goal as a constraint results in higher performance 
than using a combination of an exogenous goal and competitor’s performance, 
regardless of the level of competitor’s performance.  
Proposition 8: Using an exogenous goal as a constraint results in higher exploration 
than using a combination of an exogenous goal and performance of inferior competitor 
and in lower exploration than using a combination of an exogenous goal and 
performance of inferior competitor. 
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A COMPUTATIONAL MODEL TO EXPLORE CONSTRAINT SPECIFICATION 
Multi-armed bandit model 
I develop ideas discussed in the previous section formally in the context of the multi-
armed bandit model. The multi-armed bandit is an important model to study dynamic learning 
from feedback in the presence of Knightian uncertainty and has been widely used in disciplines 
as diverse as statistics, economics, computer science, and psychology (e.g. Gittins and Jones, 
1974; Arthur, 1991; Sutton and Barto, 1998; Rieskamp and Otto, 2006). Even though the bandit 
model has been around for quite some time in the organizations literature (Lave and March, 
1975; Denrell and March, 2001; Greve, 2002), the interest in it among management scholars has 
only recently experienced a considerable uptick (e.g. Posen and Levinthal, 2012; Stieglitz, 
Knudsen, and Becker, 2016; Puranam and Swamy, 2016; Lee and Puranam, 2016).  
The multi-armed bandit is a sequential choice problem, where an actor has N alternative 
solutions (arms) with unknown payoff distributions. The only way the actor can learn the 
underlying payoff distribution of any arm is by trying it. Naturally, the actor would like to select 
the arm with the highest expected payoff at each time period but she will have to find it first, and 
the feedback she receives from each trial is ambiguous. At each time period, the actor has to 
make a decision based on the knowledge she has developed up to that point. However, the 
knowledge may or may not be veridical, and the actor may or may not be aware of that. The 
question, therefore, is how much to explore before settling on any particular arm. This is a 
classic exploitation – exploration tradeoff (March, 1991). This tradeoff becomes more critical, 
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when the ratio of number of arms to the number of available trials increases or when there is a 
likelihood for the actor to be selected out if she happens to draw a lower payoff. Each trial is an 
opportunity to gather more information to potentially benefit long-term performance if a better 
performing arm (or maybe even the best) is found; however, exploration can undermine short-
term performance, threatening the actor’s survival. To take again the example of repeated patent 
renewal decisions, an organization would like to explore different ways of defining value of 
patents, but the risk of foregoing valuable patents and keeping useless ones is quite substantial.  
The multi-armed bandit serves as a good simplified representation of a particular type of 
a problem where deductive reasoning and perfect rationality do not work ─ the one where 
consequences of alternatives cannot be computed with reasonable accuracy. It is not well-suited 
for the other types of problems discussed earlier, namely when a complete set of alternatives is 
not known or cannot be evaluated in a reasonable amount of time17. However, the uncertainty 
alone creates an obstacle to identifying the optimal solution. Solving the problem, and by solving 
I mean finding a satisfactory solution, depends on the quality and accuracy of knowledge that a 
decision maker has at a given point in time and her ability to recognize that what she knows may 
be wrong. 
Therefore, the key element of the multi-armed bandit model is the specification of the 
choice function. There are three things to consider when specifying the choice function. First, to 
what extent can the actor take advantage of any information in a problem statement or general 
knowledge (Simon, 1983)? This will affect what information will be attended to at each trial and 
                                                          
17 Computational intractability may arise even in the context of the bandit problem, if an actor forms a problem 
space that consists of numerous possibilities for potential values of each arm and then attempts to run scenarios to 
predict outcomes of picking an arm considering various possibilities. It may become even more computationally 
intractable if scenarios include sequences of time periods and not just evaluations of what to do in the next time 
period – what is known as the search for the optimal strategy (Gans, Knox, and Croson, 2007). This is, however, 
beyond the scope of the current study. 
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used for making decisions in subsequent trials. Second, how does the actor assimilate new 
information? How much weight is given to new information? This will define how existing 
beliefs are updated. And finally, how much does the actor trust that knowledge she has reflects 
reality? This will define how likely the actor is to act on her existing beliefs ─ in other words, 
how likely the actor is to select an alternative with the payoff currently believed to be the 
highest. 
I use the multi-armed bandit to build an agent-based model. Scholars in economics and 
statistics are concerned with finding the optimal solution to the bandit problem, and a number of 
closed-forms solutions to special cases of bandit problems exist (e.g. Gittins and Jones, 1974). 
Agent-based models are not used, however, to find under what conditions the system is in 
equilibrium (Arthur, 2013). Instead, they allow a researcher to model the task environment, 
agents’ decision heuristics, and the updating process (how new information is assimilated into a 
decision heuristic) and then evaluate individual and population-level outcomes over time. The 
objective of building the agent-based model is thus to observe how agents’ behavior and task 
environment interact, how path dependency unfolds, and through that gain new insights about 
the system’s dynamic behavior.  
The problem space in the bandit model is represented by a set of alternative strategies 
𝑆 =  [𝑆1, 𝑆2, … , 𝑆𝑁] and their payoffs. Depending on the chosen distribution for specifying 
payoff functions of each strategy, distribution parameters serve as cues for the actor to use them 
to build her decision heuristics and updating rules. For example, if outcomes of each choice are 
drawn from a normal distribution with mean µ and standard deviation 𝜎, then both these 
parameters can be used by the agent to evaluate alternatives that have been tried. For any 
unknown parameter, an actor needs to make three decisions. First, she needs to decide whether to 
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pay attention to it, assuming that she is aware of it. Second, she needs to develop a method of 
estimating the parameter based on the imperfect information she receives from experience. 
Third, the actor needs to decide how to incorporate information about the parameter estimate in 
to the choice function. 
When specifying the bandit model, there are choices to be made about the type of 
distribution, distribution parameters and cues. I make several important assumptions. First, for 
each strategy 𝑆𝑗, payoffs are drawn from a normal (Gaussian) probability distribution with mean 
𝑄∗(𝑆𝑗) and variance 𝜎
2 = 𝐶. Therefore, I assume all strategies have the same variance that is 
also constant over time. Second, because variance is assumed to be constant and same across 
strategies, I also assume that agents do not pay attention to variance and do not attempt to 
estimate it. The only parameter from the problem space that the agents pay attention to is the 
estimate of the mean payoff for each arm. 
As actors do not know the true values of strategies, they have to make decisions based on 
incomplete knowledge that they have at the time of making a decision. Actors develop and 
update beliefs about merits of each strategy based on their experience. There are few traditional 
ways to specify belief updating rules and choice rules that I will discuss below, before 
introducing new assumptions based on the discussion of constraints in the previous section. 
Actor i is assumed to have a set of beliefs at time t, 𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = [𝑉𝑖,𝑡(𝑆1), 𝑉𝑖,𝑡(𝑆2), … , 𝑉𝑖,𝑡(𝑆𝑁)], 
where 𝑉𝑖,𝑡(𝑆𝑗) is a vector of beliefs about the value of strategy 𝑆𝑗 at time t. In a traditional set-up, 
𝑉𝑖,𝑡(𝑆𝑗) is a scalar that captures an estimate of the mean payoff. It is estimated as a weighted 
function of the belief in a previous time period and a realized payoff in the current time period, 
such that: 
𝑉𝑖,𝑡(𝑆𝑗)  =  𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1(𝑆𝑗) +  𝜑 × (𝑄𝑖,𝑡(𝑆𝑗) − 𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1(𝑆𝑗))                                                                (1) 
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𝑄𝑖,𝑡(𝑆𝑗) is a realized payoff for strategy 𝑆𝑗 if it was tried at time t. The parameter φ 
regulates how much new information about a strategy contributes to the actor’s belief about the 
value of this strategy. A special case of this updating rule is a simple average of realized payoffs 
from all trials with strategy 𝑆𝑗. 
The choice function could be specified to maximize with respect to existing beliefs or as 
a probabilistic choice rule (Puranam et al, 2015). Maximizing with respect to existing beliefs is 
known as greedy action selection rule in the artificial intelligence literature (Sutton and Barto, 
1998). This choice rule makes the actor always pick a strategy that is believed to have the highest 
payoff at the time of making a decision, i.e. based on the information that the actor has gathered 
up to that point. Therefore, in accordance with the greedy method, actor i picks up max
𝑆𝑗
𝑉𝑖,𝑡(𝑆𝑗) 
at time t+1. Doing so is naturally incredibly myopic when the actor knows little about the 
problem. Therefore, the probabilistic choice rule may be more appropriate. In accordance with 
this rule, the probability of picking a particular strategy is proportional to its value to the decision 
maker. One probabilistic choice function established in the literature is known as softmax 
selection rule (Sutton and Barto, 1998), where probability of choosing strategy Sj at time t+1 is 
defined as: 
𝑃𝑖,𝑡+1(𝑆𝑗) =
𝑒
𝑉𝑖,𝑡(𝑆𝑗)/𝜏
∑ 𝑒
𝑉𝑖,𝑡(𝑆𝑗)/𝜏𝑁
𝑗=1
                                                                                                    (2) 
Apart from the relative values of strategies, the choice is also determined by a positive 
parameter τ, called the temperature (Sutton and Barto, 1998). Low temperatures make the actor 
to put more weight on her current mental representation – in other words, the actor is more likely 
to act on current beliefs. When the temperature is sufficiently low (𝜏 → 0), softmax selection 
rule is equivalent to greedy action selection rule. High temperatures could be thought of as 
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reflecting the actor’s awareness of the fallibility of her knowledge. The higher the temperature, 
the more current representations are discounted (Puranam et al, 2015). At very high 
temperatures, the actor is almost indifferent between alternatives and has nearly equal probability 
of selecting any alternative, irrespective of their values. 
While the traditional approach in bandit models is to use actual payoffs in estimating 
strategies’ values, the research in psychology and management suggests that decision makers 
may judge the value of alternative solutions as successes and failures relative to the reference 
point (Holland et al, 1986; Levitt and March, 1988; Greve, 2003). By using Simon’s (1955) 
suggestions on simplifying value functions, the value of each strategy can be coded as a success 
or failure relative to a specified constraint. Compared to making calculations of actual payoffs 
and keeping track of them across time, the actor can instead only keep track of whether a 
particular strategy has been useful. If a strategy Sj has been useful in meeting the constraint P* at 
time t, the value of this strategy increases. If it has not been useful, its value decreases. More 
formally, we can specify the belief of actor i about the value of a strategy Sj at time t as follows:  
𝑉𝑖,𝑡(𝑆𝑗) = {
𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1(𝑆𝑗) + 1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑄𝑖,𝑡(𝑆𝑗) ≥ 𝑃
∗
𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1(𝑆𝑗) − 1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑄𝑖,𝑡(𝑆𝑗) < 𝑃
∗                                                                              (3) 
If the actor uses two constraints (P1* and P2*), then she is assumed to make two 
independent judgments of the strategy’ usefulness, which are then combined in the following 
way:  
𝑉𝑖,𝑡(𝑆𝑗) =
{
 
 
 
 𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1(𝑆𝑗) + 𝛼 × 1 + (1 − 𝛼) × 1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑄𝑖,𝑡(𝑆𝑗) ≥ 𝑃1
∗ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑄𝑖,𝑡(𝑆𝑗) ≥ 𝑃2
∗
𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1(𝑆𝑗) + 𝛼 × 1 + (1 − 𝛼) × (−1), 𝑖𝑓 𝑄𝑖,𝑡(𝑆𝑗) ≥ 𝑃1
∗ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑄𝑖,𝑡(𝑆𝑗) < 𝑃2
∗
𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1(𝑆𝑗) + 𝛼 × (−1) + (1 − 𝛼) × 1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑄𝑖,𝑡(𝑆𝑗) < 𝑃1
∗ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑄𝑖,𝑡(𝑆𝑗) ≥ 𝑃2
∗
𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1(𝑆𝑗) + 𝛼 × (−1) + (1 − 𝛼) × (−1), 𝑖𝑓 𝑄𝑖,𝑡(𝑆𝑗) < 𝑃1
∗ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑄𝑖,𝑡(𝑆𝑗) < 𝑃2
∗
                  (4) 
 
If α=0.5, then an actor pays equal attention to both constraints. The strategy value, once 
encoded in terms of successes and failures, is then used in the probabilistic choice rule based on 
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softmax action selection specification. By using this simplified value function, I want to study its 
effectiveness in the acquisition of the veridical knowledge and the achievement of long-term 
performance. I consider two simulation experiments. The first experiment explores how different 
levels of exogenous goal affect exploration, acquisition of accurate beliefs, and performance. 
With this, I address Propositions 1, 2, 3, and 4. The second simulation experiment adds 
performance of inferior and superior competitor as a second constraint, in a combination with an 
exogenous goal. With this, I address Propositions 5, 6, 7, and 8.  
 
Model specification 
A computational model based on multi-armed bandit requires specification of a set of 
parameters. In this section I describe the specification of parameters associated with (a) problem 
space, (b) choice function, and (c) value function. 
Specification of the problem space. A problem space in the multi-armed bandit consists 
of a set of strategies and their associated payoffs. Number of strategies in the main simulation 
experiment are set to N=8, while in the sensitivity analysis, I also explore N=4 and N=12. The 
expectation is that a larger number of strategies make it harder to locate better strategies. Payoffs 
for each strategy are drawn from the normal distribution with a mean that falls in the interval PS 
= (4, 6) and variance of 1 (C=1). Distributions from which payoffs are drawn do not change over 
time. With this specification, the problem of finding a superior alternative is sufficiently hard, 
because even the worst strategy may produce payoffs that fall anywhere in problem space. In 
other words, there is sufficient overlap in distributions of payoffs produced by different 
strategies. In the sensitivity analysis, I also explore a smaller interval PS = (4, 5) and a larger 
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interval PS = (4, 8). The expectation is that a wider problem space makes it easier to locate 
superior strategies.  
The problem space is given the following structure. The entire problem space is divided 
into 4 chunks, and means for 25% of strategies are drawn from a uniform distribution, 
corresponding to the chunk. For example, in the main experiment, with N=8 and PS = (4, 6), 
means for 2 strategies are drawn from the uniform distribution (4, 4.5), means for the next 2 
strategies – from the uniform distribution (4.5, 5), next 2 strategies – from the uniform 
distribution (5, 5.5), and the last 2 strategies – (5.5, 6). With this structure, the analysis always 
considers number of strategies to be a multiple of 4. Having such rigid structure allows me to 
ensure consistency across trials. In other words, keeping the structure constant, I can be sure that 
the differences in outcomes are driven by differences in constraint specification, and not by 
differences in the problem structure18.   
Specification of the choice function. The choice function is based on the softmax 
selection rule (Formula 2) and involves specifying the temperature τ – a parameter that regulates 
to what extent an actor acts on her current beliefs. The higher the value of τ, the more the actor 
questions her beliefs. The parameter τ is sensitive to the magnitude of a belief 𝑉𝑖,𝑡(𝑆𝑗) about the 
value of strategy 𝑆𝑗; it is also sensitive to the differences in beliefs between strategies. In the 
main simulation experiment, τ is set at 0.25. When τ=0.25, the actor is most likely to choose a 
strategy that she believes to have the highest payoff based on her experience19. In the sensitivity 
analysis, the following additional values for τ are considered: τ = (0.5, 0.75, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0).  
                                                          
18 Simulations were replicated on problem spaces without chunks. Results hold.  
19 It is important to note that when τ=0.25, an actor pursues greedy search strategy most of the times. However, on 
occasion, the actor may choose a different strategy if expected payoffs of different strategies are very close to each 
other. That makes a softmax action selection rule at τ=0.25 work more like a ε-greedy search with a very small value 
of ε (Sutton and Barto, 1998: p. 28).  
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Specification of the value function. The value function at time zero is equal to zero for 
all strategies and all agents. To update beliefs after each time period, I use Formula 3 and 
Formula 4. For this, I need to specify P*. First, I consider exogenous goals. To comprehensively 
study the effect of exogenous goals, I specify a range of goals that cover the entire problem space 
in a given simulation. In the main experiment, where PS = (4,6), I consider the following levels 
of exogenous goals: P*=(3.5, 3.75, 4.0, 4.25, 4.5, 4.75, 5.0, 5.25, 5.5, 5.75, 6.0, 6.25, 6.75). Once 
set, the goal level stays the same across the entire course of simulation. 
Second, I consider competitive performance. I create two stylized competitors – an 
inferior competitor and the superior competitor. When an actor faces an inferior competitor, Pic* 
is defined as Pic*<< (min
𝑆𝑗
𝑄∗(𝑆𝑗). In the main experiment, Pic*=3. When an actor faces a superior 
competitor, Pic* is defined as Pic*>> (max
𝑆𝑗
𝑄∗(𝑆𝑗). In the main experiment, Pic*=7. In addition, I 
need to specify α, which is equal 0.5 in all simulations. 
Other specifications. Each scenario considers 100 agents sampling strategies for 100 
time periods on the same problem space. All extracted measures are averaged first across 100 
agents, and then across 2,000 replications20. Belief accuracy is calculated as the proportion of 
actors that at time T=100 believes that the best strategy in a given problem is in fact the best. 
Cumulative payoff is calculated as the sum of realized payoffs across 100 time periods, averaged 
across actors. Number of strategies tried across 100 periods is calculated as the number of 
unique strategies sampled across 100 time periods, averaged across actors. Number of strategies 
tried in the last 50 periods is calculated as the number of unique strategies tried in the last 50 
time periods, averaged across actors.  
                                                          
20 In each replication, when goal level is varied, the problem space stays the same. Similarly, when testing the 
addition of competitor’s performance, results on the same problem space are compared. 
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Simulations are structured according to the following process. First, I generate a problem 
space. Second, within the problem space, I generate a certain number of groups with 100 agents 
in each that search according to different rules. In the first simulation experiment, where I 
consider exogenous goals, there are 13 goal levels. Therefore, I generate 13 groups of agents that 
search in the same problem space. In the second simulation experiment, there are 13 levels of 
goals and 3 scenarios (no competitor, inferior competitor, and superior competitor). Therefore, I 
generate 13×3=39 groups of agents that search in the same problem space. Third, I repeat the 
first and second steps 2,000 times.  
 
Simulation experiment #1: Analysis of effects of exogenous goals 
I begin the analysis of constraints by considering effects of setting up an exogenous goal. 
When an actor has very little knowledge about a problem, setting an exogenous goal could be 
very difficult. Without knowing what level of performance is feasible to achieve in a given 
problem space, it is impossible to say whether the goal is high enough to ensure that the actor 
does not settle with inferior strategies but also realistic enough for an actor to actually be able to 
achieve the goal. While this seems quite intuitive, what we do not know is where that threshold 
lies relative to the problem space.  
I start by analyzing outcomes of bandit model for different levels of goals. Figure 3 
captures belief accuracy and cumulative payoff as a function of the goal level. In this simulation 
scenario, the number of strategies is N=8, the interval for the problem space is PS = (4, 6), and 
τ=0.25. In line with Proposition 1, the goal level has a curvilinear effect on belief accuracy. 
Similarly, in line with Proposition 2, the goal level has a curvilinear effect on cumulative payoff. 
As the goal level rises, actors develop more accurate beliefs and achieve higher performance. 
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With higher goal level, actors are able to make better judgments about the merit of different 
strategies and are more efficient at discarding inferior strategies and retaining superior strategies. 
However, after a point, a higher goal starts having a detrimental effect on the quality of 
judgments that actors make about the merit of different strategies. When the goal is too 
ambitious, actors discard most strategies they try and continue searching for better strategies. 
This excessive exploration results in lower performance.  
 In Proposition 4, I suggested that the tipping point in curvilinear effects described above 
should be in the neighborhood of the solution with best true value. Although pretty close, it is not 
exactly the case. Actors do seem to develop more accurate beliefs the closer the goal gets to the 
state with the highest achievable outcome. However, the best outcomes are achieved when the 
goal isolates a couple of top-performing strategies, not just the best one. In Figure 3, we can see 
that the goal level of P*=5.5 – the one that divides the problem space into one chunk with 2 
highest performing strategies and the other one with remaining (lower performing) strategies – 
results in the highest belief accuracy. When a goal is set at this level, the evaluation of strategies 
is very efficient. Inferior strategies are deemed useless, while superior strategies are deemed 
useful for achieving the goal and retained. There is a disadvantage to setting a goal higher than 
that. Given that even the best strategy can sometimes result in a subpar performance, it seems 
that the goal that provides some buffer is better than a higher goal that is more rigid and has a 
higher likelihood of leading to an inference that the best strategy is not useful. Other than the 
development of wrong beliefs, setting a goal at very high levels has a more tangible 
disadvantage. At very high goal levels, the goal cannot actually be achieved. In this scenario, the 
goal is achieved as long as it is set at or below P*=5.5 ─ a constraint that separates a top quartile 
of strategies.  
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As the goal level changes, it has different implications for knowledge accumulation and 
performance. As we can see in Figure 3, there is a zone in the problem space (approximately 
between 4.75 and 5.75), where substantial differences in belief accuracy are associated with 
much smaller differences in performance. This suggests diminishing returns to exploration. A 
higher goal leads to higher likelihood of rejecting strategies that have been tried. When actors try 
other strategies, they have a higher likelihood of finding a better strategy, but in the process of 
searching for it, performance may drop if inferior strategies are discovered. 
Setting up goals at various levels also has different implications for variability of 
outcomes. Figure 4 depicts standard deviations of belief accuracy and cumulative payoff across 
2,000 replications. There is a curvilinear effect of the goal level on variability of belief accuracy 
and cumulative payoff. Interestingly, the highest variability is observed when the goal is set very 
close to the state with the highest achievable outcome. When the goal is at P*=5.75, actors are 
likely to discover a superior strategy, but they are also very likely to fail. It is informative to 
compare distributions of cumulative payoff at two goal levels: P*=5.25 (the level at which the 
highest payoff is achieved) and P*=5.75 (the level at which payoffs exhibit the highest variance). 
Figure 5 compares histograms of cumulative payoffs for the two goal levels side by side. While 
maximum potential payoff is similar across two goal levels, the distribution has a longer and 
fatter left tail at P*=5.75 where lower payoffs are much more likely. 
I have argued in Proposition 3 that the knowledge and performance outcomes with 
respect to the goal level are driven by differences in exploration dynamics. Figure 6 shows how 
exploration changes across goal levels. As the goal level increases, actors sample a higher 
number of strategies, eventually sampling all of them across time at a very high goal level. 
Although I observe an increase in exploration as the goal level increases, the relationship is not 
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linear, unlike Proposition 3 states. We observe that as the goal level increases, there is an 
increase in number of strategies tried overall, but exploration declines rapidly in the last 50 
periods, effectively resulting in exploitation of only one strategy. We observe this effect as long 
as the goal level P*≤5.25. After this point, we observe a dramatic increase in exploration, which 
does not decrease with time. Therefore, the relationship between goal level and exploration has 
more of an S shape than a straight line. 
Previous research using bandit models suggests that higher levels of exploration are 
usually beneficial for generating new knowledge, but are detrimental for performance (e.g. Posen 
and Levinthal, 2012). However, what I find here suggests that there could be a limit to which 
more intense exploration is beneficial ─ even for developing more accurate beliefs (see Figure 
7). Whether more intense sampling of different strategies results in the acquisition of more 
accurate beliefs depends on how new information is encoded in knowledge structures and how 
those beliefs are formed. If it is true that we “reason in service of our goals” (Johnson-Laird, 
2006), then it is possible that the quality of acquired beliefs is only as good as the goals are. 
Higher level of exploration is only beneficial to an extent that it results in accurate inferences 
about the usefulness of different strategies. At high goal levels, many strategies, including good 
ones, are deemed useless, which prevents the actor from developing accurate beliefs about high 
performing strategies and forces her to explore other strategies. When an actor is able to 
differentiate efficiently between inferior and superior strategies, the values of different strategies 
become more distinct, exploration decreases, and the actor starts exploiting accumulated 
knowledge. However, we can see that exploration does not reduce efficiently at higher goal 
levels. On the other hand, we observe an efficient reduction in number of strategies sampled at 
lower goal levels. The higher performance results when a reasonably high number of strategies 
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are sampled initially, but then only one or two strategies are exploited in the later time periods. 
Therefore, what we want is balance between initial exploration and subsequent exploitation, 
where a sufficiently large number of strategies is sampled in early time periods, but only one or 
two strategies are exploited in later time periods. 
I examined the sensitivity of results to changes in (a) the temperature τ; (b) size of the 
problem space; and (c) number of strategies N. First, I consider changes in τ. Main simulation 
experiment was based on a very small temperature (τ=0.25), which means that actors are very 
likely to act on their current beliefs. In the sensitivity analysis, I analyze higher levels of τ. With 
increase in temperature, actors are more likely to question their current beliefs. While 
performance declines as the parameter τ increases, it does so in a similar way across all goal 
levels, preserving the same kind of curvilinear effect that we observe in the main experiment. 
Second, I consider changes in the size of the problem space. The main simulation experiment 
was based on PS = (4, 6). In the sensitivity analysis, I analyze the outcomes of decreasing (PS = 
(4, 5)) and increasing (PS = (4, 8)) the size of the problem space. Decreasing the size of the 
problem space increases the difficulty of distinguishing among the strategies. It pushes the 
optimal goal level downwards, but only slightly. When PS = (4, 5), N=8, and τ=0.25, the optimal 
goal level falls in the middle of the problem space (P*=4.5), as opposed to a top quartile we 
observed in the main experiment. All other outcomes are the same. The slight downward shift in 
the optimal goal level provides additional evidence that a more flexible goal is better than a more 
rigid goal (thus further contradicting Proposition 4). Third, I consider changes in number of 
strategies. In the main experiment, number of strategies was fixed at 8. In the sensitivity analysis, 
I analyze effects of decreasing (N=4) and increasing (N=12) number of strategies. Increasing 
number of strategies makes it more difficult to find better performing strategies and thus requires 
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more sampling. When N=12, we observe an increase in sampling, but overall results are the same 
as in the main experiment. Therefore, the sensitivity analysis suggests that effects of setting an 
exogenous goal on performance, knowledge, and exploration are robust across different levels of 
parameters.  
Table 1 compares how model results stand against Propositions 1, 2, 3 and 4. While 
Propositions 1 and 2 are supported, Propositions 3 and 4 are not, but in a subtle way. Although I 
do find a curvilinear effect of the goal level on knowledge and performance, as suggested by 
Propositions 1 and 2, the optimal goal level is not in the neighborhood of the optimal solution, as 
suggested by Proposition 4. According to model results, the optimal goal level allows for 
inferences that at least a couple of top performing strategies are useful. This flexibility increases 
the chances of making correct inferences and decreases the likelihood of rejecting superior 
strategies. A higher goal level leads to a higher likelihood of rejecting strategies that have been 
tried and increases exploration, but at very high goal levels, exploration becomes excessive and 
does not reduce efficiently with time because actors are not able to identify superior strategies. 
While Proposition 3 suggests a linear increase in exploration, we observe more of an S shape, 
where actors explore too little at low goal levels and explore too much at high goal levels.  
Theoretically, these results have several important implications. First, they suggest that 
there is more that we need to understand about the mechanism that explains the relationship 
between a goal level and performance. To be effective for finding superior solutions and 
achieving superior performance, a goal should help an actor distinguish between strategies with 
superior outcomes and strategies with inferior outcomes. If the goal is so high that it does not 
divide the problem space in an efficient manner, the quality of beliefs that actors develop about 
usefulness of strategies declines substantially, exploration increases, and performance declines. 
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Goal-setting theory attributes this effect to the drop in motivation and commitment when the 
actor perceives the goal as unattainable and explores less, reducing their chance of finding a 
better solution (Locke and Latham, 2002). However, results in simulation experiment #1 
demonstrate that even if actors stay motivated and committed, a very challenging goal leads to 
subpar performance, solely because actors evaluate strategies relative to the goal level, find 
strategies that they try to be ineffective, and continue searching for better ones. A very 
challenging goal may lead to perfection syndrome, with which actors explore a lot but learn a 
little.  
Therefore, the second theoretical implication is that these findings provide support to the 
following assertion made by March (1991, p. 71): 
“Adaptive systems that engage in exploration to the exclusion of exploitation are likely to find 
that they suffer the costs of experimentation without gaining many of its benefits. They exhibit 
too many undeveloped new ideas and too little distinctive competence.”  
However, I further extend March’s ideas on exploration by addressing the question of 
why actors explore more. I suggest that if goals are used to generate inferences about the 
problem structure, then exploration is an endogenous outcome of knowledge development. 
Actors only explore more because they believe they have not found the best strategy yet and thus 
continue searching. Whether actors’ beliefs are more or less likely to be accurate depends on the 
goal level. 
This brings us to the third theoretical implication. I find that there is a strong positive 
correlation between quality of acquired knowledge and performance. However, both the 
knowledge and performance were a result of the process of making inductions based on 
experience relative to the goal level. In the simulation experiment, actors that paid attention to 
different goals had the same initial beliefs at time zero but eventually differed in the quality of 
knowledge they developed and performance they were able to achieve. The only difference was 
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the level of goal that they paid attention to. This suggests that we should give a more careful 
consideration to the context in which actors learn about the problem structure. It seems that 
performance advantage could arise simply because the goal happened to be set at the right level, 
which facilitated acquisition of accurate beliefs. The focus on the context in which actors learn 
complements previous research on the role of cognition in learning that mostly focused on 
characteristics of the problem, such as interdependencies, complexity, or feedback delays (e.g., 
Sterman, 2000; Denrell, Fang, and Levinthal, 2004; Gary and Wood, 2011).     
Finally, the results have an implication for how we think about the virtue of optimization 
as an organizational objective in the context where the problem structure is unknown to actors. 
While the best performing strategy leads to superior performance if applied consistently, 
searching for the best strategy may prove counterproductive. Excessive exploration results in 
inferior performance, because the more actors search the more they are likely to come across 
inferior strategies than superior ones. It further implies that if the party that sets a goal has the 
knowledge what level of performance can be achieved in a given problem space, while actors do 
not know what strategy results in the highest performance, the party is better off setting a modest 
goal for actors rather than a challenging one. A modest goal will ensure that actors engage in 
sufficient exploration to increase chances of finding a better solution but do not develop a 
perfection syndrome in the process.  
 
Simulation experiment #2: Analysis of effects of competitor’s performance 
In the second experiment, I analyze the effects of using information on competitor’s 
performance for setting up constraints, in addition to exogenous goals. I introduce stylized 
inferior and superior competitors. It means that no matter what actors do, their performance is 
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always above the performance of a competitor (when there is an inferior competitor) or below 
(when there is a superior competitor). I compare 3 scenarios: (a) actors use only an exogenous 
goal to evaluate strategies; (b) actors use a combination of an exogenous goal and inferior 
competitor’s performance to evaluate strategies: and f(c) actors use a combination of an 
exogenous goal and superior competitor’s performance to evaluate strategies.  
Figure 8 shows cumulative payoffs and Figure 9 shows belief accuracy across these 3 
scenarios and goal levels. The results suggest that there is only partial support to Propositions 6 
and 7. Using an exogenous goal alone results in the highest cumulative payoffs and most 
accurate beliefs only within a specific region of the problem space. Specifically, Figure 10 
captures proportion of trials in which cumulative payoff from a scenario where actors pay 
attention only to the exogenous goal exceeds cumulative payoffs from the two scenarios where 
actors also pay attention to competitor’s performance. We can see that only at some goal levels, 
Proposition 6 is supported in 100% of trials. 
It seems that paying attention to competitor’s performance in addition to an exogenous 
goal has a negative effect on knowledge and performance only when the exogenous goal itself is 
effective. Particularly, using the exogenous goal as a constrain pays off really well when the goal 
is set in such a way that it allows to distinguish between inferior and superior strategies in an 
efficient manner. This is a zone where accurate inferences are most likely to be made. As the 
goal allows to make more accurate inferences, paying attention to competitor’s performance, in 
addition to the goal, hurts the actor’s performance in this zone. It hurts performance when the 
actor pays attention to a superior competitor, because superior strategies are undervalued, i.e. 
they are considered useless when comparing their payoffs to a superior competitor’s 
performance, thus reducing the efficiency of distinguishing between strategies. It also hurts 
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performance when the actor pays attention to an inferior competitor because inferior strategies 
are overvalued, i.e. they are considered useful when comparing their payoffs to an inferior 
competitor’s performance, again reducing the efficiency of distinguishing between strategies. 
Figure 11 (in the middle) shows that when the goal is set at P*=5.5, paying attention to an 
inferior competitor results in insufficient number of strategies explored, while paying attention to 
a superior competitor results in persistent excessive exploration. Paying attention to only the 
exogenous goal at P*=5.5 results in sampling a good number of different strategies initially that 
is later reduced to exploitation of only two strategies.   
Second, it seems that paying attention to an inferior competitor is beneficial when the 
goal level is very high. To explain this result, one can think of it as a competitor’s performance 
serving as a reality check. When the goal is extremely high, almost all strategies are deemed 
useless for achieving the goal – we saw in the analysis of results from Simulation experiment #1 
that at high goal levels actors continue to engage in excessive exploration over time. However, 
when they observe performance of an inferior competitor, actors have an additional information 
signal that strategies that they try may not be that useless ─ at least they are good for beating the 
competitor. In other words, strategies that are deemed useless when evaluated against a very high 
goal level are deemed useful when evaluated against a competitor’s performance. This double 
evaluation that provides opposite inferences reduces exploration in a more efficient manner, than 
an exogenous goal alone, as can be seen in Figure 11 (on the right).  
Figure 11 provides indirect support to Proposition 5. Although I did not test the effects of 
using competitor’s performance alone, when competitor’s performance is combined with 
exogenous goal, actors that observe performance of superior competitor explore more than actors 
that observe performance of inferior competitor. This difference in the level of exploration holds 
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across different goal levels. Results provide only partial support to Proposition 8. Proposition 8 is 
supported only when the goal is set at a moderate level. When the goal is very high, there is not 
much difference in the level of exploration by actors that only use an exogenous goal and actors 
that use a combination of the exogenous goal and performance of a superior competitor. At a 
very high goal level, actors already reject virtually all strategies that they try and continue to 
explore; therefore, paying attention to a superior competitor does not make things any worse. At 
the same time, paying attention to an inferior competitor neutralizes some of the false inferences 
and results in efficient reduction of exploration as discussed above. When the goal level is very 
low, there is not much difference in the level of exploration by actors that only use an exogenous 
goal and actors that use a combination of the exogenous goal and performance of an inferior 
competitor. At a very low goal level, actors explore very little, because the very first one or two 
strategies that they try are likely to be found useful; paying attention to inferior competitor only 
reinforces these beliefs. However, at very low goal levels, paying attention to superior 
competitor results in an inference that there could be better strategies, thus forcing actors to 
explore more.  
As I have done in Simulation experiment #1, I examined the sensitivity of results of 
Simulation experiment #2 to changes in (a) the temperature τ; (b) size of the problem space; and 
(c) number of strategies N. First, I consider changes in τ. An increase in temperature makes it 
more likely that the actor will question her existing beliefs. Performance superiority of using 
only exogenous goal shifts downwards with respect to the goal level as the parameter τ increases. 
Figure 12 shows cumulative payoff across the three scenarios and across goal levels when τ=2.0. 
Figure 13 captures a proportion of trials in which cumulative payoff from a scenario where 
actors pay attention only to exogenous goal exceeds cumulative payoff from scenarios where 
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actors also pay attention to competitive performance when τ=2.0. Interestingly, an increase in 
temperature does not have implications for relative dynamics in accuracy of beliefs and 
exploration. The odd result is that there is no high correlation between accuracy of beliefs and 
performance, particularly at lower goal levels when τ=2.0. Actors that pay attention to both 
exogenous goal and performance of superior competitor develop more accurate beliefs than other 
groups but this knowledge advantage does not result in performance advantage. On the other 
hand, actors that pay attention only to exogenous goal develop less accurate beliefs but achieve a 
much better performance than the group that also pays attention to superior competitor. Second, I 
consider changes in the size of the problem space. Increasing or decreasing the size of the 
problem space does not have a substantive effect on the nature of results. Third, I consider 
changes in a number of strategies. Increasing or decreasing the number of strategies also does not 
have a substantive effect on the nature of results. Therefore, results are sensitive to changes in 
the temperature but robust to the size of the problem space and the number of strategies. 
The comparison of results from Simulation experiment #2 with Propositions 5, 6, 7, and 8 
is summarized in Table 2. While Proposition 5 is supported, Proposition 6, 7, and 8 only hold in 
specific circumstances. A theoretical implication of the results is that introducing an additional 
source of information that could be used to set up constraints does not just have a straightforward 
positive or negative effect. Whether having more information means better knowledge and better 
performance outcomes depends a lot on the quality of information sources themselves. I find that 
when the exogenous goal is set extremely high, it pays off to notice an inferior competitor. But 
when the goal itself is effective, paying attention to another source of information hurts 
performance. In a real-world situation, the challenge is of course to know when the goal is set 
right and when the competitive performance tells what’s realistic in a given space and what is 
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not. One possible way to deal with this challenge is to collect more information about 
distribution of outcomes in a given problem space. However, naturally, collection, analysis, and 
synthesis of data are not cheap. The issue of what information to pay attention to and how much 
data to collect is very important to continue to study.  
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AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY: METHODOLOGY 
In an experimental study, participants try to solve a problem that in reality has an optimal 
solution. However, in the beginning participants do not know anything about the structure of the 
problem or what solutions work to solve it; therefore, they may find it extremely difficult to 
optimize. The experimental design that has been chosen for this study allows me to explore 
effects of competitor’s performance on the development of knowledge, decision making, and 
performance. Participants are given an exogenous goal that indicates precisely the location of the 
optimal solution and some participants also have access to information about performance of 
other players. With this laboratory experiment, I explore Propositions 5, 6, 7, and 8. Below I 
discuss methodology and experimental design in detail.  
 
Why a laboratory experiment?  
Investigating effects of competitor’s performance on knowledge acquisition, decision 
making and performance of strategic decision makers is difficult in real-world settings because 
there are confounding effects of many other factors that are virtually impossible to control for. 
For example, I could have chosen to study effects of competitor’s performance on analysts in a 
knowledge process outsourcing (KPO) firm, as they work on projects for estimating the market 
size for new pharmaceutical products. As analysts work on more and more similar projects, they 
become more efficient in executing them. At the end of each project, they receive feedback on 
their work. In theory, this feedback should help them figure out how to improve their work. 
Hypothetically, I could introduce an experimental design in a company, so that some analysts 
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receive feedback only about their own performance, and others also become aware of the 
performance of others.  
In such a field-based experiment, I would have to find a way to control for many 
contextual parameters on which analysts may exhibit heterogeneity. I would have to control for 
social dynamics in the firm, i.e. understand how analysts interact, who they are likely to compare 
themselves to, who they are likely to imitate and learn from. In other words, I will have to 
control for voluntary social comparisons. In addition, it will be impossible to differentiate effects 
of feedback from one’s own actions and effects of feedback from other’s actions. Moreover, 
there will be effects of changing environment and effects of changes in what optimal market 
sizing capability actually entails. For example, while analysts learn what final product of their 
market sizing project satisfies managers and customers the most, this optimal value of the 
product will also change over time. In this real world scenario with analysts in a KPO firm, it 
will be difficult to make causal claims, because there will be many factors affecting outcomes, 
which will be difficult or impossible to control for (Wilson, Aronson, Carlsmith, 2010).  
Unlike this real-world setting, a laboratory experiment allows me to eliminate effects of 
some factors, randomize out effects of others, and make certain causal claims (Wilson et al, 
2010). There are few major concerns that a lab experiment helps take care of or at least reduce 
their effect. First, I am concerned with being able to measure knowledge and performance 
objectively, thus many realistic tasks with interdependencies, noise, uncertainty, and feedback 
delays (e.g. a management game in Gary and Wood, 2011) pose a problem if a unique optimal 
solution does not exist. Therefore, in a laboratory experiment, I design a problem task that has a 
unique optimal solution which is feasible to find, but to participants, the underlying structure of 
the problem is unknown. Second, I am concerned about effects of identity and behavior 
72 
 
comparisons and social interaction patterns that always occur in a real world (Corcoran et al, 
2011). These effects can be entirely eliminated through an experimental design. Third, I am 
concerned with effects of changing environment, changing nature of the problem, and changing 
optimal solution – the laboratory experiment allows to keep all these constant. There are still 
concerns about some individual characteristics of participants (such as intellectual abilities, 
motivation, and decision making style) that may confound effects of performance comparisons, 
but a random assignment of participants into treatment conditions allows us to diminish the 
likelihood of having this issue, as long as the sample size of each group is sufficiently large 
(Wilson et al, 2010). Even though I will randomize participants to treatment conditions, I intend 
to collect data on individual characteristics. 
The experimental setting gives me an additional advantage of being able to collect data at 
the three levels of analysis – knowledge (mental representations), decision making behavior, and 
performance. To see these three levels of analysis in a single study is rare (see Gary and Wood 
(2011) for exception). Studies of cognition usually focus on mental models and decision making; 
studies of learning curves and performance usually focus only on performance and rarely 
consider behavior. Accessing information at all three levels is very challenging, especially in 
real-world settings, where we often deal with complex and ambiguous situations, or where no 
clear strategies exist, or where performance cannot be clearly attributed to decisions made. 
However, having information at all three levels is crucial in the current study. Therefore, it is 
important to choose a problem that can be solved with the use of clear analytical strategies and 
understanding of which participants can try to improve over time.  
Based on the above, I have chosen to conduct a laboratory experiment, where participants 
play an analytical game on a computer. This experiment is low on mundane realism, because the 
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laboratory setting and activities in which I have engaged participants are hardly reflective of real 
life activities of decision makers in organizations. However, I believe that the experiment is high 
on experimental and psychological realism (Wilson et al, 2010). I believe that participants have 
taken the analytical game seriously and have been motivated to perform well. I also believe that 
the effect of competitor’s performance on search is the same in the lab as it is in the real world. I 
argue that the processes of forming mental representations, acquiring knowledge, and making 
decisions during the game are psychologically same as the ones that occur in real-world settings. 
In other words, the laboratory experiment, the way it is designed, captures the essential features 
of the phenomenon (Locke, 1986). The details of the experiment are described below.  
 
Overview of the analytical game 
For individuals to be able to learn from their experience and make relevant inferences, 
the problem they are facing should be neither too easy nor too complex. Previous research has 
shown that too much complexity impede learning (Levinthal, 1997; Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; 
Sterman, 2000; Gary and Wood, 2011), while too easy problems are usually solved quickly and 
may not produce necessary performance heterogeneity across participants (Bandura and Jourden, 
1991). Participants in the study are asked to play a game where they need to attempt to reach an 
optimal value of variable Y, which is set at 30,000, by adjusting values of the three decision 
variables X1, X2, and X3. Each of the three X variables can take 100 possible values, making 
1,000,000 possible combinations of the X variables, and only one combination corresponds to the 
optimal value of “Y”. Participants have only 20 attempts to find the optimal value of Y. At each 
attempt, participants can adjust values of as many X variables as they like and receive immediate 
feedback about the value of Y that has resulted from the last chosen combination of the three X 
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variables. To make this game sufficiently difficult for participants, I relate the three X variables 
to the Y variable through a deterministic quadratic function with equal weights, no interaction 
terms, and no temporal dependency. It can be expressed the following way: 
𝑌 = 30,000 − [(𝑋1 − 𝑎1)
2 + (𝑋2 − 𝑎2)
2 + (𝑋3 − 𝑎3)
2]                                                        (5) 
Y is a performance metric, X1, X2, and X3 are decision variables, and a1, a2, and a3 are 
optimal values of decision variables. Participants do not know the underlying function captured 
in Formula 5 and have to judge how their actions affect outcomes solely based on the feedback 
provided to them. Participants may employ various search strategies to achieve the goal. They 
may choose to adjust one decision variable at a time to observe its effect on the outcome 
variable, or they may choose to change more than one decision variable at a time. They may also 
choose to make small or large adjustments to the values of decision variables.  
Given the structure of the problem, changing the values of variables one at a time is 
clearly the superior search strategy as it avoids confounding effects and superstitious learning. 
One interesting aspect of this strategy is that it often requires to forgo an immediate gain in order 
to have a long-term benefit, i.e. to experiment – something that organizations and decision 
makers within organizations are often reluctant to do (March, 1991). However, if the outcome of 
interest is the performance achieved at the end of a specified time period during which 
individuals can make several choices, we should reasonably expect that those individuals that 
employ “change one at a time” search strategy more consistently than others will achieve higher 
performance.  
At the beginning of the game, participants are given the description and rules of the 
game. The game is described purely as a math problem challenge. The advantage of using this 
wording is that it presents a novel problem for participants to deal with. It enables participants to 
75 
 
work with a clean slate as they learn how to play the game and allows me to observe the 
development of mental representations, learning from experience, and decision making – all 
within the context of a problem that is new to all participants. While there may be concerns about 
irrelevance of this problem to a business world, as I mentioned earlier, low level of mundane 
realism is compensated by high level of experimental and psychological realism. A choice of a 
problem is dictated by the need to observe development of knowledge about the problem from 
scratch, therefore the more abstract the game is, the higher the likelihood is that participants will 
not have any prior knowledge about the problem structure21. Rules of the game read as follows: 
“You have 3 decision variables (A, B, C) that you can manipulate to change the value of an 
outcome variable Y. Each of the decision variables can take any integer value between 0 and 99. 
Therefore, there are 1,000,000 combinations of values for A, B, and C. Only one of the 
combinations corresponds to the optimal value of Y that is set at 30,000. As a starting point, you 
are given a combination of values for A, B, and C that corresponds to Y=23,006. Can you find a 
combination of values for A, B, and C that corresponds to the optimal value of Y in 20 attempts 
or less? At each attempt, you can adjust as many variables as you like, and you will be given a 
corresponding value of Y for every combination you select. [You will also see the performance of 
another participant who played this instance of the game before you (we will call this person 
Kasper).] If you reach the optimal value, you will win $10. Good luck!” (Note: Only participants 
observing competitor’s performance will see the sentence in italics). 
Participants are motivated to engage intellectually in the game through monetary rewards. 
The rewards depend on participants’ ability to find the optimal value of “Y” – this, in turn, 
depends on their ability to identify the most efficient way of adjusting the three “X” variables in 
20 attempts. Without the use of efficient analytical strategies, participants are extremely unlikely 
to find the optimal solution, given that there are 1,000,000 possible combinations of “X” 
variables. The rewards are also structured as “all or nothing”, further motivating participants to 
optimize, as opposed to satisficing. Each participant is asked to play 6 rounds of the game. The 
                                                          
21 The abstract novel problem does not preclude participants from using what Simon (1983) called common sense 
knowledge.  
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reward system is structured as follows: each participant receives 10 dollars as a base reward and 
10 dollars for each round of the game that he or she wins (i.e. whenever he or she finds the 
optimal value of 30,000). Therefore, each participant has an opportunity to get up to 70 dollars 
during the experiment. Table 3 summarizes the course of the game and provides an example. 
 
Experimental design 
Participants are randomly assigned to one of the 4 treatment conditions (see Table 4). 
Group 1 does not observe competitor’s performance. The remaining 3 groups observe 
competitor’s performance. During the game, participants in groups 2-4 do not only see their own 
performance, but also performance supposedly achieved by another participant, a so-called 
“virtual competitor”. This additional piece of information is the only thing that differentiates the 
treatment conditions, in which participants observe competitor’s performance, from the treatment 
condition, in which participants only observe their own performance. The performance of 
participants does not depend on the performance of a “virtual competitor”. However, 
performance values of a “virtual competitor” do depend on performance values of the 
participant. 
Performance values for a “virtual competitor” will be calculated by the program to reflect 
one of the three scenarios in competitor’s performance conditions – inferior performance, similar 
performance, and superior performance. Given the original nature of the game, there are no 
existing benchmarks for defining inferior, superior, or similar performance. However, we could 
look at analogous research in organizational behavior and consumer behavior where scholars 
have studied perceptions of pay changes, income increases, and price changes (Uhl and Brown, 
1971; Katona and Mueller, 1968; Rambo and Pinto, 1989). When we compare numbers, we can 
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definitively say which one is larger and which one is smaller; however, the difference between 
the two numbers may not be meaningful in a cognitive sense. Research has used the idea of “just 
noticeable difference” to identify what differences between numbers are large enough for people 
to assign different cognitive labels to different amounts. “Just noticeable difference” can vary, 
but over 80% of people notice 15% increase in price for a large range of products (Uhl and 
Brown, 1968). Pay increases at 7-10% are perceived to be functionally meaningful (Rambo and 
Pinto, 1989; Mitra, Gupta, and Jenkins, 1997). By using these findings as a benchmark and using 
several iterations, I have created the following rules:  
 When participants observe inferior performance of a competitor (Group 2), the computer 
program calculates the distance between the participant’s performance value and optimal 
value (i.e. 30,000) and does the following: 
o For distance > 100, randomly picks an integer between (Performance – 0.5*Distance) 
and (Performance – 0.2*Distance) 
o For distance < 100, randomly picks an integer between (Performance – 100) and 30,000 
 When participants observe similar performance of a competitor (Group 3), the computer 
program calculates the distance between the participant’s performance value and optimal 
value (i.e. 30,000) and does the following: 
o For distance > 100, randomly picks an integer between (Performance – 0.2*Distance) 
and (Performance + 0.2*Distance) 
o For distance < 100, randomly picks an integer between (Performance – 100) and 30,000 
 When participants observe superior performance of a competitor (Group 4), the computer 
calculates the distance between the participant’s performance value and optimal value (i.e. 
30,000) and does the following: 
o For distance > 100, randomly picks an integer between (Performance + 0.2*Distance) 
and (Performance + 0.5*Distance) 
o For distance < 100, randomly picks an integer between (Performance – 5) and 30,000 
The key with simulating performance values of a virtual competitor is to make treatment 
conditions sufficiently different. It is achieved by exposing participants to sufficiently large and 
sufficiently small numbers in “superior performance” and “inferior performance” treatment 
conditions respectively. In “similar performance” treatment condition, participants are exposed 
to numbers both above and below the participant’s performance values (but close enough) to 
indicate that the competitor is neither better nor worse than the participant.  
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The use of a “virtual competitor” in experimental studies is well-established (Burton and 
Obel, 1988; Bandura and Jourden, 1991) and allows the researcher to control the environment 
and test different conditions. It is necessary to control what kind of competitor’s performance 
(for example, superior vs. similar, or inferior vs. similar) participants observe for two reasons. 
First, as previous research in social psychology has shown that different patterns of performance 
comparisons may have a differential effect on self-efficacy, an important influence on attentional 
and cognitive processes of decision-making (Schunk, 1986; Brown and Inouye, 1978; Bandura 
and Jourden, 1991). Second, the importance of such differences has been demonstrated in the 
literature on learning from performance feedback (Baum and Dahlin, 2007; Gaba and 
Bhattacharya, 2012). 
 
Main variables 
The experiment will allow me to collect rich data across the three levels of analysis: 
mental representations, decision making behavior, and performance.  
Mental representations. This study investigates whether exposure to different levels of 
competitor’s performance leads to differences in the knowledge that decision makers acquire 
about the problem they are trying to solve repeatedly. Previous literature offers a wide variety of 
techniques to measure the accuracy of knowledge22, including repertory grid technique (Reger 
and Huff, 1993), causal loop diagramming (Huff, 1990; Sterman, 2000), content analysis of 
written narratives (Osborne, Stubbart, and Ramaprasad, 2001; Nadler, Thompson, and Van 
Boven, 2003), cognitive map drawing (Hodgkinson et al, 1999), and use of a standardized test 
(Borgatti and Carboni, 2007; Gary and Wood, 2011). The most feasible techniques to apply in 
                                                          
22 The studies that are cited use different terms of the same concept, including mental models, cognitive maps, and 
others.  
79 
 
this study are content analysis of written narratives and a test. The data for the first measure is 
collected thrice in the course of the game. After every two rounds of the game, participants are 
prompted to describe approaches that they have tried and their opinion on the best strategy. After 
Round 2, participants are asked the following questions: 
1. After playing two rounds of the game, we would like to learn what insights you have gained. 
What do you think the most effective strategy to find the optimal value of the performance 
variable Y is? Please explain in a short paragraph (2-4 sentences). 
2. In your opinion, what approaches are not effective in finding the optimal value of the 
performance variable Y? Please explain in a short paragraph (2-4 sentences). 
After Rounds 4 and 6, participants are asked the following questions: 
1. Now that you have had an experience of two more rounds, we would like to learn more about 
your insights about the game. (Variation for round 6: Now that you completed all six rounds, 
we would like to learn about your insights one last time.) What do you think the most 
effective strategy to find the optimal value of the performance variable Y is now? Please 
explain in a short paragraph (2-4 sentences). 
2. What new approaches have you tried that you found helpful? Please explain in a short 
paragraph (2-4 sentences). 
3. What new approaches have you tried that you did NOT find helpful? Please explain in a short 
paragraph (2-4 sentences). 
Answers to these prompts were analyzed and coded to create a quantitative measure of 
problem awareness. The idea behind it is to capture what aspects of the problem and its solutions 
were salient to participants. It was done in the following way. First, I developed a taxonomy of 
characteristics of the problem structure and elements of solutions. Then, I checked which 
characteristics and elements participants actually mentioned in their answers. It was done in an 
iterative way, by first creating a preliminary set of categories and then by verifying them against 
the answers. In the process, some categories were omitted and others were added. The final list 
of categories is as follows: 
1. Changing one variable at a time is helpful. 
2. Changing two or three variables at a time is not helpful. 
3. Random guessing does not work. 
4. There is a curvilinear relationship between variables and performance. 
5. Variables should be changed by large and small increments.  
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A participant was given a point for each category that was present in his or her response. 
The more the number of points the participant receives for a set of answers he or she has given at 
a point in time, the higher will be his or her score for problem awareness at that point in time.  
The data for the second measure, knowledge accuracy, is collected twice, after Round 4 
and after Round 6. The participants answer multiple-choice questions about the nature of the 
problem and potential solutions to solve it. The main reason for administering the test only once 
during the game is to avoid priming participants to think of the problem in a certain way, at least 
for the part of the game. Administering the test one more time, after all 6 rounds of the game are 
complete, allows me to observe changes in knowledge with a repeated measure. Questions in the 
tests are as follows: 
1. What best describes the relationships between decision variables A, B, and C, and 
performance variable Y? 
a. Y is a linear function of A, B, and C. 
b. Y is a quadratic function of A, B, and C. 
c. Y is a cubic function of A, B, and C. 
d. There is no identifiable function. It is random. 
2. Do changes in values of decision variables affect Y differently, depending on values of other 
decision variables? In other words, are there interactions? 
a. Yes, effects of changing A depend on values of B, and vice versa. 
b. Yes, effects of changing A depend on values of C, and vice versa. 
c. Yes, effects of changing B depend on values of C, and vice versa. 
d. All three variables (A, B, and C) interact with each other. 
e. No, variables are independent of each other. Change in one variable does not affect 
the other. 
3. Do variables A, B, and C have different effects on the performance variable Y? In other 
words, do they have different weights? 
a. Variable A has a bigger weight than variables B and C. 
b. Variable B has a bigger weight than variables A and C. 
c. Variable C has a bigger weight than variables A and B. 
d. All variables have the same weight. 
e. All variables have different weights. 
4. Is there a random component that contributes to the relationships between decision variables 
and the outcome variable? 
a. No, there is no random component. 
b. Yes, but its contribution is trivial. 
c. Yes, and it significantly outweighs effects of decision variables on the performance 
variable, essentially making the game a random guess. 
5. How many decision variables should be changed at each step to get the best result? 
a. Only one variable at a time. 
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b. Two variables at a time. 
c. All three variables should be changed at each step. 
d. It should be a combination of the approaches above. 
e. None of the above is a useful approach. 
6. What is the best approach to changing the values of decision variables at each step? 
a. Changing them just by little amount (e.g. less than 10 points). 
b. Changing them by some amount, but not too drastically (e.g. by 10-20 points). 
c. Changing them drastically – exploring extreme values (e.g. from 1 to 100). 
d. Some combination of the first and second approaches. 
e. Some combination of the first three approaches. 
f. It does not really matter for winning the game. 
 
 
A proportion of correct answers to these questions creates a measure of knowledge 
accuracy, which can also be split into two parts: knowledge of the structure (based on the first 4 
questions) and heuristic knowledge (based on the last 2 questions).  
Decision making behavior. As each decision made by a participant is being recorded, 
there is ample amount of data to work with. The objective here is to understand whether 
participants use more or less efficient search strategies, and whether exposure to competitor’s 
performance has an effect on the choice of strategies. Changing one variable at a time is the most 
efficient strategy for this game – in fact, the only one that can lead to finding the optimal value 
within 20 attempts (not counting pure luck)23. Therefore, the primary variable of interest is 
decision making effectiveness ─ the proportion of attempts at which only one variable was 
changed, calculated for each round24. Another variable of interest is exploration. It is measured 
by counting a number of different strategies a participant used in each round. I assume that there 
are 4 possible strategies: not changing any variable, changing one variable, changing two 
variables, and changing three variables.  
                                                          
23 A couple of participants found a way to solve the problem by using derivatives, which involves one step of setting 
all variables to zero (meaning that more than variable is changed at a time).  
24 To calculate how many variables are changed at a time, I compare values at each attempt to the previous attempt. 
The measure of decision making effectiveness is conservative, because occasionally participants make a change 
relative to values chosen few attempts prior to that. The measure here does not include these changes as “one 
variable at a time” and instead treats them as changing multiple variables at a time.  
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Performance. Finally, I collect information on performance of each participant in each 
of the 6 rounds. This is again very rich data, as I will have performance data within each trial (for 
each 20 steps), as well as across trials. I consider two performance metrics: absolute scores and 
round wins. Absolute performance score captures the highest value of an outcome variable that a 
participant reaches in a round (in any of the 20 attempts). Win is a dichotomous variable that 
equals to one when a participant reaches 30,000 in a round and zero otherwise.  
 
Control variables 
Perceived self-efficacy is an individual’s belief in his or her ability to perform a task or 
tasks effectively (Payne, Youngcourt, and Beaubien, 2007). Research has demonstrated that 
perceived self-efficacy is an important factor for performance (Gary and Wood, 2011), 
motivation for change (Paglis and Green, 2002), use of effective strategies to solve problems 
(Bandura and Jourden, 1991), creativity (Gong, Huang, and Farh, 2009), and adoption of 
advanced technologies (Hill, Smith, and Mann, 1987). I develop a scale for perceived self-
efficacy based on the approach proposed by Bandura (1997), which has been used in prior 
research (e.g., Bandura and Jourden, 1991; Gary and Wood, 2011). The scale includes 6 items 
preceded by a header question: “Please rate your effectiveness in the game on a 10-point scale 
(from 1 – “very little confidence” to 10 – “total confidence”) on the following aspects”. The 
items are as follows: 
1. Applying the strategy that you described as the best  
2. Setting appropriate values for decision variables A, B, and C 
3. Consistently improving the value of performance variable Y 
4. Tracking changes in values of decision variables A, B, and C 
5. Tracking changes in values of performance variable Y 
6. Finding optimal values of performance variable Y 
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Goal orientation. The motivation literature in psychology and management has paid a 
lot of attention to the construct of goal orientation and its role in what individuals are able to 
achieve and behaviors that individuals adopt in order to achieve desired outcomes. Goal 
orientation has been argued to be an important factor in performance and learning (Hofmann, 
1993; Button, Mathieu, and Zajac, 1996; Seijts et al, 2004; Johnson, Shull, and Wallace, 2011), 
creativity (Hirst et al, 2011), effective selling (Sujan, Weitz, and Kumar, 1994), job satisfaction 
(van Yperen and Janssen, 2002; Janssen and van Yperen, 2004), feedback-seeking (Farr, 
Hofmann, and Ringenbach, 1993; VandeWalle and Cummings, 1997), goal setting (Farr et al, 
1993; Seijts et al, 2004), adoption of learning strategies (Ames and Archer, 1988; Nolen, 1988; 
Ford et al, 1998), continuous improvement, and individual work role innovation (Farr and Ford, 
1990; Farr et al, 1993). While several conceptualizations of goal orientation exist in the literature 
(DeShon and Gillespie, 2005), for the purpose of this study it will be defined as “a set of 
dispositional tendencies that cause individuals to strive toward certain types of implicit 
achievement goals in performance settings” (Hafsteinsson, Donovan, and Breland, 2007; p. 
719). Goal orientation is considered to be a somewhat stable trait that can be, however, altered 
by context (Button et al, 1996; DeShon and Gillespie, 2005; Payne et al, 2007). With this in 
mind, questions related to goal orientation are administered to participants prior to the game. In 
the literature, there are multiple scales to measure goal orientation, focusing on both academic 
and work domain, but in this experiment, I will use a scale, which is best known as Patterns of 
Adaptive Learning Scales developed by Midgley and her colleagues (Midgley et al, 1996; 
Midgley et al, 2000), with an intention to assess students’ motivation in the classroom. This 
instrument, however, is reasonably adaptable to be used with adults as well and has been 
demonstrated to be better than other scales, in terms of distributional characteristics and 
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construct validity (Jagacinski and Duda, 2001). The goal orientation scale includes three sub-
scales: learning, performance, and avoid performance. The items are preceded with the following 
question: “Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements”. The response 
format is a five-point Likert scale with the following anchors: 1 – “not at all true”, 3 – 
“somewhat true”, and 5 – “very true”. The scale includes the following items: 
Learning: 
1. It’s important to me that I learn a lot of new things this year. 
2. One of my goals in my work/studies is to learn as much as I can. 
3. One of my goals is to master a lot of new skills this year. 
4. It’s important to me that I thoroughly understand the work I do. 
5. It’s important to me that I improve my skills this year 
Performance: 
1. It’s important to me that other people think I am good at what I do. 
2. One of my goals is to show others that I’m good at my work/studies. 
3. One of my goals is to show others that work/studies is easy for me. 
4. One of my goals is to look smart in comparison to the other people. 
5. It’s important to me that I look smart compared to others. 
Avoid performance: 
1. It’s important to me that I don’t look stupid in comparison to other people. 
2. One of my goals is to keep others from thinking I’m not smart. 
3. It’s important to me that others don’t think that I know less than they do. 
4. One of my goals in my work/studies is to avoid looking like I have trouble doing the 
work. 
Use of intuition. Intuition is a non-conscious ability to tap into one’s experience, identify 
relevant past information or decisions to facilitate more efficient current decision making 
(Simon, 1987; Agor, 1989; Wally and Baum, 1994). The important aspect of engaging intuition 
is a process of using heuristics, simple rules, rather than complex cognitive information 
processing, to come up with a solution to the problem (Wally and Baum, 1994). Researchers 
have explored how the use of intuition relates to creativity (Shirley and Langan-Fox, 1996), 
productivity (Agor, 1985; Agor, 1986), and decision making such as corporate planning, stock 
analysis, performance appraisal, capital investments, and product commercialization (Agor, 
1986; Simon, 1987; Hayashi, 2001; Dane and Pratt, 2007). To measure the use of intuition, I use 
a modified scale developed by Wally and Baum (1994). The items will be preceded with the 
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following question: “Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements”. 
The response format is a five-point Likert scale with the following anchors: 1 – “not at all true”, 
3 – “somewhat true”, and 5 – “very true”. The scale includes the following items: 
1. I never have vague feelings of unease that precede unexpected significant events. 
2. Sometimes when I awaken, I have an answer to a problem that had troubled me.  
3. I listen to my intuition while solving problems I face. 
4. I usually get along better with realistic people, rather than creative types (reverse). 
5. I prefer careful and thorough analysis to intuition (reverse). 
6. I used intuition when I made some important decisions such as choosing a college.  
Attitude toward math. Participants are asked the following question: “How did you feel 
about math classes in high school?” with the following options for answers: 
1. These were my favorite classes. 
2. Math classes were among my favorite. 
3. Math classes were ok. I liked them. 
4. Going to math classes was not my favorite activity in high school. 
5. I was going to math classes just because I had to, but I really did not like them. 
Variable favorable attitude toward math is a dichotomous variable coded as 1 if 
participants marked the first or the second option, and 0 otherwise. 
Familiarity with calculus. Participants are asked the following question “Have you ever 
taken a calculus course?” with the following options for answers:  
1. Yes, I have had several of them. 
2. Yes, I have had a calculus course once. 
3. No, I have never had a calculus course. 
The variable several calculus classes is dichotomous coded as 1 if participants marked 
the first option and 0 otherwise. 
Other Control Variables. In addition to the above measures, the survey also included 
questions to capture few additional individual characteristics. Participants were asked about their 
gender, age, current occupation, and self-satisfaction after performing a task. 
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Experimental protocol 
Participants were invited to a laboratory to participate in an experiment on decision 
making and problem solving that lasts anywhere between 40 and 90 minutes25, depending on 
how fast participants play the game. They were told that the experiment involved answering 
several survey questions and playing a game.  
Upon arrival, participants were briefed about the experimental procedure, after which 
they signed a consent form. Each participant was given a sheet of paper that included a personal 
code (used to connect different parts of the experimental data), a game code (used to identify 
which treatment condition to launch in the game), and rules of the game. A random sequence of 
game codes was regenerated in Python, and a stack of sheets was prepared in advance. When a 
sheet of the paper was given to each participant, I delivered the following prompt: 
“Thank you for taking time to participate in this study! Each of you has been given a sheet that 
has all information you will need. The first thing that you see is a personal code. This is 
something you will need to enter several times, so please hold on to the paper. When you get to 
the game, it will also ask you for the game code. You can see it on this sheet as well. As for the 
process, you will start with a survey. Once you complete it, you can close the browser and get to 
the game window. As you play the game, the surveys will pop up couple of more times. You can 
again just close the browser after completing surveys and be back to the game window. Rules of 
the game will be on the screen in the beginning of the game, but if you want to refer to them at 
any point in time, they are on the sheet as well. There are 6 rounds of the game, and it is pretty 
challenging, but there is a reward of 10 dollars for every round if you win. Even though the game 
is challenging, we have seen the wins before, and we are always looking for the next big win. If 
you experience any technical difficulties, feel free to call me any time. Now, unless you have any 
questions, let’s get started, and good luck!” 
The prompt was delivered in a very positive and friendly manner. Smiling, establishing 
an eye contact, and animated delivery is believed to induce positive and pleasant emotions in 
participants (Bartel and Saavedra, 2000; Hakonsson et al, 2016), which in turn may facilitate 
                                                          
25 The time estimate was based on a pilot study with 20 participants. In the main experiment, there are few 
participants who spent more than 90 minutes.  
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more effective decision making and creativity (Fredrickson, 2003; Amabile et al, 2005; Davis, 
2009).  
Participants started with a Qualtrics survey that included questions intended to capture 
data for control variables outlined earlier (except for self-efficacy and self-satisfaction). After 
completing the first survey, the game, written in Python language, was launched. After every two 
rounds the web-based Qualtrics was called by Python to capture participants’ responses to 
questions related to measures of mental representations, self-efficacy, and self-satisfaction. After 
participants completed the study, they called me or a research assistant to display the results on a 
computer screen and were paid at their desk in a discrete manner. The debriefing was done via e-
mail sent after the study was completed by all participants. 
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AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY: RESULTS 
I conducted an experimental study in the fall of 2016 using a participant pool of the 
Center for Decision Research at Kenan-Flagler Business School. The main advantage of the 
participant pool at the Center for Decision Research is that it also includes individuals other than 
undergraduate students. Therefore, in addition to undergraduate students, graduate students, 
university staff, and members of the community also participated in the study. This diverse mix 
of participants allows me to make some generalizations beyond the population of undergraduate 
students. 
A pilot study was conducted in October of 2016 to test the protocol of the experiment. 20 
participants were recruited; 19 participants completed the study. Based on the pilot study, few 
minor changes were made to how participants were briefed in the beginning of the study and to 
questions that were related to variables measuring knowledge. Data from the pilot study were 
also used to carry out power analyses. The main study was conducted in November-December of 
2016. Totally, 143 participants were recruited; 142 participants attempted to play the game; 141 
participants completed all 6 rounds. 
 
Pilot study 
20 people signed up to participate in the pilot study. The advertisement for the study only 
mentioned that the study was about decision making and problem solving in a computer game. I 
conducted 2 sessions – 12 people attended the first session, and 8 people attended the second 
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session. In the second session, one person quit the study during the first round of the game, 
saying that he had no idea what he was doing and did not want to continue. 19 participants 
completed all 6 rounds of the game. Out of 19 participants, 13 people did not win a single round. 
Out of 6 participants who won at least one round, 4 people won one round each, and 2 people 
won 2 rounds each. Given that the pilot study was the first time the game was tested on a group 
of individuals, the winning statistics provided some initial evidence that the game was very 
challenging to win. In fact, some participants of the pilot study commented that the game was 
tricky and impossible to win. One participant said “It was all a lie”, although in a joking tone.  
Originally, the briefing of participants in the beginning of the study did not include any 
reference to how challenging the game is. However, after observing reactions of participants in 
the pilot study, I added a statement about the fact that the game is challenging but possible to win 
to a briefing prompt that I used in the main study. I refrained from providing specific odds of 
winning, which are quite low as we can see from the winning statistics described above. 
Because the pilot study was the first study to test the game, the pilot study provided the 
only reasonable data to perform the power analysis. Table 5 summarizes differences in means, 
pooled standard deviation, standardized effect size, and estimated number of participants per 
group for a set of measures related to knowledge, decision making, and performance. A required 
sample size for each measure is calculated assuming α=0.05 and 80% power. Differences in 
means are calculated as the mean of Group 1 (that does not observe performance of “another 
participant”) minus the mean of Group 2, 3 or 4 (that observes inferior, similar, and superior 
performance of ‘another participant”, respectively).  
Of 19 participants who completed the study, 4 people were in Group 1, 6 people – in 
Group 2, 5 people – in Group 3, and 4 people – in Group 4. Although the sample size is very 
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small, it is important to note that effects for decision making effectiveness and absolute 
performance score and performance were in line with expectations (based on Propositions 6 and 
7). Average decision making effectiveness in round 6, average change in decision making 
effectiveness across 6 rounds, average performance in round 6, and average change in 
performance across 6 rounds are higher for Group 1, than for either Group 2, 3, or 4. Average 
differences for knowledge are not consistent with Proposition 6. One of the reasons for this 
inconsistency is that questions for capturing knowledge measures suffered from several wording 
issues. For example, most multiple choice questions included an option “I don’t know” and many 
participants opted for this. Based on the pilot study results, questions were rephrased to make 
them clearer. The wording that was used in the main experiment has been described in the 
methodology section. 
 
Participants  
In the main study, there were 143 participants. There were 82 females (58%) and 59 
males (42%). The age of participants ranged from 18 to 64 years, with median age of 21 years 
and mean of 23 years. There were 102 (72%) undergraduate students, 21 (15%) graduate 
students, and 19 (13%) members of the community. 70 participants (50%) had a favorable 
attitude toward math. 60 participants (42%) had taken several calculus courses. Table 6 provides 
the descriptive statistics. 
 
Analysis of main effects 
The lab study was designed to test the effects of competitor’s performance on knowledge, 
decision making, and performance. Therefore, the primary analysis is concerned with analyzing 
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differences in these metrics across groups. In line with Propositions 6 and 7, I expected wins, 
absolute performance scores, decision making effectiveness, problem awareness, and knowledge 
accuracy to be higher for Group 1 (that did not observe competitor’s performance) than for 
Group 2 (that observed inferior competitor) and Group 4 (that observed superior competitor). In 
line with Proposition 5, I expected exploration to be higher for Group 4 than for Group 2. In line 
with Proposition 8, I expected exploration for Group 1 to be higher than that for Group 2 but 
lower than that for Group 4. Group 3 serves as a control group, and I did not expect differences 
between this group and Group 1. 
Of 143 participants, 141 completed all 6 rounds of the game. 36 participants won at least 
one round. Table 7 shows distribution of wins. As expected, winning the game is challenging, 
especially winning multiple rounds. I did not expect anyone to win all 6 rounds; however, there 
were 2 people who were able to do that, while 4 more were able to win 5 rounds.  
Of the 142 participants who attempted to play the game, 34 subjects were in Group 1, 36 
subjects – in Group 2, 40 subjects – in Group 3, and 32 subjects – in Group 4. Table 8 shows 
tabulation of wins in Round 1, Round 6, and across all 6 rounds. Even though, on the surface, 
some substantial differences exist across groups in Rounds 1 and 6, both the chi-square test and 
Fisher’s exact test show independence between round wins and treatment conditions. When we 
pool all rounds together, the chi-square test suggests there could be differences between groups 
(p=0.037). Consistent with Proposition 7, there were 13% of wins in Group 1, compared with 7% 
of wins in Group 2 and 6% of wins in Group 4. However, wins of each participant are not 
independent of each other. To adjust for that, I estimate a population average logistic regression 
with first-order, autoregressive correlation structure for residuals26: 
                                                          
26 As a robustness check, I have also estimated a model with standard errors clustered by participant. P-values 
increase to 0.131 for β0 and 0.11 for β3 (considering one-tailed test). 
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𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(Pr(𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑗 = 1)) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗                                   (6) 
Model 1 in Table 9 provides estimates for equation (6). Model 2 also includes fixed 
effects for the rounds. I interpret results using estimates of Model 1. The estimated odds of 
winning in Group 1 is 𝑒𝛽0= 0.14, with 95% confidence interval (0.08, 0.25). The estimated odds 
of winning in Group 2, which observed performance of inferior competitor, is 𝑒𝛽0+𝛽1= 0.07, with 
95% confidence interval (0.04, 0.15). The estimated odds of winning in Group 2 are 48% lower 
than the estimated odds of winning in Group 1 (p=0.09, one-tailed test27). This result is 
consistent with Proposition 7. The estimated odds of winning in Group 3, which observed 
performance of similar competitor, is 𝑒𝛽0+𝛽2=0.14, with 95% confidence interval (0.08, 0.24). 
There are no differences in odds of winning between Group 1 and Group 3 (p>0.4). This result is 
consistent with my expectations. The group that observed performance of a similar competitor 
did not have additional information to be used for making inferences, thus I would not have 
expected differences in performance. The estimated odds of winning in Group 4, which observed 
performance of superior competitor, is 𝑒𝛽0+𝛽3=0.07, with 95% confidence interval (0.03, 0.16). 
The estimated odds of winning in Group 4 are half of the estimated odds of winning in Group 1 
(p=0.08). This result is also consistent with Proposition 7. Predicted probabilities of winning are 
0.12 for Group 1, 0.07 for Group 2, 0.12 for Group 3, and 0.07 for Group 4.  
Next, I analyze differences in absolute performance scores (APS) across groups. Figure 
14 illustrates mean performance across all 6 rounds for each treatment condition. APS appears to 
improve across rounds for all groups. Contrary to Proposition 7, APS of Group 2 (that observed 
inferior competitor) appears to be the highest among the groups across all 6 rounds. APS of 
Group 4 (that observed superior competitor) appears to be no different from APS of Group 1. 
                                                          
27 All tests associated with propositions are one-tailed unless otherwise stated. 
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Given that observations are correlated for each participant, I estimate the following 
generalized linear models with first-order, autoregressive correlation structure for residuals: 
𝐴𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗                                                                (7) 
To evaluate whether performance improves over time and test for difference in 
performance trajectories across treatment conditions, I estimate the following generalized linear 
model with first-order, autoregressive correlation structure for residuals: 
𝐴𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽5𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖 × 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗 +
 𝛽6𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖 × 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽7𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖 × 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗                                                                            (8) 
Model 1 in Table 10 provides estimates for equation (7). Model 2 adds round fixed 
effects. Model 3 provides estimates for equation (8). Based on estimates of Model 1, APS does 
not differ between Group 1 and Groups 3 and 4 (p>0.4). Group 2, which observed performance 
of inferior competitor, has performance higher than Group 1 by 263 points (p=0.06). Based on 
estimates of Model 3, performance in Group 1 improves with every round by about 74 points 
(p=0.08). Performance trajectories in Groups 2, 3, and 4 do not differ from the performance 
trajectory in Group 1. Coefficients β5, β6, and β7 from equation (8) in Model 3 are insignificant 
(p>0.2). The analysis of absolute performance scores does not provide support to Proposition 7. 
Next, I analyze decision making effectiveness (DME). Figure 15 illustrates mean DME 
across all 6 rounds for each group. Similar to performance, DME improves across rounds for all 
treatment conditions, and DME of Group 2 (that has observed inferior competitor) appears to be 
the highest across all 6 rounds. This is contrary to Proposition 628.  
I estimate the following generalized linear models with first-order, autoregressive 
correlation structure for residuals:  
                                                          
28 In my theoretical framework, decisions are driven by beliefs, therefore decision making behavior could serve as a 
proxy for beliefs that participants hold when they make decisions. 
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𝐷𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 ,                                                             (9) 
𝐷𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽5𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖 × 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗 +
 𝛽6𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖 × 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽7𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖 × 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗                                                                           (10) 
Model 1 in Table 11 provides estimates for equation (9). Model 2 adds round fixed 
effects. Model 3 provides estimates for equation (10). Based on estimates of Model 1, DME does 
not differ between Group 1 and Groups 3 and 4 (p>0.3). Group 2, which observed performance 
of inferior competitor, has DME higher than Group 1 by 0.08 (p=0.06). Based on estimates of 
Model 3, DME in Group 1 improves with every round by about 0.03 (p=0.01). DME trajectories 
in Groups 2, 3, and 4 do not differ from DME trajectory in Group 1. Coefficients β5, β6, and β7 
from equation (10) in Model 3 are insignificant (p>0.3). The analysis of decision making 
effectiveness does not provide support to Proposition 6. 
Finally, I analyze measures related to mental representations. I start with the analysis of 
knowledge accuracy (KA), which is based on multiple choice questions administered after round 
4 and round 6. Figure 16 shows average KA for each group measured after round 4 and after 
round 6. Group 1 has the highest KA in both rounds, which is consistent with Proposition 6. KA 
in Group 1 seems to decline from Round 4 to Round 6. Group 4, which observed performance of 
superior competitor, has the lowest knowledge accuracy in both rounds. Group 2, which 
observed performance of inferior competitor, seems to have the highest improvement in 
knowledge from round 4 to round 6.  
I test for differences between groups by estimating the following generalized linear 
models with clustered standard errors, where observations from round 4 and round 6 are pooled 
together:   
𝐾𝐴𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 ,                                                             (11) 
𝐾𝐴𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑6𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗,                                      (12) 
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where round6 is an indicator variable coded as zero for Round 4 and as one for Round 6. 
I also test for differences between Round 4 and Round 6 by estimating the following generalized 
linear model with clustered standard errors: 
𝐾𝐴𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑6𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽5𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖 × 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑6𝑖𝑗 +
 𝛽6𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖 × 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑6𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽7𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖 × 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑6𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗                                                                      (13) 
Model 1 in Table 12 provides estimates for equation (11), Model 2 – for equation (12), 
and Model 3 – for equation (13). Based on results in Table 12, there are no differences in 
knowledge accuracy between groups, and there are no differences across time periods either (for 
all tests, p>0.2). One exception is that knowledge accuracy for Group 2, which observed 
performance of inferior competitor, improved by 0.19 (p=0.11). If after Round 4, participants in 
Group 2 answered 1.94 questions out of 6 correctly on average, they answered 2.13 questions 
correctly on average after Round 6. Group 2 is the only group that showed some improvement in 
knowledge accuracy. Overall, the analysis of knowledge accuracy does not provide support to 
Proposition 6. 
Figure 17 shows the patterns of knowledge if we divide it into knowledge of problem 
structure and knowledge of heuristics. There are few interesting observations. Group 1 seems to 
have better knowledge of structure of the problem than the knowledge of what strategies are 
better for solving the problem (heuristic knowledge). Group 2, which observed inferior 
competitor, is the other way around. It has the highest level of heuristic knowledge but lowest 
level of knowledge of the problem structure. Group 4, which observed superior competitor, 
seems to have improved its knowledge of structure from Round 4 to Round 6, while heuristic 
knowledge declined. Group 1 appears to have better knowledge of structure than Groups 2 and 4, 
which is consistent with Proposition 6. However, it does not appear to have better heuristic 
knowledge, which is inconsistent with Proposition 6. 
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I estimate the same type of models for knowledge of structure and heuristic knowledge as 
I did for knowledge accuracy. Results for knowledge of structure are presented in Table 13. I 
interpret the results using Model 3. After round 4, participants in Group 1, which did not observe 
competitor’s performance, had an estimated knowledge of structure at the level of 1.31 (out of 
4), with 95% confidence interval (0.96, 1.67). Participants in Group 2, which observed 
performance of inferior competitor, had an estimated knowledge of structure at the level of 𝛽0 +
𝛽1=0.83, with 95% confidence interval (0.50, 1.17). The difference in estimated knowledge of 
structure between Group 1 and Group 2 after Round 4 is estimated at –0.48 (p=0.03). 
Participants in Group 3, which observed performance of similar competitor, had an estimated 
knowledge of structure at level of 𝛽0 + 𝛽2=1.33, with 95% confidence interval (1.00, 1.67). 
There are no significant differences in knowledge of structure between Group 1 and Group 3 
(p>0.5). Participants in Group 4, which observed performance of superior competitor, had an 
estimated knowledge of structure at the level of 𝛽0 + 𝛽3=0.94, with 95% confidence interval 
(0.58, 1.29). The difference in knowledge of structure between Group 1 and Group 4 after Round 
4 is estimated at –0.38 (p=0.07). Overall, results for Round 4 are consistent with Proposition 6. 
However, the situation with knowledge of structure is a little different after Round 6. 
Differences between levels of knowledge of structure shrink between treatment conditions. 
Participants in Group 1, which did not observe a performance of a competitor, had an estimated 
knowledge of structure at the level of 𝛽0 + 𝛽4=1.24 (out of 4), with 95% confidence interval 
(0.86, 1.61). The estimated knowledge of structure after round 6 for Group 1 is not significantly 
different from the estimated knowledge of structure after Round 4 (p>0.7).  Participants in Group 
2, which observed performance of inferior competitor, had an estimated knowledge of structure 
at the level of 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 + 𝛽4 + 𝛽5=0.99, with 95% confidence interval (0.66, 1.32). The estimated 
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knowledge of structure for Group 2 improved from Round 4 to Round 6 by 0.16 (p=0.12). The 
difference in knowledge of structure between Group 1 and Group 2 after Round 6 is estimated at 
–0.24 (p=0.17). Participants in Group 3, which observed performance of similar competitor, had 
an estimated knowledge of structure at level of 𝛽0 + 𝛽2 + 𝛽4 + 𝛽6=1.35, with 95% confidence 
interval (1.03, 1.66). The estimated knowledge of structure after round 6 for Group 3 is not 
significantly different from the estimated knowledge of structure after Round 4 (p>0.4). There 
are no significant differences in knowledge of structure between Group 1 and Group 3 (p>0.6). 
Participants in Group 4, which observed performance of superior competitor, had an estimated 
knowledge of structure at level of 𝛽0 + 𝛽3 + 𝛽4 + 𝛽7=1.16, with 95% confidence interval (0.82, 
1.51). The estimated knowledge of structure for Group 4 improved from Round 4 to Round 6 by 
0.23 (p=0.09). There are no significant differences in knowledge of structure between Group 1 
and Group 4 (p>0.3). The analysis of knowledge of structure after Round 6 does not provide 
support to Proposition 6. 
Results for heuristic knowledge are presented in Table 13. I interpret results using 
estimates of Model 3. The heuristic knowledge of participants in Group 2, which observed 
performance of inferior competitor, is actually higher than the accuracy of heuristic knowledge 
of participants in Group 1 – with the estimated difference of 0.23 after Round 4 (p=0.08) and 
0.21 after Round 6 (p=0.10). There are no differences in the accuracy of heuristic knowledge 
between Group 3 and Group 1 as well as Group 4 and Group 1 after Round 4 (p>0.2 for both 
tests). However, after Round 6, the accuracy of heuristic knowledge of participants in Group 3, 
which observed performance of similar competitor, is lower than the accuracy of heuristic 
knowledge of participants in Group 1 – with the estimated difference of –0.14 (p=0.18). The 
accuracy of heuristic knowledge of participants in Group 4, which observed performance of 
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superior competitor, is even lower – with the estimated difference of –0.18 (p=0.14). Group 4 is 
the only group where the accuracy of heuristic knowledge declined from Round 4 to Round 6, by 
estimated difference of –0.14 (p=0.12). Overall, the analysis of heuristic knowledge does not 
provide support to Proposition 6. 
The second set of analyses related to mental representations involves problem awareness 
(PA) – a measure developed from the coding of open-ended questions about the strategies to win 
the game. Problem awareness was measured thrice – after Round 2, Round 4, and Round 6.  
Figure 18 shows empirical means of problem awareness across treatment conditions and time 
periods. There are a couple of interesting observations. First, groups that observed competitor’s 
performance visually seem very similar to each other in terms of evolution of problem 
awareness. Second, Group 1, that did not observe competitor’s performance, although very 
similar to other groups after Round 2, seems to have developed higher problem awareness by 
Round 6. This is somewhat consistent with Proposition 6. 
I test for differences between groups by estimating the following generalized linear 
models with clustered standard errors:  
𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽5𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖 × 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗 +
 𝛽6𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖 × 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽7𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖 × 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗,                                                                      (14) 
where variable round is treated as a continuous variable, and linear trend is assumed. 
And: 
𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑4𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽5𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑6𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽6𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖 ×
𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑4𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽7𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖 × 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑4𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽8𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖 × 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑4𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽9𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖 × 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑6𝑖𝑗 +
 𝛽10𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖 × 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑6𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽11𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖 × 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑6𝑖𝑗𝜀𝑖𝑗,                                                                     (15) 
where Rounds 2, 4, and 6 are treated as discrete time periods, and I include indicator 
variables for round 4 and round 6 in the model. 
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Model 1 in Table 15 provides estimates for equation (14), and Model 2 provides 
estimates for equation (14) with added first-order, autoregressive correlation structure for 
residuals. Table 16 provides estimates for equation (15). I interpret results using estimates from 
Table 16. After Round 2, the estimated problem awareness for Group 1 is 1.79 (out of 5), with 
95% confidence interval (1.25, 2.34). The estimated problem awareness for Groups 2, 3, and 4 
does not differ significantly from the problem awareness for Group 1 (p>0.5 for all tests). After 
Round 4, the estimated problem awareness for Group 1 is 2.28, with 95% confidence interval 
(1.67, 2.90). For Group 1, the problem awareness improved from Round 2 to Round 4 by 0.49 
(p=0.005). After round 4, the estimated problem awareness for Groups 2, 3, and 4 also does not 
differ significantly from the problem awareness for Group 1 (p> 0.5 for all tests). Groups 2, 3, 
and 4 also saw improvement in problem awareness from Round 2 to Round 4 ─ by 0.33 
(p=0.003), 0.23 (p=0.05), and 0.83 (p=0.002) respectively. The analysis of problem awareness 
after Round 2 and Round 4 does not provide support to Proposition 6. 
After round 6, the estimated problem awareness for Group 1 is 2.82, with 95% 
confidence interval (2.19, 3.45). It is an improvement of 0.54 from Round 4 to Round 6 
(p=0.005). The estimated problem awareness for Group 2 is 2.3, with 95% confidence interval 
(1.77, 2.83). It is 0.52 lower than problem awareness for Group 1 (p=0.108) but is insignificant 
improvement of 0.11 from Round 4 (p>0.3). The estimated problem awareness for Group 3 is 
2.49, with 95% confidence interval (2.00, 2.98). It is an improvement of 0.42 from Round 4 
(p=0.003) but is not different from problem awareness in Group 1 (p>0.2). The estimated 
problem awareness for Group 4 is 2.42, with 95% confidence interval (1.85, 3.00). It is 0.40 
lower than problem awareness for Group 1 (p=0.18) and also is an improvement of 0.25 from 
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Round 4 (p=0.09). The analysis of problem awareness after Round 6 provides support to 
Proposition 6. 
Finally, I analyze exploration (EXPL) to address Propositions 5 and 8. Figure 19 shows 
average exploration across 6 rounds for each group. As we can see from the graph, there are no 
any visible differences in exploration between groups, which is inconsistent with both 
Proposition 5 and Proposition 8. To further confirm that, I estimate the following generalized 
linear model with first-order, autoregressive correlation structure for residuals:  
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗                                                         (16) 
Model 1 in Table 17 provides estimates for equation (16). Model 2 also includes round 
fixed effects. Based on the estimates in Table 17, there are no significant differences in 
exploration between groups (p>0.4 for all tests). Propositions 5 and 8 are not supported.  
 
Discussion of results and supplementary analysis 
In my theoretical framework on effects of using competitor’s performance as a constraint, 
I argued that using an exogenous goal alone will result in better knowledge and higher 
performance than using a combination of the exogenous goal and competitor’s performance 
(Propositions 6 and 7). I further argued that this is the case because paying attention to inferior 
competitor leads to overvaluing low-performing strategies and under-exploring, while paying 
attention to superior competitor leads to undervaluing superior strategies and over-exploring 
(Propositions 5 and 8).  
 Table 18 summarizes analysis of results in comparison with Propositions 5, 6, 7, and 8. 
The first important finding that I should discuss is that there are no significant differences in 
exploration across groups; thus, there is no support for Proposition 5 and 8. One possible 
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explanation for this result is that participants did not pay enough attention to competitor’s 
performance. The critical assumption in my theoretical framework is that actors actually notice 
information about competitor’s performance and use it to make inferences. However, in real-
world situations this assumption may not always hold. Few participants explicitly commented on 
Kasper (a virtual competitor in the game), and some wondered whether information on Kasper’s 
performance was helpful. A few quotes are provided below: 
“I still do not know the purpose of Kasper's numbers, unless the variables affect that number by 
some factor to output my Y variable. Seeing as I am not given the values he inputted to attain 
those numbers, it serves as little more than a distraction.” 
“I'm not sure if I should be looking at the performance score or not of Kasper.” 
“I have tried using Kasper's results as a base instead of coming up with something random. This 
has been helpful because it has gotten me a little closer to the number I was supposed to find.” 
“I have an inkling my idea to form an equation from the first set was useless. I'm also wondering 
why "Kasper's" info is even included.” 
“It wasn't helpful to look at Kasper's experience, obviously. It also didn't help to make wild 
swinging changes to all three at a time.” 
“Paying attention to Kasper has not been part of my plan. There's no way of seeing what variables 
Kasper is using, so looking at that just makes you feel bad if you're not doing as well.” 
Most likely, participants varied substantially in how much attention they gave to 
information on competitor’s performance and how they used it. However, it is a little surprising 
that Group 4, which observed superior competitor, did not explore more than other groups, 
especially because this group displayed the lowest level of satisfaction and had the lowest 
perceived self-efficacy at the end of the game (Table 19). If the satisfaction score in Group 1, 
which did not observe competitor’s performance, was 2.7, with 95% confidence interval (2.3, 
3.1), the satisfaction score in Group 4 was 1.9, with 95% confidence interval (1.5, 2.3) ─ a 
difference of 0.8 (p=005). Given that satisfaction was measured on a 5-point scale, a difference 
of 0.8 is pretty substantial. Self-efficacy in Group 1 was 5.5, with 95% confidence interval (4.6, 
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6.4), while in Group 4 it was 4.5, with 95% confidence interval (3.5, 5.5). The difference of 1 
point (p=0.07) is fairly large on a 10-point scale.  
Group 4, which observed superior competitor, did not explore more than Group 1, which 
did not observe competitor’s performance. Its decision making effectiveness and absolute 
performance score also did not differ. These results do not lend support to Propositions 6 and 7. 
However, Group 4 was half as likely to win the game as Group 1. Group 4 also appeared to have 
developed mental representations of lower quality on some dimensions, compared to Group 1 
(see Table 18). This provides some support to Propositions 6 and 7. However, if groups did not 
differ in the level of exploration, it is not immediately clear why we observed such outcomes. 
One possible explanation is that my measure of exploration is too limited and does not capture 
real exploration that participants actually engaged in. My measure of exploration only captures 
how many variables participants changed at a time. Other aspects could include exploration over 
rate of change, functional form, formulae, and others. For example, if participants change 3 
variables together, it could be because they try to guess randomly or it could be because they try 
to find a functional trick. For example, there were 1,086 decisions, in which participants entered 
the same value for the 3 variables; participants entered (1, 1, 1) 108 times and (99, 99, 99) 90 
times. In other words, participants may have explored the problem in ways other than just 
changing the number of variables they adjust at each attempt. This is very similar to the idea of 
searching among different representations (Holland et al, 1986; Nelson, 2008). One way to try to 
measure such cognitive exploration is to conduct a lab experiment using think-aloud protocols 
and then conduct text analysis of participant’s thoughts to capture how many different mental 
hypotheses participants have entertained.  
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Another finding is that Group 2, which observed inferior competitor, had the highest 
absolute performance score, decision making effectiveness, and heuristic knowledge, than other 
groups (Table 20). This is contrary to Propositions 6 and 7. The fact that the group that observed 
inferior competitor made more effective decisions and was better able to raise its performance 
score seems interesting in the light of my findings in Simulation Experiment #2, where I found 
that the group that observed inferior competitor performed the best when the goal was extremely 
challenging. It is plausible to think that the goal of the game was extremely challenging because 
it was the highest (optimal) possible score in the game, and only one of 1,000,000 combinations 
corresponded to that value.  
However, I would be hesitant to claim consistency between a computational model and a 
lab study for two reasons. First, Group 2 had substantially higher decision making effectiveness 
even in Round 1. Therefore, it is possible that Group 2 just happened to have participants who 
started the game with more accurate beliefs about the right strategy (i.e. changing only one 
variable at a time), received feedback that this strategy is indeed working, and continued using it. 
Second, even though Group 2 had higher absolute performance score and decision making 
effectiveness, this group was only half as likely to win the game and had lower knowledge of 
structure and problem awareness than Group 1, which did not observe competitor’s performance 
(Table 18). One possible way to reconcile this inconsistency across different metrics is to 
consider that the strategy that is effective for raising the absolute performance score may not be 
sufficient for winning the game. Changing one variable at a time is enough to get the score closer 
to 30,000, but actually hitting 30,000 in 20 attempts or less requires an understanding of the 
functional form that relates decision variables to the outcome variable. Table 21 provides 
estimates of differences across groups in the likelihood of correctly answering questions about 
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structural characteristics of the game (based on multiple-choice questions administered after 
Round 4), using logistic regressions. Group 2 was half as likely to correctly answer the question 
about the functional form (Model 1), as Group 1 (p=0.13). It was also half as likely to correctly 
answer the question about the interactions between variables (p=0.085) as Group 1 (Model 2). 
Group 2 was 73% less likely to correctly answer the question about a random component in the 
function (p=0.009), than Group 1 (Model 4). Provided below are two quotes from participants in 
Group 2:  
“I found a lot of things that didn't work. Finding wildly different variables getting the same result 
made me think that there was more randomness in the game than I originally thought.” (Note: 
The same outcome for two different values is a clue that an optimal lies in the middle between the 
two) 
“Honestly, I think this game is rigged. A variance from 0,0,1 =/= 50,50,51.  As in they are scaled 
or this is to monitor how performance failure affects our mood as we go through this.  Basically, 
actually using math is ineffective in finding the optimal value.” (Note: A different rate of change 
at different levels of value is a clue for a non-linear relationship) 
It seems that although participants in Group 2 changed one variable at a time, they did 
not necessarily make right inferences about the outcomes of their decisions. Curiously enough, 
because of their experience, participants often stuck with their original beliefs. The participant 
who made a comment above about the game being rigged after Round 2, continued to believe 
that the game was rigged after Round 6 as well.  
To further explore the idea that winning the game requires more than just changing one 
variable at a time, I estimated the following model: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(Pr(𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑗 = 1)) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑃𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑗 × 𝑃𝐴𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗,                                        (17) 
where wins and decision making effectiveness are only for Round 5 and 6, and problem 
awareness is measured after Round 429. Model 1 in Table 22 shows estimates of equation (17). In 
                                                          
29 Results are qualitatively similar if we replace problem awareness with knowledge accuracy or with knowledge of 
structure. 
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Model 2, I add control variables, such as demographic characteristics participants, goal 
orientation, favorable attitude toward math, and use of intuition, as well as indicator variables for 
groups and Round 6. There are a couple of notable effects of control variables. Self-efficacy 
increases the likelihood of winning. With every additional point on self-efficacy scale, 
participants are 25% more likely to win (p=0.134, two-tailed test). Participants who indicated 
favorable attitude to math classes in schools are 3.67 times more likely to win than participants 
who thought that math classes were just ok or did not like them at all (p=0.003, two-tailed test).  
To help interpret main effects of problem awareness and decision making on likelihood 
of winning in Rounds 5 and 6, I calculate predicted probabilities of winning at different levels of 
problem awareness and decision making effectiveness, using estimates from Model 1 (Table 23), 
and create a surface plot (Figure 20). The likelihood of winning increases with more effective 
decision making as well as more accurate understanding of the problem but the interaction 
between the two is the most interesting aspect. It appears that it is more important to have a 
better understanding of the game structure than just using a more effective strategy. For example, 
even if a participant’s decision making effectiveness is at 0.2 but her problem awareness is at 5 
(maximum value), the estimated probability of winning is 0.359. However, if a participant’s 
decision making effectiveness is at 1 (maximum value) but her understanding of the problem is 1 
(out of 5), the estimated probability of winning is only 0.175. As suggested before, I believe the 
main reason for higher importance of problem awareness for the likelihood of winning is that 
problem awareness captures understanding of multiple structural characteristics of the game, 
while decision making effectiveness captures only one of them – the fact that it is better to 
change only one variable at a time.  
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The question that I find most fascinating but most difficult to answer is to what extent 
experience with the game affected participants’ ability to develop an understanding about the 
problem structure and what solutions work to solve it, as opposed to initial beliefs that they held 
at the beginning of the game. Figure 21 shows distributions of problem awareness scores after 
Round 2. Graph on the left shows the distribution for 41 participants that had problem awareness 
scores of 4 or 5 after Round 6. Graph on the right shows the distribution for 93 participants who 
had the problem awareness score of 3 or less after Round 6. Although scores for 41 participants 
ranged between 0 and 5, the average problem awareness score for this group (that had high 
problem awareness score after Round 6) was 3.1 after Round 2. The average problem awareness 
score for the group that had low problem awareness score at the end of the game was only 1.2. 
So it seems that participants that had higher scores at the end of the game already had better 
understanding of the game just after two rounds. In other words they seem to have approached 
the game with the right assumptions or mental hypotheses. Provided below are quotes from 
participants: 
One participant after Round 2: “There does not seem to be any local optimum. That means we 
just need to figure out optimum of every single variable. So, starting from one variable and 
subdivide the space in a binary way. As we have only 99 options, within 4-6 trials we can find the 
optimum of a single variable. Then the next variable.” 
Another participant after Round 2: “This is an optimization problem and I believe the objective 
function is concave in all three parameters. There is a unique optimum.” 
The second participant after Round 6: “I didn't try any other approach. I believed there is a unique 
optimal because otherwise (in case there are local optima), there is no systematic way of 
searching for the optimal solution. The only way in that case would be to search randomly, which 
is meaningless for measuring one's analytical skills.” 
It is also informative to see how participants changed their understanding of the problem 
from Round 2 to Round 6. Out of 92 participants that had problem awareness score of 2 or lower 
after Round 2, 11 people had problem awareness score of 4 or higher at the end of the game. The 
rest (62 people out 92) continued to have a low problem awareness score. On the other hand, out 
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of 19 participants that had a problem awareness score of 4 or higher after Round 2, only 2 people 
decreased their problem awareness score after Round 6 (one person got a score of 2 and one 
person got a score of 3). Other 17 participants continued to have high problem awareness score 
at the end of the game. It seems that for majority of participants, their initial beliefs and mental 
hypotheses about the structure of the game mattered more than their experience during the game.  
A small number of participants (11 people) dramatically improved their understanding of 
the problem structure during the game. However, it is not immediately clear how their 
experience contributed to this improvement. In the discussion on the use of an exogenous goal as 
a constraint, I argued that strategies whose performance falls below the goal are judged useless, 
leading to increased search behavior. Given that these participants mostly failed (there was only 
one win by one person in Round 2), it is plausible to assume that a failure led these individuals to 
realize that their initial beliefs were wrong. However, 62 individuals that did not improve their 
understanding during the game also mostly failed in the first 2 rounds. All individuals were 
engaged in high level of exploration. However, in case of some individuals, exploration resulted 
in better knowledge, and in case of others, it did not. Clearly, there is heterogeneity in how well 
individuals extract knowledge from their experience30.  
To check whether an improvement in the problem awareness score is associated with any 
individual characteristics, I run an ordinary least squares regression model where a dependent 
variable is a difference in problem awareness score after Round 6 and after Round 2. Table 24 
provides estimates for this model. There are a couple of curious results. First, female participants 
                                                          
30 In a logistic regression, where a dependent variable equals 1 for a person who improved PA from less than 3 to 
more than 3, few individual characteristics differentiate the individuals who started out with low PA but improved 
substantially from those who started with low PA and did not improve. They include being an undergraduate 
student, taking several calculus classes, and learning goal orientation. It is plausible to assume that people who had a 
natural inclination and aptitude for math puzzles were more likely to improve their understanding even if they 
started with wrong assumptions.  
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improved their problem awareness by 0.5 more than male participants (p=0.03. two-tailed test). 
Second, participants that had favorable attitude to math improved their problem awareness by 
0.27 (p=0.244, two tailed test). Other individual characteristics did not have substantial effects. 
In addition, as discussed earlier, participants in Group 1 improved problem awareness much 
more than participants in Group 2, 3, and 4. Variables included in the model explain only 10% of 
variance in the improvement of problem awareness. Understanding what differentiated 
individuals that improved their understanding of the problem from those who did not warrants 
further research. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This dissertation is driven by a broad question of how to make better decisions in 
strategic problem situations where principles of perfect rationality do not hold and optimization 
is not feasible. Optimization requires complete knowledge of the problem structure, but in 
strategic situations that organizations face, the requirement of complete knowledge is almost 
never met. Actors make decisions based on mental representations of the problem, and I have set 
to explore how mental representations of the problem emerge and evolve. The objective is to 
study what affects a decision maker’s ability to acquire accurate beliefs from experience and 
achieve superior long-term performance.  
The main focus is on effects of using constraints – setting threshold values on variables 
of interest in order to learn about the problem in a more efficient manner. Findings from a 
computational model and a laboratory experiment suggest that constraints have non-trivial 
consequences on knowledge and performance. However, I have also found that our current 
understanding of acquisition of knowledge is not sufficient to explain some results of the lab 
study. I discuss implications of my findings for theory and practice. 
Results from simulation experiments #1 and #2 demonstrate that a significant 
heterogeneity in knowledge and performance arises even if we hold constant the structure of the 
problem and computational abilities of actors – the famous blades of Simon’s scissors (Simon, 
1990). Performance heterogeneity is driven by differences in the process of acquiring beliefs, 
where constraints influence an actor’s ability to acquire accurate beliefs. When constraints allow 
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actors to differentiate between superior and inferior strategies efficiently, actors develop accurate 
beliefs. However, if constraints are inappropriate for a given problem space, actors may acquire 
inaccurate beliefs. The implication of this result is that actors may fail at making better decisions, 
even if actors are deliberate about learning. Organizations may do many things right – provide 
incentives to properly motivate decision makers, conduct rigorous analysis prior to making 
decisions, perform a post-mortem of decisions and their outcomes to extract lessons. However, 
actors may still develop inaccurate beliefs because of the choices of constraints. I consider what 
happens when actors rely on an exogenous goal and competitor’s performance to set constraints.  
Goals are considered extremely important in organizations. Goals are critical for 
organizational change and drive search behavior (Cyert and March, 1963; Greve, 2003). The 
goal setting theory argues that challenging and specific goals improve performance (Locke and 
Latham, 1990). However, research also showed that extremely challenging goals may hurt 
performance due to actors’ decreased commitment to the goal and lack of exploration (Kanfer 
and Ackerman, 1989; Locke and Latham, 2002). In the simulation experiment #1, I find that 
accuracy of beliefs and performance declines when the goal is very challenging. However, the 
mechanism is not a decreased exploration. It is quite the opposite – actors explore more because 
they fail to achieve an impossible goal. An inappropriately high goal leads to incorrect inferences 
about the usefulness of the strategies that actors try.  
Results from a lab study provide further support for this mechanism. Participants have 
been presented with a very challenging goal – the baseline probability of winning the game is 
less than 0.1. In line with theoretical framework, participants in the study have engaged in high 
level of exploration and continued to explore at a high level throughout the game, especially if 
they failed to win at least one round. This exploration, however, has not necessarily led to better 
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understanding of the underlying structure of the problem. Most participants have started with low 
understanding of the problem and continued to have low understanding at the end of the game.  
Goals appear to shape mental representations by affecting inductions that actors make 
from their experience. This implies that although setting the right goal is important in general, it 
is especially critical when organizations face new strategic problems. Young firms that just begin 
to learn everything about business and established firms that venture into new markets, products, 
or technologies have to deal with the challenge of setting an appropriate performance objective. 
Succumbing to the usual pressure from investors to maximize returns may prove fatal for both 
firms’ ability to learn about new businesses or markets and achieve high performance in a long 
term. 
Competitor’s performance has long been critical to understanding learning from 
performance feedback through the concept of social aspirations (Cyert and March, 1963; Greve, 
2003). In this literature, competitor’s performance is theorized to influence search behavior in a 
similar way as historical aspirations would ─ organizations are more likely to engage in 
problemistic search if their performance is below the social aspiration level than if it is above the 
social aspiration level (Greve, 1998a). It is further assumed that organizations select their social 
comparison group (Haveman, 1993; Porac et al, 1995; Greve, 1998b). In previous research, it has 
been impossible to establish empirically whether competitor’s performance matters for firms 
when they try to establish a reference point, because firms also observe competitor’s actions. 
Here, I explicitly theorized the use of competitor’s performance in setting up a constraint and 
proposed that paying attention to superior competitor’s performance results in higher exploration 
than paying attention to inferior competitor’s performance. I further proposed that adding 
information on competitor’s performance to exogenous goals leads to increased exploration 
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when there is a superior competitor and decreased exploration when there is an inferior 
competitor. While results of the simulation experiment #2 generally support this proposition, 
results from the lab study do not. It is possible that for a competitor’s performance to matter, an 
actor needs to have some idea about strategies the competitor uses. It is also possible that 
exogenous goal is powerful enough on its own that it diverts actor’s attention from competitor’s 
performance. The second possibility is slightly undermined by the fact that in the lab study 
participants that observed superior competitor were less satisfied with their performance and 
their perceived self-efficacy was lower. Therefore, lack of competitor’s effect on exploration 
does not seem to be the result of lack of attention. This issue requires further theorizing and 
empirical testing.  
The lack of differences in exploration depending on competitor’s performance results in a 
theoretical puzzle to explain other results of the lab study. I found that participants that observed 
inferior competitor made better decisions and achieved higher scores in the game, yet they failed 
to develop better understanding of the game and had lower odds of winning the game than 
participants that did not observe competitor’s performance. Results of the simulation experiment 
#2 and the lab study do not allow me to draw unequivocal conclusions about the mechanisms 
behind the effects of competitor’s performance. The most plausible explanation is that individual 
differences in mental representations were much stronger in driving differences in performance 
than competitor’s performance. I elaborate on this point below.  
I have argued in my theoretical framework that knowledge of the problem structure plays 
a critical role in an actor’s ability to solve the problem. Knowledge is potentially more important 
than the structure of the problem or actor’s computational abilities. The structure could be 
simple, but actors may not know it. Computational abilities could be infinite, but actors may not 
113 
 
know what to compute. Results of the lab study acutely demonstrate the power of veridical 
knowledge of the problem structure. Participants in the lab experiment faced a well-structured 
problem and yet varied widely in both decision making effectiveness and performance. 
Heterogeneity in decision making and performance emerged in the first round and persisted 
through all six rounds. In the lab experiment, knowledge accuracy explained up to 20% of 
variance in winning the game. A correct understanding of one additional aspect of the problem 
structure may double or even triple the odds of winning. The results complement the very limited 
previous research that demonstrated association of accurate mental representations with better 
decisions and higher performance (Barr, Stimpert, and Huff, 1992; Gary and Wood, 2011).  
However, this study extends beyond previous research by tracking the evolution of 
mental representations. Results of the lab study show that majority of participants approached the 
problem with inaccurate assumptions about the problem structure. Most of them continued to 
have inaccurate beliefs after six rounds of the game. However, given the previous discussion on 
exploration, it was not for the lack of trying to find better solutions. This suggests that a simple 
model of reinforcement learning that lies at the foundation of organizational learning in the 
management literature (Levitt and March, 1988) and induction-based learning in cognitive 
science (Holland et al, 1986; Sutton and Barto, 1998) may be either insufficient or inappropriate 
to explain the dynamics of mental representations. To make accurate inferences about the 
problem structure, actors need to do more than just try out different strategies, observe their 
outcomes, and retain the ones that are judged useful for solving the problem. The simple model 
of reinforcement learning does not address two issues, which appear to have been critical in the 
lab study. First, the assumption in the theory is that actors have access to all available 
alternatives. However, it seems that participants in the lab study varied in what possibilities they 
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have considered. Therefore, in a real-world scenario, actors may never come across a strategy 
that is actually useful for solving the problem. It is therefore not surprising that many problems 
remain unsolved for long periods of time. For example, mathematicians could not find a solution 
to “Fermat's last theorem” for over 300 years. Second, the theory of reinforcement learning 
simply assumes that failed strategies are discarded and successful strategies are retained. 
However, in the lab study, participants varied in how they responded to feedback about success 
or failure of alternatives that they tried. Some have stuck with their beliefs despite failures. Few 
have improved their understanding of the problem despite not observing successes. These 
findings suggest that we need to give much more consideration to how experience actually 
affects acquisition of beliefs and decision making behavior.  
Focusing on emergence and dynamics of mental representations and emphasizing 
knowledge of structure as one of the main drivers suggests many directions for future research. 
More in-depth theorizing and empirical testing is needed to develop better understanding of 
effects of challenging goals on development of beliefs about the problem structure. It is 
especially important to explore boundary conditions of effects observed in both simulation 
experiments and the lab study. The computational model holds many factors constant, and it is 
important to understand how changing these factors will affect the outcomes. Future research can 
focus on studying how incentives, social context, and interdependency among strategic decisions 
change the effects of challenging goals on acquisition of knowledge. The limitation of this study 
is that an organization is assumed to be a unitary actor. However, in reality, organizations consist 
of many agents making many simultaneous decisions.  
Multiple issues with effects of competitor’s performance also need to be addressed. It 
appears that competitor’s performance is not just a reference point. The limitation of this study is 
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the treatment of a competitor as a faceless piece of information. In reality, it is never the case. It 
is possible that information on competitor’s performance only matters when competitor itself 
matters to the actor. In future research, factors such as presence of a competitor, competitor’s 
characteristics, and importance of competition for survival can be studied for their effects on 
using information on competitor’s performance as a constraint. 
Finally, in future research, we need to continue expanding our understanding of how 
individuals and organizations acquire beliefs from experience. If a simple model of 
reinforcement learning is not sufficient, do we need a more complex model or do we need a 
different model altogether? More studies with in-depth longitudinal analysis of mental 
representations are needed in order to understand how mental representations evolve based on 
experience. The limitation of this study is that it attempts to measure beliefs at discrete points in 
time. A more fluid, continuous approach, for example, using think-aloud protocols, is required. 
This study has also been limited to individual decision making. Understanding how evolution of 
mental representations is different when individuals are situated within organizational context is 
of paramount importance. Differences in network structures, social context, or organizational 
culture are just a handful of factors that could have an effect on how beliefs of individuals and 
organizations emerge from experience.  
It has long been acknowledged that decision makers in organizations are boundedly 
rational (Simon, 1955; 1956). However, the research in management has been slow in explicitly 
incorporating cognition in dynamic models of boundedly rational decision making. Despite many 
advances in understanding the dynamics of mental representations in cognitive science and in 
determining the critical importance of strategy for organizational performance in management 
research, this study demonstrates that there is still a long road ahead of us in developing a 
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comprehensive understanding of why some organizations are better at strategic problem solving 
than others and why some organizations have persistent performance advantages despite the fact 
that they have to operate in dynamic, uncertain, and complex environments.  
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Table 1. Comparing model results from simulation experiment #1 to propositions 
Proposition Model results 
Proposition 1: The effect of the goal level on accuracy 
of beliefs that the actor develops from experience is 
curvilinear. Accuracy of beliefs increases as the goal 
level increases but after a point it starts decreasing as 
the goal becomes more challenging. 
Supported. 
Proposition 2. The effect of the goal level on 
performance is curvilinear. Performance increases as 
the goal level increases but after a point it starts 
decreasing as the goal becomes more challenging. 
Supported. 
Proposition 3: Level of exploration increases linearly 
with the goal level. 
Supported overall – level of exploration increases as 
the goal level increases. However, the relationship has 
more of an S shape than a straight line. 
Proposition 4: The exogenous goal will be the most 
effective in guiding search and knowledge 
development when it is in the neighborhood of the 
solution with best true value. 
Not supported. The goal that helps isolate at least 2 
top performing strategies is more effective than a 
higher goal that only isolates the best strategy. When it 
becomes more difficult to distinguish between 
strategies, having an even lower goal that isolates a 
few top performing strategies is more beneficial, than 
the goal that isolates only one or two top performing 
strategies. 
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Table 2. Comparing model results from simulation experiment #2 to propositions 
Proposition Model results 
Proposition 5: Using performance of a superior 
competitor as a constraint results in higher level of 
exploration than using performance of an inferior 
competitor. 
Effects of using inferior or superior competitor are not 
tested directly. When competitor’s performance is 
combined with exogenous goal, the proposition is 
supported. The effect holds at different goal levels.  
Proposition 6: Using an exogenous goal as a constraint 
results in higher accuracy of beliefs than using a 
combination of an exogenous goal and competitor’s 
performance, regardless of the level of competitor’s 
performance. 
Only supported for a specific region of the problem 
space. Not supported at very low or very high goal 
levels.  
Proposition 7: Using an exogenous goal as a constraint 
results in higher performance than using a 
combination of an exogenous goal and competitor’s 
performance, regardless of the level of competitor’s 
performance.  
Only supported for a specific region of the problem 
space. Not supported at very low or very high goal 
levels. The effects are sensitive to changes in 
temperature. 
Proposition 8: Using an exogenous goal as a constraint 
results in higher exploration than using a combination 
of an exogenous goal and performance of inferior 
competitor and in lower exploration than using a 
combination of an exogenous goal and performance of 
inferior competitor.  
Only supported for a specific region of the problem 
space. At very low goal level, exploration using an 
exogenous goal as a constraint is not distinguishable 
from exploration using a combination of exogenous 
goal and inferior competitor, but both are lower than 
exploration using a combination of exogenous goal 
and superior competitor. At very high goal level, 
exploration using an exogenous goal as a constraint is 
not distinguishable from exploration using a 
combination of exogenous goal and superior 
competitor, but both are higher than exploration using 
a combination of exogenous goal and inferior 
competitor. 
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Table 3. Description and a sample realization of the game 
Prior to the game 
Description of rules A participant reads rules of the game 
Preset optimal value 
of “Y” 
The optimal value of Y is set at 30,000 and is known by the participant. 
b0=30,000 
Preset optimal 
values of decision 
variables 
The computer preselects a combination of optimal values, for example:  
a1=32; a2=52; a3=92 
These values are not known by the participant and are different for every game 
realization.  
Start game 
On the screen, the participant will see values of the three “X” variables and a 
corresponding value of “Y”, for example:  
(X1;X2;X3)=(44;69;11) and “Y”=23,006 
These values also differ for every realization of the game; however the starting value 
of “Y” is always the same. This is done to ensure the comparability across different 
realizations of the game. 
During the game 
Step 1 
The participant needs to make adjustments to the values of the three “X” variables. 
He/she can change as many variables, as he/she likes (only one, two, or all three). For 
example, he/she decides to make the following adjustment: 
(X1;X2;X3)=(50;50;50) 
The participant will receive a feedback that “Y”=27,908 
Step 2 
The participant will make another adjustment to the values of the three “X” variables, 
for example: 
(X1;X2;X3)=(50;50;75) 
He/she will receive a feedback that “Y”=29,383 
Step 3-20 
The participant will continue to adjust values of the three “X” variables and receive 
feedback at every step. 
If the participant finds a combination of the “X” variables that corresponds to 
Y=30,000, he/she wins the game and receives $10 as a reward. If the participant does 
not find combination of the optimal values, he/she loses and receives no money for a 
game.  
The participant receives a base payment of $10 for participating in the experiment. He/she has an opportunity 
to win $10 for each of the 6 rounds he/she plays. Therefore, the participant has an opportunity to win up to 
$70 during the experiment. 
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Table 4. Treatment conditions in experimental design 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
Does not observe 
performance of “another 
participant” 
Observes competitor’s performance 
Observes inferior 
performance of “another 
participant” 
Observes similar 
performance of “another 
participant” 
Observes superior 
performance of “another 
participant” 
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Table 5. Power analysis using pilot data 
Comparing Group 1 with… 
Mean 
difference 
Pooled standard 
deviation 
Standardized 
effect size 
Estimated number of 
people per group 
Knowledge accuracy after round 4 
Group 2 (inferior) -0.17 1.37 0.12 1,014 
Group 3 (similar) 0.25 0.97 0.26 238 
Group 4 (superior) -0.5 0.91 0.55 52 
Knowledge accuracy after round 6 
Group 2 (inferior) -0.17 0.89 0.19 428 
Group 3 (similar) 0.75 0.79 0.95 18 
Group 4 (superior) 0.5 1.07 0.47 72 
Decision making effectiveness in round 6 
Group 2 (inferior) 0.26 0.23 1.12 12 
Group 3 (similar) 0.42 0.27 1.57 6 
Group 4 (superior) 0.2 0.24 0.84 22 
Decision making effectiveness – growth coefficient 
Group 2 (inferior) 0.11 0.07 1.62 6 
Group 3 (similar) 0.11 0.04 2.75 2 
Group 4 (superior) 0.12 0.05 2.35 3 
Absolute performance score in round 6 
Group 2 (inferior) 325 309 1.05 14 
Group 3 (similar) 1,364 1,973 0.69 33 
Group 4 (superior) 664 857 0.77 26 
Absolute performance score – growth coefficient 
Group 2 (inferior)  202 116 1.73 5 
Group 3 (similar) 314 347 0.9 19 
Group 4 (superior) 257 147 1.75 5 
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Table 6. Descriptive statistics 
Variable 
No. of 
observations 
Mean S.D. Min Max 
            
Mental representations 
Problem awareness after round 2 140 1.84 1.41 0 5 
Problem awareness after round 4 137 2.20 1.56 0 5 
Problem awareness after round 6 134 2.49 1.68 0 5 
Knowledge accuracy after round 4 138 2.04 1.43 0 5 
Knowledge of structure after round 4 138 1.11 1.06 0 4 
Heuristic knowledge after round 4 139 0.93 0.66 0 2 
Knowledge of structure after round 6 136 2.10 1.35 0 6 
Knowledge of structure after round 6 136 1.19 1.03 0 4 
Heuristic knowledge after round 6 136 0.91 0.66 0 2 
            
Decision making behavior 
Decision making effectiveness in round 1 141 0.41 0.26 0 0.9 
Decision making effectiveness in round 2 141 0.51 0.29 0 1 
Decision making effectiveness in round 3 141 0.54 0.31 0 1 
Decision making effectiveness in round 4 141 0.54 0.31 0 1 
Decision making effectiveness in round 5 141 0.59 0.29 0 1 
Decision making effectiveness in round 6 141 0.56 0.28 0 1 
Exploration in round 1 141 2.87 0.48 1 4 
Exploration in round 2 141 2.77 0.55 1 4 
Exploration in round 3 141 2.62 0.61 1 4 
Exploration in round 4 141 2.61 0.58 1 4 
Exploration in round 5 141 2.57 0.61 1 4 
Exploration in round 6 141 2.67 0.58 1 4 
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Table 6 Continued 
Variable 
No. of 
observations 
Mean S.D. Min Max 
            
Performance 
Absolute performance score in round 1 141 29,218.5 1,140.6  23,386  30,000  
Absolute performance score in round 2 141 29,356.7  1,183.0  23,006  30,000  
Absolute performance score in round 3 141 29,312.9  1,296.6  23,332  30,000  
Absolute performance score in round 4 141 29,438.2  1,047.7  23,429  30,000  
Absolute performance score in round 5 141 29,520.9  985.8  24,520  30,000  
Absolute performance score in round 6 141 29,433.8  1,152.9  23,389  30,000  
Win in round 1 141 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Win in round 2 141 0.06 0.25 0 1 
Win in round 3 141 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Win in round 4 141 0.13 0.33 0 1 
Win in round 5 141 0.13 0.33 0 1 
Win in round 6 141 0.15 0.36 0 1 
            
Control variables 
Female 141 0.58 0.50 0 1 
Age 139 23.12 6.75 18 64 
Undergraduate 141 0.72 0.45 0 1 
Several calculus classes 141 0.42 0.50 0 1 
Favorable attitude towards math 141 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Learning goal orientation 139 4.12 0.66 2.4 5 
Performance goal orientation 140 3.11 0.91 1 5 
Avoid performance goal orientation 139 2.96 0.97 1 5 
Use of intuition 139 3.03 0.46 2 4.3 
Self-efficacy after round 2 132 5.08 2.28 0 9.5 
Self-efficacy after round 4 138 5.00 2.59 0 10 
Self-efficacy after round 6 132 5.44 2.72 0 10 
Self-satisfaction after the game 136 2.57 1.24 1 5 
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Table 7. Distribution of participants across number of wins in the game 
Number of wins Number of participants 
0 105 
1 17 
2 6 
3 6 
4 1 
5 4 
6 2 
Total 141 
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Table 8. Distribution of wins across groups 
Round 1 
Number of participants  
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4  
    None Inferior Similar Superior Total 
  0 32 36 39 30 137 
  1 2 0 1 2 5 
  Total 34 36 40 32 142 
Proportions  
   None Inferior Similar Superior Total 
  0 94% 100% 98% 94% 96% 
  1 6% 0% 3% 6% 4% 
χ2=2.7 (p=0.441) 
Fisher’s exact test: p=0.422 
 
Round 6  
Number of participants   
   None Inferior Similar Superior Total 
  0 30 31 31 28 120 
  1 4 5 9 3 21 
  Total 34 36 40 31 141 
Proportions  
   None Inferior Similar Superior Total 
  0 88% 86% 78% 90% 85% 
  1 12% 14% 23% 10% 15% 
χ2=2.78 (p=0.426) 
Fisher’s exact test: p=0.483 
 
All 6 rounds  
Number of participants  
   None Inferior Similar Superior Total 
  0 177 201 211 174 763 
  1 27 15 29 12 83 
  Total 204 216 240 188 846 
Proportions  
   None Inferior Similar Superior Total 
  0 87% 93% 88% 94% 90% 
  1 13% 7% 12% 6% 10% 
χ2=8.48 (p=0.037) 
Fisher’s exact test: p=0.037 
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Table 9. Estimating differences in likelihood of winning across treatment conditions 
  Model 1 Model 2 
  DV: win DV: win 
  Coef. S.E. P Coef. S.E. P 
Constant -1.95 0.29 0.000 -3.03 0.52 0.000 
Inferior competitor -0.64 0.47 0.170 -0.62 0.46 0.176 
Similar competitor -0.03 0.40 0.946 -0.02 0.40 0.960 
Superior competitor -0.69 0.50 0.163 -0.75 0.50 0.130 
              
Round fixed effects No Yes 
              
Number of observations 848 848 
Number of participants 142 142 
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Table 10. Estimating differences in absolute performance scores (APS) across groups 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  DV: APS DV: APS DV: APS 
  Coef. S.E. P Coef. S.E. P Coef. S.E. P 
Constant 29,295.40 124.50 0.000 29,153.26 143.86 0.000 29,038.22 222.46 0.000 
Inferior competitor 263.44 173.60 0.129 263.48 173.02 0.128 271.93 310.20 0.381 
Similar competitor -38.17 169.33 0.822 -38.05 168.77 0.822 146.35 302.57 0.629 
Superior competitor 36.50 179.48 0.839 37.89 178.88 0.832 235.31 319.74 0.462 
Round           73.51 52.77 0.164 
Inferior competitor*Round           -2.44 73.59 0.974 
Similar competitor*Round           -52.77 71.78 0.462 
Superior competitor*Round           -56.66 76.13 0.457 
                    
Round fixed effects No Yes NA 
                    
Number of observations 848 848 848 
Number of participants 142 142 142 
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Table 11. Estimating differences in decision making effectiveness (DME) across groups 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  DV: DME DV: DME DV: DME 
  Coef. S.E. P Coef. S.E. P Coef. S.E. P 
Constant 0.49 0.04 0.000 0.40 0.04 0.000 0.39 0.06 0.000 
Inferior competitor 0.08 0.05 0.122 0.08 0.05 0.119 0.10 0.08 0.205 
Similar competitor -0.03 0.05 0.623 -0.03 0.05 0.617 -0.01 0.08 0.864 
Superior competitor -0.01 0.05 0.841 -0.01 0.05 0.851 -0.05 0.08 0.544 
Round           0.03 0.01 0.015 
Inferior competitor*Round           -0.01 0.02 0.743 
Similar competitor*Round           0.00 0.02 0.838 
Superior competitor*Round           0.01 0.02 0.515 
                    
Round fixed effects No Yes NA 
                    
Number of observations 848 848 848 
Number of participants 142 142 142 
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Table 12. Estimating differences in knowledge accuracy (KA) across groups 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  DV: KA DV: KA DV: KA 
  Coef. S.E. P Coef. S.E. P Coef. S.E. P 
Constant 2.18 0.24 0.000 2.15 0.25 0.000 2.19 0.26 0.000 
Inferior competitor -0.15 0.31 0.633 -0.15 0.31 0.641 -0.25 0.34 0.471 
Similar competitor -0.03 0.31 0.927 -0.03 0.31 0.929 -0.03 0.35 0.930 
Superior competitor -0.30 0.33 0.359 -0.30 0.33 0.364 -0.35 0.37 0.336 
Round 6      0.06 0.10 0.530 -0.01 0.17 0.935 
Inferior competitor*Round 6           0.20 0.23 0.376 
Similar competitor*Round 6           0.00 0.26 0.988 
Superior competitor*Round 6           0.10 0.29 0.723 
                    
Number of observations 274 274 274 
Number of participants 141 141 141 
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Table 13. Estimating differences in knowledge of structure (KS) across groups 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  DV: KS DV: KS DV: KS 
  Coef. S.E. P Coef. S.E. P Coef. S.E. P 
Constant 1.27 0.17 0.000 1.23 0.18 0.000 1.31 0.18 0.000 
Inferior competitor -0.37 0.23 0.115 -0.36 0.23 0.119 -0.48 0.25 0.053 
Similar competitor 0.07 0.23 0.761 0.07 0.23 0.757 0.02 0.25 0.935 
Superior competitor -0.23 0.24 0.329 -0.23 0.24 0.337 -0.38 0.26 0.142 
Round 6      0.07 0.08 0.326 -0.08 0.14 0.569 
Inferior competitor*Round 6           0.24 0.19 0.222 
Similar competitor*Round 6           0.09 0.21 0.650 
Superior competitor*Round 6           0.31 0.22 0.158 
                    
Number of observations 274 274 274 
Number of participants 141 141 141 
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Table 14. Estimating differences in heuristic knowledge (HK) across groups 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  DV: HK DV: HK DV: HK 
  Coef. S.E. P Coef. S.E. P Coef. S.E. P 
Constant 0.91 0.10 0.000 0.92 0.11 0.000 0.88 0.11 0.000 
Inferior competitor 0.22 0.14 0.132 0.22 0.14 0.133 0.23 0.16 0.150 
Similar competitor -0.10 0.13 0.448 -0.10 0.13 0.447 -0.05 0.15 0.723 
Superior competitor -0.07 0.14 0.605 -0.07 0.14 0.601 0.03 0.16 0.871 
Round 6      -0.01 0.05 0.798 0.06 0.11 0.546 
Inferior competitor*Round 6           -0.03 0.15 0.847 
Similar competitor*Round 6           -0.09 0.15 0.547 
Superior competitor*Round 6           -0.21 0.16 0.195 
                    
Number of observations 275 275 275 
Number of participants 141 141 141 
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Table 15. Estimating differences in problem awareness (PA) across groups treating round as a continuous variable 
  Model 1 Model 2 
  DV: PA DV: PA 
  Coef. S.E. P Coef. S.E. P 
Constant 1.27 0.32 0.000 1.33 0.32 0.000 
Inferior competitor 0.40 0.44 0.355 0.32 0.43 0.448 
Similar competitor 0.22 0.41 0.589 0.19 0.41 0.646 
Superior competitor 0.33 0.43 0.439 0.34 0.43 0.431 
Round 0.26 0.05 0.000 0.26 0.06 0.000 
Inferior competitor*Round -0.15 0.08 0.063 -0.15 0.08 0.061 
Similar competitor*Round -0.10 0.07 0.149 -0.10 0.07 0.149 
Superior competitor*Round -0.12 0.08 0.154 -0.13 0.09 0.142 
              
AR1 correlation structure No Yes 
              
Number of observations 411 405 
Number of participants 140 137 
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Table 16. Estimating differences in problem awareness (PA) across groups treating round as a 
categorical variable. 
        
  DV: PA 
  Coef. S.E. P 
Constant 1.79 0.28 0.000 
Inferior competitor 0.07 0.36 0.851 
Similar competitor 0.05 0.36 0.885 
Superior competitor 0.08 0.35 0.828 
Round 4 0.49 0.19 0.010 
Round 6 1.03 0.22 0.000 
Inferior competitor*Round 4 -0.16 0.23 0.480 
Similar competitor*Round 4 -0.26 0.24 0.269 
Superior competitor*Round 4 -0.19 0.26 0.458 
Inferior competitor*Round 6 -0.59 0.32 0.063 
Similar competitor*Round 6 -0.38 0.27 0.150 
Superior competitor*Round 6 -0.48 0.33 0.153 
       
Number of observations 411 
Number of participants 140 
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Table 17. Estimating differences in exploration (EXPL) between groups 
  Model 1 Model 2 
  DV: EXPL DV: EXPL 
  Coef. S.E. P Coef. S.E. P 
Constant 2.70 0.05 0.000 2.87 0.06 0.000 
Inferior competitor -0.01 0.07 0.897 -0.01 0.07 0.891 
Similar competitor -0.02 0.07 0.809 -0.02 0.07 0.806 
Superior competitor 0.01 0.07 0.873 0.01 0.07 0.888 
              
Round fixed effects No Yes 
              
Number of observations 848 848 
Number of participants 142 142 
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Table 18. Comparing results of an experimental study to propositions 
Proposition Prediction Lab study results 
Proposition 5: Using 
performance of a 
superior competitor as a 
constraint results in 
higher level of 
exploration than using 
performance of an 
inferior competitor. 
EXPLa(Group 2)<EXPL(Group 4) No significant difference (p>0.4). 
Proposition 6: Using an 
exogenous goal as a 
constraint results in 
higher accuracy of 
beliefs than using a 
combination of an 
exogenous goal and 
competitor’s 
performance, regardless 
of the level of 
competitor’s 
performance. 
KAb(Group 1)>KA(Group 2) No significant difference (p>0.2). 
KA(Group 1)>KA(Group 4) No significant difference (p>0.2). 
KSc(Group 1)>KS(Group 2) 
After round 4, knowledge of structure in the 
group that did not observe competitor’s 
performance is higher by half a point (on a 4-
point scale) than knowledge of structure in the 
group that observed inferior competitor 
(p=0.003). 
After round 6, the difference is only quarter of 
a point (p=0.17). 
KS(Group 1)>KS(Group 4) 
After round 4, knowledge of structure in the 
group that did not observe competitor’s 
performance is higher by 0.4 (on a 4-point 
scale) than knowledge of structure in the 
group that observed superior competitor 
(p=0.07). 
After round 6, no significant difference 
(p>0.3). 
HKd(Group 1)>HK(Group 2) 
The effect is reversed. After Round 4, 
heuristic knowledge in the group that 
observed inferior competitor is 0.23 (on a 2-
point scale) higher than heuristic knowledge 
in the group that did not observe competitor’s 
performance (p=0.08). 
After Round 6, the difference is 0.21 (p=0.1). 
HK(Group 1)>HK(Group 4) 
After Round 4, no significant differences 
(p>0.2). 
After Round 6, heuristic knowledge in the 
group that did not observe competitor’s 
performance is higher by 0.18 (on a 2-point 
scale) than heuristic knowledge in the group 
that observed superior competitor (p=0.14). 
PAe(Group 1)>PA(Group 2) 
After Rounds 2 and 4, no significant 
differences (p>0.2). 
After Round 6, problem awareness in the 
group that did not observe competitor’s 
performance is 0.52 (on a 5 point scale) 
higher than problem awareness in the group 
that observed inferior competitor (p=0.11). 
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Table 18 Continued 
Proposition Prediction Lab study results 
Proposition 6: Using an 
exogenous goal as a 
constraint results in 
higher accuracy of 
beliefs than using a 
combination of an 
exogenous goal and 
competitor’s 
performance, regardless 
of the level of 
competitor’s 
performance. 
PA(Group 1)>PA(Group 4) 
After Rounds 2 and 4, no significant 
differences (p>0.2). 
After Round 6, problem awareness in the 
group that did not observe competitor’s 
performance is 0.4 (on a 5-point scale) higher 
than problem awareness in the group that 
observed superior competitor (p=0.18). 
DMEf(Group 1)>DME(Group 2) 
The effect is reversed. Decision making 
effectiveness in the group that observed 
inferior competitor is 0.08 (equivalent to 1 – 2 
attempts) higher than decision making 
effectiveness in the group that did not 
observed competitor’s performance (p=0.06).  
DME(Group 1)>DME(Group 4) No significant difference (p>0.3). 
Proposition 7: Using an 
exogenous goal as a 
constraint results in 
higher performance than 
using a combination of 
an exogenous goal and 
competitor’s 
performance, regardless 
of the level of 
competitor’s 
performance.  
P(Win(Group1))>P((Win(Group2)) 
The odds of winning in the group that did not 
observe competitor’s performance are twice 
the odds of winning in the group that 
observed inferior competitor (p=0.09). 
P(Win(Group1))>P((Win(Group4)) 
The odds of winning in the group that did not 
observe competitor’s performance are twice 
the odds of winning in the group that 
observed superior competitor (p=0.08). 
APSg(Group 1)>APS(Group 2) 
The effect is reversed. Absolute performance 
score in the group that observed inferior 
competitor is 263 points higher than absolute 
performance score in the group that did not 
observed competitor’s performance (p=0.06). 
APS(Group 1)>APS(Group 4) No significant difference (p>0.4). 
Proposition 8: Using an 
exogenous goal as a 
constraint results in 
higher exploration than 
using a combination of 
an exogenous goal and 
performance of inferior 
competitor and in lower 
exploration than using a 
combination of an 
exogenous goal and 
performance of inferior 
competitor.  
EXPL(Group 1)>EXPL(Group 2) No significant difference (p>0.4). 
EXPL(Group 1)<EXPL(Group 4) No significant difference (p>0.4). 
Note: a EXPL– exploration; b KA – knowledge accuracy; c KS – knowledge of structure; d HK – heuristic 
knowledge; e PA – problem awareness; f DME – decision making effectiveness; g APS – absolute performance score. 
All reported probabilities are for one-tailed tests. 
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Table 19. Estimating differences in satisfaction and self-efficacy at the end of the game between 
groups 
  Model 1 Model 2 
  DV: Satisfaction DV: Self-efficacy 
  Coef. S.E. P Coef. S.E. P 
Constant 2.71 0.21 0.000 5.49 0.46 0.000 
Inferior competitor -0.04 0.29 0.894 0.05 0.67 0.938 
Similar competitor 0.14 0.28 0.608 0.56 0.64 0.383 
Superior competitor -0.81 0.30 0.009 -1.01 0.68 0.140 
              
Number of participants 136 137 
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Table 20. Estimating differences in performance (APS), decision making effectiveness (DME), 
and heuristic knowledge (HK) across groups with Group 2 being the omitted category 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  DV: APS DV: DME DV: HK 
  Coef. S.E. P Coef. S.E. P Coef. S.E. P 
Constant 29,558.84 77.71 0.000 0.57 0.04 0.000 1.13 0.10 0.000 
No competitor -263.44 183.37 0.151 -0.08 0.05 0.139 -0.22 0.14 0.132 
Similar competitor -301.61 170.08 0.076 -0.11 0.05 0.039 -0.32 0.13 0.014 
Superior competitor -226.94 148.44 0.126 -0.09 0.05 0.075 -0.29 0.14 0.041 
                    
Number of 
observations 848 848 275 
Number of 
participants 142 142 141 
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Table 21. Estimating differences in the likelihood of correctly answering questions about the problem structure after Round 4 across 
groups 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  
DV: functional form 
DV: interactions between 
variables 
DV: variable weights DV: random component 
  Coef. S.E. P Coef. S.E. P Coef. S.E. P Coef. S.E. P 
Constant -0.94 0.39 0.017 -0.13 0.35 0.724 -1.95 0.53 0.000 -0.13 0.35 0.724 
Inferior competitor -0.67 0.60 0.260 -0.70 0.51 0.169 0.34 0.70 0.629 -1.30 0.55 0.018 
Similar competitor 0.32 0.51 0.535 -0.18 0.48 0.711 0.59 0.67 0.374 -0.39 0.48 0.423 
Superior competitor -0.12 0.57 0.836 -0.77 0.53 0.148 -1.46 1.15 0.205 -0.47 0.52 0.360 
                          
Number of participants 139 139 138 139 
 
 
  
 140 
 
Table 22. Modeling wins in Round 5 and Round 6 as a function of decision making effectiveness 
and problem awareness 
  Model 1 Model 2 
  DV: win DV: win 
  Coef. S.E. P Coef. S.E. P 
Constant -8.07 1.72 0.000 -7.43 2.84 0.009 
Decision making effectiveness 6.14 2.21 0.006 5.91 2.31 0.010 
Problem awareness 1.47 0.57 0.010 1.11 0.52 0.032 
Decision making effectiveness × problem 
awareness -1.09 0.74 0.143 -0.83 0.71 0.242 
Self-efficacy       0.22 0.15 0.134 
Female       -0.68 0.54 0.211 
Undergraduate       0.46 0.60 0.445 
Several calculus classes       -0.01 0.58 0.981 
Favorable attitude toward math       1.30 0.61 0.033 
Learning goal orientation       0.14 0.40 0.716 
Performance goal orientation       -0.25 0.27 0.358 
Use of intuition       -0.74 0.58 0.204 
Inferior competitor       0.64 0.61 0.294 
Similar competitor       -0.17 0.72 0.818 
Superior competitor       -0.72 0.63 0.252 
Round 6       0.42 0.39 0.276 
              
Number of observations 274 266 
Number of participants 137 133 
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Table 23. Predicted probabilities of winning in Rounds 5 and 6 at different levels of decision 
making effectiveness and problem awareness 
  
Decision making effectiveness 
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 
Problem 
awareness 
0 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.012 0.041 0.126 
1 0.001 0.004 0.010 0.027 0.072 0.175 
2 0.006 0.013 0.028 0.060 0.123 0.237 
3 0.025 0.044 0.075 0.126 0.204 0.314 
4 0.101 0.138 0.186 0.247 0.319 0.402 
5 0.327 0.359 0.392 0.426 0.461 0.497 
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Table 24. Change in problem awareness from Round 2 to Round 6 as a function of individual 
characteristics and treatment conditions 
  Model 1 
  
DV: change in problem 
awareness 
  Coef. S.E. P 
Constant 0.66 1.04 0.526 
Female 0.50 0.23 0.030 
Undergraduate -0.01 0.25 0.966 
Several calculus classes -0.12 0.23 0.606 
Favorable attitude to math 0.27 0.23 0.244 
Learning goal orientation 0.16 0.17 0.349 
Performance goal orientation -0.09 0.12 0.475 
Intuitive decision making -0.11 0.25 0.662 
Inferior competitor -0.65 0.31 0.041 
Similar competitor -0.47 0.31 0.135 
Superior competitor -0.53 0.33 0.114 
        
R2 0.1 
Number of participants 131 
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Figure 1. Using an exogenous goal as a constraint 
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Figure 2. Using competitor’s performance as a constraint 
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Figure 3. Belief accuracy (left axis) and cumulative payoff (right axis) as a function of the goal 
level (N=8; PS = (4,6); τ=0.25) 
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Figure 4. Standard deviations for belief accuracy (left axis) and cumulative payoff (right axis) 
across goal levels (N=8; PS = (4,6); τ=0.25) 
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Figure 5. Cumulative payoff distributions at goal levels P*=5.25 (left) and P*=5.75 (right). (N=8; 
PS = (4,6); τ=0.25) 
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Figure 6. Number of tried strategies (left axis) and cumulative payoff (right axis) across goal 
levels (N=8; PS = (4,6); τ=0.25) 
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Figure 7. Number of tried strategies (left axis) and belief accuracy (right axis) across goal levels 
(N=8; PS = (4,6); τ=0.25) 
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Figure 8. Cumulative payoff across goal levels – comparing effects of exogenous goals to 
combinations of exogenous goals and competitor’s performance (N=8; PS = (4,6); τ=0.25) 
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Figure 9. Belief accuracy across goal levels – comparing effects of exogenous goals to 
combinations of exogenous goals and competitor’s performance (N=8; PS = (4,6); τ=0.25) 
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Figure 10. Proportion of trials in which payoffs from using only exogenous goals are higher than 
payoffs from using a combination of exogenous goal and competitor’s performance (N=8; PS = 
(4,6); τ=0.25) 
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Figure 11. Number of tried strategies – comparing effects of exogenous goals to a combination of exogenous goal and competitor’s 
performance (N=8; PS = (4,6); τ=0.25). Graph on the left compares scenarios at P*=4.0, graph in the middle compares scenarios at 
P*=5.5, and graph on the right compares scenarios at P*=6.5 
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Figure 12. Cumulative payoff across goal levels – comparing effects of exogenous goals to a 
combination of exogenous goals and competitor’s performance (N=8; PS = (4,6); τ=2.0) 
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Figure 13. Proportion of trials in which payoffs from using only exogenous goals are higher than 
payoffs from using a combination of exogenous goal and competitor’s performance (N=8; PS = 
(4,6); τ=2.0) 
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Figure 14. Average absolute performance score across 6 rounds for all groups 
 
 
  
 157 
 
Figure 15. Average decision making effectiveness across 6 rounds for all groups 
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Figure 16. Average knowledge accuracy for all groups at Round 4 and Round 6 
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Figure 17. Average knowledge of structure (graph on the left) and average heuristic knowledge 
(graph on the right) for all groups at Round 4 and Round 6 
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Figure 18. Average problem awareness for all groups at Round 2, Round 4, and Round 6 
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Figure 19. Average exploration across rounds for all groups 
 
 
  
 162 
 
Figure 20. Predicted probabilities of winning in Rounds 5 and 6 as a function of decision making 
effectiveness and problem awareness 
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Figure 21. Distributions of problem awareness scores after Round 2 for participants that had high 
problem awareness scores after Round 6 (on the left) and for participants that had low problem 
awareness scores after Round 6 (on the right) 
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